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CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary constitutional theory rests on the mistaken assump-
tion that judicial decisionmaking is a unitary activity.1 This mistaken
assumption is usefully called "the fallacy of unitary adjudication," or
to coin a phrase, "the unitaristic fallacy" for short. Constitutional con-
ventionalists, pragmatists and coherence theorists are all committed to
this mistaken assumption, inevitably resulting in a serious failure to
understand the nature of constitutional change.2 The result of this
failure is catastrophic. If we cannot recognize constitutional change,
we cannot identify the current state of constitutional law. Conse-
quently, we cannot know what the law is in a given case.
Constitutional conventionalists commit the unitaristic fallacy by
insisting that judicial decisions are based solely upon explicit legal
conventions about which there is a consensus in the constitutional
community.3 Such theorists usually point to some well-accepted con-
vention as the basis for constitutional interpretation. The convention-
alist believes that since everyone agrees that the text,4 the framers'
1. Constitutional jurisprudence is not alone in assuming the unitary or singular na-
ture of adjudication. The common law, especially tort theory and contract theory,
is committed to the same erroneous assumption. The obvious consequence of this
mistaken assumption is the erroneous conclusion that legal methodology is simi-
larly unitary.
2. One presupposition of this enterprise is that constitutional jurisprudence and
legal philosophy generally must take legal change more seriously. Constitutional
practice is not a fixed system. Rather, it is designed to change and evolve. See J.
DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 61 (1920)(describing change as the mea-
sure of reality). See also A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 177
(1982) (arguing that constitutional law is paradoxically another name for constitu-
tional change).
3. Textualism and originalism are examples of constitutional conventionalism. See
infra notes 4-5. Conventionalism is an interpretive version of legal positivism,
i.e., it is a positivist conception of legal practice designed to show that practice in
its best light. Positivism is a legal theory that attempts to discover necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of a legal system. Typically, contemporary
positivists explain law as a system of rules. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW (1955); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1946). A standard
feature of positivism is the separation of law and morality. See J. AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 184 (1954)(arguing that "[t]he exist-
ence of a law is one thing;, its merit or demerit is another").
Conventionalism maintains "that collective force should be trained against in-
dividuals only when some past political decision has licensed this explicitly in
such a way that competent lawyers and judges will all agree about what that
decision was, no matter how much they disagree about morality and politics." R.
DwoRItN, LAW's EMPIRE 144 (1986). In this view, "legal practice, properly under-
stood, is a matter of respecting and enforcing [legal] conventions." Id. at 115.
Legal conventions are the agreed-upon sources of law such as statutory and judi-
cial authority. In novel cases, in which there are no conventions, judges must use
their discretion to make law. Id.
4. Textualism and intentionalism or originalism dominate contemporary discussions
of constitutional conventionalism. Textualism holds that constitutional meaning
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:701
intent,5 the history, structure and logic6 of the Constitution are rele-
is determined by the words of the constitutional text. Sturges v. Crowningshield,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 70, 106 (1819)("[A]lthough the spirit of an instrument, espe-
dally of a constitution, is to be respected not less than its letter, yet the spirit is to
be collected chiefly from its words."). In distinguishing between textualism and
originalism, I depart from custom. Ordinarily, the term originalism, or interpre-
tivism, includes textualism and intentionalism. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980). I depart from cus-
tom because textualism presents a model of ascertaining a text's meaning that is
appealing because it appears automatic. To know what a text means, just read it.
Consequently, to understand the Constitution, or to determine whether a statute
is constitutional, just read the statute and compare it with the Constitution. Con-
sider, for example, the following:
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land ordained and estab-
lished by the people. All legislation must conform to the principles it
lays down. When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the
courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial
branch of the Government has only one duty,--to lay the article of the
Constitution which is involved beside the statute which is challenged
and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. All the court
does, or can do, is to announce its considered judgment upon the ques-
tion. Its delicate and difficult office is to ascertain and declare whether
the legislation is in accordance with, or in contravention of, the provi-
sions of the Constitution; and having done that, its duty ends.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
This method, if viable, provides an apparently mechanical and neutral way to
determine meaning. Textualism, however, cannot explain the meaning of open-
textured or indeterminate provisions. In that event, we then have the following
choice. Where the text fails to determine a constitutional choice, we may either
remain silent or seek a supplemental method for determining constitutional
meaning. See Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional
Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (1985)(evaluating recent attempts to formulate a
textualist model).
5. Originalism or intentionalism contends that when the text is insufficient to sup-
ply constitutional meaning, the only other legitimate avenue is to interpret the
recalcitrant clauses according to the framers' original understanding of the Con-
stitution. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Originalism is an interpretive methodology in Dworkin's sense
of the term. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 3. In this sense it has more in common
with other interpretive methodologies, such as non-originalism, than it does with
textualism. On the other hand, originalism also seeks a relatively neutral mecha-
nism for understanding the Constitution. In this regard, it is closer to textualism
than it is to non-originalism. Theoretically, textualism and originalism can be
viewed as one theory which states that the framers' intentions control constitu-
tional meaning. Textualism then states that the text provides conclusive evi-
dence of the framers' intentions. Originalism states that evidence of their
intentions can be determined from extra-textual sources. In this regard, textual-
ism and originalism are inextricably interwoven. See Schauer, An Essay on Con-
stitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797, 831 n.159 (1982). See also R. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)
(weaving together textualist, structuralist and intentionalist threads to create a
novel brand or originalism).
6. History is relevant to constitutional interpretation by revealing the objective
forces at work in creating the Constitution. Structuralism insists that the formal
structure of the Constitution, and the government it creates, determines the
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vant to interpretation, these conventions should exhaust constitu-
tional methodology.7 An underlying presupposition of this view is
that constitutional interpretation should be objective and not depend
upon the particular moral or political convictions of particular judges.8
Appealing to explicit constitutional conventions in judicial interpreta-
tion is designed to achieve objectivity.
Traditional constitutional pragmatists commit the unitaristic fal-
lacy by exhorting judges to always make the best moral or political
decision he or she can in a given case. 9 Consequently, the pragmatist's
meaning of constitutional provisions. For example, this structure includes the
concepts of the separation of powers and federalism. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1969). Structuralism contends that con-
stitutional meaning and the resolution of constitutional questions derive from
"inferences from the existence of constitutional structures and the relationships
which the Constitution ordains among these structures .... Structural arguments
... depend on deceptively simple logical moves from the entire Constitutional
text rather than one of its parts." P. BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 74 (1982).
We should distinguish structuralism from a view that permits inferring implicit
rights from the logic of particular constitutional provisions. For example, the
right to listen to a speech is implied by the structure of the first amendment.
Easterbrook, Implicit and Explicit Rights of Association, 10 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y. 91, 100 (1987). Here, the implicit right is derived from the "logic" of the
first amendment. Appeals to "logic" are conventionalist strategies.
7. There are at least two additional forms of constitutional adjudication exhibiting
some conventionalist features: passivism and essentialism. Constitutional passiv-
ism recognizes the necessity of limited judicial interference with the democratic
processes of government. To restrict constitutional adjudication, passivism pro-
poses restrictions on the circumstances under which the Court can hear a case.
See A. BCIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SuPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS (1962)(describing the general motive for passivism).
Essentialism is my term for theories that derive constitutional meaning from
particular conceptions of the essential nature of the Constitution. For example,
Professor Ely contends that political participation is the essential component of
the Constitution. Hence, the Supreme Court is justified in intervening in the
political process when, and only when, judicial review will strengthen political
participation. See J. ELY, DEmOcRAcY AND DImTRusT (1967). See also R. DwOR-
KIN, supra note 3.
8. For example, advocates of judicial restraint and positivists regard the concept of
legislative intent as a legitimate convention "because [it] appear[s] to provide an
empirical, historical, and legal answer that does not depend upon moral judg-
ments." Kress, The Interpretive Turn, 97 ETHICs 834, 846 (1987).
9. Constitutional pragmatism contends that the point of judicial decisions is to solve
contemporary problems in terms of the best conception of our constitutional de-
mocracy. Consequently, a constitutional pragmatist will endorse a strong princi-
ple requiring affirmative action even if she concedes that such a principle cannot
be discovered by using ordinary constitutional conventions. Mlichelman's conten-
tion that welfare rights should be constitutionally guaranteed or Karst's proposal
to view constitutional law in terms of certain feminist theories are examples of
constitutional pragmatism. Mlichelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional De-
mocracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659; Karst, Women's Constitution, 1984 DuKE L.J.
447. Often traditional pragmatism involves the balancing of competing values in
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vision does not include consistency with the past for its own sake.1O A
concern for the past should be honored if it leads to the best future; if
not, it should be abandoned.
The unitaristic fallacy is evident in the coherence theorist's conten-
tion that correct judicial decisions can always be explained in terms of
moral or political principles inherent in constitutional practice.'" Ac-
cording to this view, a judge's duty is to ferret out these principles
from prior cases, statutes, constitutions and administrative rules, for-
mulate them clearly and apply them to the present case. Coherence
theorists believe that the sine qua non of constitutional law is its con-
sistency, reflection and extension of the past's essential vision.
Each jurisprudential theory offers its preferred model as the sole
basis of judicial decisions.12 This Article's thesis is that no unitary
model can adequately explain' 3 and justify constitutional practice.14
order to bring about the society's best future. See infra notes 49-71 and accompa-
nying text.
Some forms of non-originalism have a pragmatic dimension. Non-originalism
maintains that constitutional meaning may be derived from a contemporary un-
derstanding of the provisions involved. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1, 2 (1984)(arguing that there are supplemental sources of constitu-
tional law). See also M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE CouRTS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1982)(modern constitutional decisions are a species of policymaking
made without reference to any value judgment constitutionalized by the
framers).
10. But see Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331,
1344 (1988)(arguing that pragmatism holds that consistency with the past is "a
necessary ingredient in all human reasoning").
11. To date, Ronald Dworkin's law as integrity is the most influential and carefully
argued coherence theory. In some places, Lawrence Tribe exhibits a sympathy
for coherence theories. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIoNAL LAW 1421-35 (2d ed.
1987). For other discussions of coherence theory see Fallon, A Constructivist The-
ory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189 (1987). See also
Chang, Conflic Coherence and Constitutional Intent, 72 IOwA L. REv. 753 (1987);
Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis, Retro-
actively, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 CALF. L. REv. 369 (1984)(criticiz-
ing Dworkin's coherence theory).
12. Some scholars might insist that conventionalism, pragmatism and coherence are
theories of "hard cases," not general jurisprudential theories at all. Conse-
quently, as theories of "hard cases," these theories recognize the dualistic charac-
ter of constitutional adjudication. Even so, such "dualist" theories merely pay lip
service to the different types of constitutional adjudication without showing how
these different types are structurally interrelated.
13. The point here is that traditional unitary theories of constitutional adjudication
fail to explain actual practice. Unitary theories either take the explanatory di-
mension of constitutional theory too seriously, or not seriously enough. Conse-
quently, a conventional unitary theory insists that judges should stick close to the
actual decisions in a series of cases. Pragmatist theories permit judges to ignore
the actual decisions. Conventionalist theories, therefore, cannot explain the
pragmatic choices that result in radical constitutional change, while pragmatic
theories cannot explain slower, more organic change.
14. Describing constitutional adjudication as unitary does not suggest that it is monis-
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Instead, conventionalism, pragmatism and coherence each reflect dif-
ferent movements in the unified structure of constitutional adjudica-
tion. A candid, unbiased look at the way constitutional adjudication
actually operates15 reveals a jurisprudential theory that integrates
these models, revealing each model's appropriate place in the constitu-
tional landscape.' 6 Such candor 17 enables us to formulate a dualistic
theoryls of constitutional adjudication, recognizing two conceptually
tic. A unitary theory says that whenever a judge decides a case he uses the same
process. A judge uses this process whether it involves one or several factors, such
as, text, intent, theory, precedent or moral and political values. Hence, a unitary
theory might include a pluralistic model for deciding cases. The theory presented
in this Article is dualistic, describing two different, but interrelated, periods of
constitutional adjudication. Lipkin, Conventionalism, Pragmatism and Constitu-
tional Revolutions, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645, 729-57 (1988). Cf. L. TRIBE, supra
note 11, at 1-2 (describing seven basic models of constitutional adjudication). The
dualism I have in mind applies to each of Tribe's models.
15. A candid, unbiased look at constitutional adjudication requires taking the history
of constitutional adjudication seriously. Taking this history seriously reveals that
"[o]ur judges have, as a matter of unarguable historical fact, developed a body of
unwritten constitutional law-doctrine whose normative content cannot be de-
rived from examining the language of the Constitution or investigating the intent
of its framers." Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution" Fundamental Law
in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 844 (1978). Further-
more, it requires that we study the Constitution or constitutionalism as it actually
operates, not as a particular ideology would have it operate. See A. MILLER, POLI-
Tics, DEMOCRACY, Am THE SUPREME COURT 345 (1985). Taking history seriously
in constitutional theory simply involves a commitment to describe constitutional
adjudication as we describe other social practices. A corollary to this commit-
ment is the view that such descriptions can reveal novel constitutional theories,
capable of revising and refining our understanding of constitutional practice. See
also Komesar, A Job for Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive
and Complex Society, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 657 (1988)(describing institutional analysis
to determine the proper role for judges in our constitutional scheme).
16. On the view presented here, there are important structural interdependencies
between and among the different types of adjudication. Consequently, the dualist
theory offered here is not a mere amalgam of the different types of jurispruden-
tial models. Instead, it integrates and describes the relationship among the differ-
ent models. In short, this theory explains how each model affects and is affected
by the other models, and how this interaction accounts for constitutional change.
17. Although my enterprise includes a normative component, I first want to deter-
mine just how constitutional adjudication actually works. My hunch is that we
will abandon a unitary model of constitutional adjudication once we candidly look
at actual constitutional practice. Cf. TenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme
Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 27 CALiF. L. REV. 399, 410
(1939)(arguing that "[w]e must conclude that any theory which... denies the
proper influence of the altering factual world upon the meaning of the document
* is an utterly false portrayal of what the Supreme Court actually does").
18. Some writers have detected the non-unitary complexity of constitutional evolu-
tion. Ackerman, for instance, contends that there are two forms of politics:
higher and normal. Normal politics for Ackerman is the familiar clash of self-
interested parties and probably depicts legislative activity more than judicial ac-
tivity. Higher politics involves discovering the politics of the common good and
1989]
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distinct, though related, movements:19 revolutionary adjudication 20
and normal adjudication.2 1 The name of this dualistic theory of consti-
tutional adjudication is "the theory of constitutional revolutions."22
This Article describes and defends the theory of constitutional revolu-
tions2 3 and elaborates the implications this theory has for the jurispru-
dence of constitutional law.
public virtue. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013, 1022-23 (1984).
Iredell Jenkins describes a triadic conception of law. According to his view,
law "always has the three tasks of preserving continuity with the established or-
der, providing for the emergence of new forces and purposes, and directing the
passage toward a future order." I. JENKINS, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE LIMITS OF
LAw (A THEORETICAL ESSAY) 214 (1980).
There is a similarity between the view expressed in this Article and Gilmore's
eloquent characterization of the relationship between classicism and romanti-
cism. As Gilmore stated:
During the classical periods, which are, typically, of brief duration,
everything is neat, tidy and logical; theorists and critics reign supreme;
formal rules of structure and composition are stated to the general ac-
claim. During classical periods, which are, among others things, ex-
tremely dull, it seems that nothing interesting is ever going to happen
again. But the classical aesthetic, once it has been formulated, regularly
breaks down in a protracted romantic agony. The romantics spurn the
exquisitely stated rules of the preceding period; they experiment, they
improvise; they deny the existence of any rules; they churn around in an
ecstasy of self-expression. At the height of the romantic period, every-
thing is confused, sprawling, formless and chaotic-as well as, fre-
quently, extremely interesting. Then, the romantic energy having spent
itself, there is a new classical reformulation--and so the rhythms
continue.
G. GILmORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 102 (1974). Classical periods correspond to
normal adjudication, while romantic periods are similar to revolutionary adju-
dication.
19. One might object that these movements are not really distinct, but instead repre-
sent different points on a continuum. Some forms of adjudication are closer on
the continuum to revolutionary adjudication, while others are closer to normal
adjudication. Every piece of adjudication, so the argument goes, is partly revolu-
tionary and partly normal. Two replies are immediately in order. First, for this
objection to be persuasive it must show that it is impossible for any case to be
exclusively revolutionary or exclusively normal. Such a demonstration is un-
likely. Second, even if this can be shown, the objection itself depends upon the
distinction between revolutionary and normal adjudication.
20. See infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 161-76 and accompanying text.
22. The theory of constitutional revolutions was first described and defended in Lip-
kin, supra note 14, at 729-57 (describing two different, but interrelated periods of
constitutional adjudication). I characterize the theory as a theory of constitu-
tional revolutions for purposes of exposition. In fact, it is a theory of the struc-
tural relationships between revolutionary and normal constitutional adjudication
as well as the interdependencies of various kinds of normal adjudication.
23. This Article is concerned only with revolutionary constitutional adjudication.
This does not mean that constitutional revolutions are effected only by the
courts. The executive and legislative branches also engage in constitutional revo-
lutions. See A. MILLER, supra note 2, at 177.
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In Part II of this Article, I present the theory of constitutional rev-
olutions, a theory involving a dualistic conception of constitutional
methodology. Part III illustrates how the theory of constitutional rev-
olutions explains some of the Marshall and Warren Courts' critical
revolutionary cases. In Part IV, the Article demonstrates how impor-
tant controversies in constitutional jurisprudence can be fruitfully re-
interpreted and resolved by applying the theory of constitutional
revolutions. Finally, in Part V, the theory of constitutional revolu-
tions demonstrates the futility of relying exclusively on coherence
theories when interpreting constitutional law.
II. THE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS
A. The Classical Conception of Constitutional Adjudication
The theory of constitutional revolutions opposes a familiar ration-
alistic picture of constitutional change.24 On this view, there exist
neutral,25 objective2 6 and coherent principles27 that express the mean-
ing of explicit constitutional provisions.28 These principles, according
24. The classical conception of law contends that there are correct judicial proce-
dures for settling legal conflicts. Typically, the classical conception includes some
of the following conditions: law is rationally grounded; legal principles are inter-
subjectively valid; legal conflicts have correct, determinate answers; and law rep-
resents a domain of human practical reasoning that is sufficiently distinct from
ethics and politics to be called autonomous. See Stick, Can Nihilism Be Prag-
matic?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 332 (1986).
25. In constitutional law, the virtue of neutrality is advocated most eloquently by
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
34 (1959). But see Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Inter-
pretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1982).
26. The quest for objectivity is a motive for seeking legal standards that are in-
dependent of the judge's personal values. A judge does not decide a case objec-
tively when he reads his personal values into the law. However, we must
distinguish between the judge's personal values and public, defensible values that
the judge holds personally. Bennett, Objectivity in Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 445,
477 (1984).
27. See infra notes 361-426 and accompanying text.
28. In fact, this familiar conception of law is really a spectrum of related conceptions.
At one end of the spectrum there is "mechanical jurisprudence," holding that
formal legal rules will generate particular answers to legal questions. See L.
FRIEDMAN, LAw AND SocIErY 94 (1977). At the other end of the spectrum is the
view that legal decisions must be principled. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREmE COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 87 (1979)(insisting that constitutional argument must
be principled and based on reason); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 469 (1981). To oppose the view that legal decisions must be principled is
not to endorse arbitrariness in legal reasoning. Rather, it is a call to recognize the
futility in seeking a consensus concerning what counts as a "principle." More-
over, most theories concerning how principles generate legal results are margin-
ally true at best. See Lipkin, supra note 14, at 685 n.124. Most importantly, one
need not be totally disenchanted with principle and consistency to acknowledge
that an excessive concern with either distorts legal and moral reality. See Coons,
19891
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to the familiar picture,29 can be produced by a unique form of reason-
ing concerning the text, intent, history, structure or logic30 of the Con-
Consistency, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 59 (1987)(criticizing consistency as an ideal and
recommending instead the prudent use of inconsistent outcomes); Murphy,
Dworkin on Judicial Discretion: A Critical Analysis, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 767,
784 (1988)(arguing that judicial discretion cannot be explained by an appeal to
principle); Shiffrin, Radicalism, Liberalism and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 1103 (1982)(arguing against Dworkin's devotion to fundamental general
principles in political philosophy). The defect in mechanical conceptions of judi-
cial reasoning is that the judge is viewed as a technician, a mechanic, capable of
starting the engine but not influencing its operation. See Haines, General Obser-
vations on the Effects of Personat Political, and Economic Influences in the De-
cisions of Judges, 17 U. ILL. L. REv. 9, 96-98 (1922). Even theories like Dworkin's
that recognize the role of moral and political theory in adjudication depict judges
as discoverers, not inventors. Cf. M.R. COHEN, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER 112
(1933)(arguing that had judges never made law, the common law could never
have developed and changed).
My conception of "mechanical jurisprudence" refers to any conception of ad-
judication that does not take into account the judge as an independent a moral
evaluator, or, pardon the term, a moral philosopher. If true, we should be more
concerned with the purely philosophical and theoretical credentials of judges
than whether they are in the mainstream. Applying this criterion, Robert Bork
would still be disqualified as a Justice of the Supreme Court. He is no doubt a
respected legal scholar. However, he does not pretend to be, nor is he, a moral or
legal philosopher. Perhaps, we should consider appointing as Justices people
such as Hart, Dworkin, Unger, Finnis, Morris, Moore, Wasserstrom, Radin and
Cornell. Some Supreme Court Justices have been legal academics, but no Justice
has ever been a bonafide legal, moral or political philosopher. See Freund, Um-
piring the Federal System, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 561, 574 (1954)(stating that a
Supreme Court Justice should be a philosopher, but not too much of a
philosopher).
29. This familiar picture refers to "explicit constitutional conventions" as one model
of constitutional meaning. By "explicit constitutional conventions" I mean those
constitutional provisions that are uncontroversial. These conventions are what
Bickel referred to as the "manifest constitution." A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT 30 (1975). Here, Bickel argues that there is a moral obligation to obey
the manifest constitution. Bickel tells us, for instance, that the President cannot
decide to stay in office for six rather than four years. "To deny this idea is in the
most fundamental sense to deny the idea of law itself." Id.
However, this proposition does not explain how the imperial presidency ac-
quired its place in our constitutional structure. Surely, the office of president
today has much greater power than that anticipated by the framers. See Schles-
inger, Jr., After the Imperial Presidency, 47 MD. L. REV. 54, 70 (1987)(arguing
that the framers explicitly rejected the notion that the executive have sole re-
sponsibility for foreign policy). Nor are these powers derived from the manifest
constitution. Does the imperial presidency deny the idea of law itself? What
Bickel fails to recognize is that many fundamental changes in constitutional law
have occurred without either "judicial" or formal amendment. Does that mean
that the Korean or the Vietnam Wars were necessarily unconstitutional because
they were not declared wars? Only an ideological view totally distorting constitu-
tional reality would insist that we answer in the affirmative.
30. One question constitutional conventionalists try to avoid is whether it is possible
to deploy these interpretive devices independently of moral and political theory.
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stitution.31 In principle, this form of reasoning is capable of
establishing true legal propositions.3 2 The classical conception of law
maintains that legal reasoning is not reducible to other modes of dis-
course such as politics, ethics, economics or sociology.33 The entire
constitutional landscape-including Supreme Court decisions, consti-
tutional scholarship and constitutional education in law school-adopt
some part of this familiar view.3 4
Adopting the classical view3 5 does not entail Langdellian formal-
ism 3 6 any more than repudiating it entails legal realism.3 7 The classi-
cal view, however, has some of the same deficiencies as formalism.
31. See Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 579, (1987). See also Posner, The Juris-
prudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827 (1988).
32. Some versions of the classical conception of law insist that there are uniquely
correct answers to constitutional questions. Other versions of the classical con-
ception contend that constitutional reasoning can reduce the field of possible an-
swers, but only in rare instances can it determine one uniquely correct answer.
Importantly, the question of whether there are uniquely correct answers to con-
stitutional problems goes to the heart of the issue of legal skepticism. It could be
argued that if there are unique answers to constitutional questions, constitutional
theory avoids skepticism. Here, we must make an important distinction between
conceptual and epistemological skepticism. Conceptual skepticism denies the
possibility of providing a coherent definition of truth in law. Epistemological
skepticism is weaker, maintaining that although we can provide a coherent defi-
nition of truth in law, we can never know whether a legal proposition is true. For
example, suppose I say that a legal proposition is true if it follows from the best
abstract theory of politics. In providing this definition, I am resisting conceptual
skepticism. However, unless I can show which is the best abstract theory of poli-
tics, my definition of truth in law moves me closer to epistemological skepticism.
In this case, although I may know what it means to say that a legal proposition is
true, I can never know when or if it is true since I do not know which is the best
abstract theory of politics. See Lipkin, supra note 14, at 697-98.
33. A reductionist legal theory maintains that law, as a system of propositions, can be
replaced by an alternative system without loss of meaning. There are several
different types of reductionist theories. Some reductionist theories, such as law
and economics, apparently seek a near total replacement of law by economic the-
ory. Other theories, such as law as integrity, apparently contend that law is par-
tially reducible to ethics and politics.
34. I have described only the formal component of the classical conception of law.
Occasionally, this conception has a substantive component, namely, the max-
imization of liberty. For a discussion of this conception of law see the discussion
of Panel I in Barry, The Federalist Society Sixth Annual Symposium on Law and
Public Policy: The Crisis in Legal Theory and the Revival of Classical Jurispru-
dence, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 283-310 (1988) [hereinafter cited as Symposium).
35. The classical conception of law is predicated on the notion that judges do not
govern, but regulate. As Justice Brewer remarked, "The court... makes no laws,
they establish no policy, they never enter the domain of public action. They do
not govern." Brewer, The Nation's Safeguard, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE N. Y.
STATE BAR ASSN. 46.
36. Langdellian formalism contends that an indefinite number of legal problems can
be resolved by applying a distinct number of legal concepts and rules. According
to this view, the essence of law is its logical form and principles of reasoning.
Law is a formal science the principles of which can be extrapolated from case
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Both views obscure the dualistic dimension of constitutional adjudica-
tion.38 Similarly, both the classical view and formalism obscure the
decisions. C. LANGDELL, STILL CASES ON CONTRACTS at vi (1971); C. LANGDELL,
BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 220 (1905).
More contemporary conceptions of formalism insist minimally on a separation
of law and policy. See Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due
Process, 40 STAN. L. REv. 379 (1988). Formalism holds that "the law must be
internally consistent and self-contained." Id. at 382. See also Schauer, Formal-
ism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (describing some of the virtues of formal rules restricting
judicial choice); Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1502 (1985)(criticizing certain "formalistic" solutions to the
countermajoritarian challenge in constitutional theory); Wilson, The Morality of
Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431, 434 (1985)(arguing that "doctrinal formalism"
is a desirable and essential feature of constitutional jurisprudence).
37. Legal realism maintains that we must study legal phenomena from a scientific
point of view. The legal realist seeks to discover the causes and effects of legal
phenomena. Bingham, What is Law?, 11 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 9 (1912). Legal realists
deny the existence of an irreducibly internal point of view consisting of rules,
principles, arguments and reasons. The internal point of view maintains that
legal rules function as critical standards of conduct for participants in a social
practice. H.L.A. HART, supra note 3, at 55. The external perspective emphasizes
the view of a non-participatory observer concerned with describing regularities in
behavior.
One must bear in mind that legal realists are a diverse group and no simple
definition captures the richness of their views. See generally W. RUMBLE, JR.,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968). Realism is usually characterized as aban-
doning a conceptual or theoretical view of the law and instead seeking principles
that would allow one to predict judicial decisions, thereby gaining some control
over social and political life. See T. BENDITT, LAW AS RULE AND PRINCIPLE 11-16
(1978).
Although there were many significant differences between the Langdellian
formalists and legal realists, their views share a structural similarity. Both of
these perspectives were committed to the mistaken position that there was a sci-
ence of law. Consider Gilmore's views:
The Legal Realists of the 1930s embraced the fallacy quite as enthusiasti-
cally as the Langdellian formalists. As a group, the Realists unquestion-
ingly accepted the idea of the "one true rule of law" which was waiting to
be discovered if only the search was conducted in the right way. Realist
jurisprudence proposed a change of course, not a change of goal.
G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 100 (1977).
The theory of constitutional revolutions differs from legal realism in that the
former adopts both an internal and external perspective toward constitutional
questions, while legal realism adopts only an external perspective. See infra note
40. One feature the theory of constitutional revolutions shares with legal realism
is that both theories are committed to "accurate recording of things as they are, as
contrasted with things as they are imagined to be, or wished to be, or as one feels
they ought to be." Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REv.
697 (1931).
38. This Article embraces a skeptical view concerning the existence of a distinctive
form of legal reasoning. See Posner, supra note 31, at 859 (arguing that "[t]here is
no distinctive methodology of legal reasoning"). Progress in constitutional theory
will be impeded until we recognize that there is no distinctive form of constitu-
tional reasoning. Instead, constitutional reasoning is just a special kind of practi-
cal reasoning.
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role interpretation plays in legal theory.
B. The Interpretive Turn
Recently, legal theory has taken the interpretive turn.3 9 Essen-
tially, the interpretive turn insists that meaning does not inhere in a
text waiting to be discovered.40 Instead, a text's meaning is a function
of the author's intent, its sentences and the interpretive resources
brought to the text41 by the reader. The reader's goal is to apprehend
the text's point or meaning.42 In the case of a mature constitution, the
interpreter must also apprehend the point of the judicial decisions in-
terpreting the document. A clear, well-accepted interpretation of a
foundational constitutional provision plays a special role in this pro-
cess; until overruled, it represents the final word on the meaning of
the provision.
The interpretation of constitutional provisions and subsequent ju-
dicial decisions involve a subtle interplay of explanatory and justifica-
tory factors. For a judge to decide a case, she must construct a
principle that fits with or explains the prior judicial decisions.43 A
39. See Lipkin, supra note 14, at 657-61. See also Kennedy, The Turn to Interreta-
tion, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 251 (1985)(characterizing the interpretive turn as a liberal
response to left wing legal theory).
40. The interpretive turn emphasizes the interpreter's perspective.
41. Interpretation, of course, is not restricted to written text. We also interpret
sounds, sights and social practices.
42. See R. DWORKm, supra note 3, at 47.
43. One argument against the possibility of explaining case law is that legal princi-
ples are indeterminate. See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 683, 685. In reply, some
scholars maintain that "theorists who matter least are those who find language so
indeterminate that any text can mean almost anything. These theorists seem to
assume that a statute is not essentially different from a poem. They deny one of
the fundamental premises of the polity, [that we try to govern ourselves with
legal texts, not town meetings or Platonic guardians], and consequently make
themselves irrelevant." Laycock, Constitutional Theory Matters, 65 TEX. L. REV.
767, 773-74 (1987).
There are several objections to these remarks. First, no serious observer can
argue that poens can mean anything at all. For example, imagine someone sug-
gesting that the most obvious interpretation of Hamlet's famous soliloquy is that
it is an attempt to determine whether two plus two equals four, or whether it is
possible to square the circle. More importantly, it is far from obvious that a soci-
ety operating with a Platonic guardian or a town meeting could dispense with
interpretation. The problem of interpretation affects these methods of govern-
ment just as much as it affects a society operating with texts. Finally, of course, it
is foolish to contend that constitutional or statutory language is so indeterminate
as to mean anything at all. Our Constitution cannot be seriously viewed as the
foundation of a constitutional monarchy or theocracy. Moreover, it cannot be
interpreted as creating Hitlerian fascism or Stalinism. However, within certain
parameters, key provisions of our Constitution can be interpreted in conflicting
ways. For example, the equal protection clause can be interpreted in Nozickian
or Rawlsian terms, or even in terms of radical egalitarianism.
The problem with the indeterminacy argument is that it needs to be spelled
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principle explains prior judicial decisions when the present judge can
use that principle to replicate those decisions. In seeking explanatory
principles, the judge adopts an internal perspective, that is, she evalu-
ates competing principles as a socialized participant in our system of
law.44
The justifactory role of interpretation shows what is good or attrac-
tive about prior decisions. For instance, if two principles explain
equally well a series of cases, a judge should choose the principle
which portrays the practice in the best moral and political light.45 The
interplay of explanatory and justificatory elements of interpretation is
not limited to cases where there are two equally proficient explana-
tory principles. Often one principle provides a better explanatory ac-
count of a series of cases, but loses out to a less proficient explanatory
principle because the latter provides a better justification of the prac-
tice. Conservative and progressive approaches to interpretation differ
over the relationship between explanation and justification. Con-
servative approaches generally require a much higher explanatory
threshold, while progressive approaches require only a minimal ex-
planatory fit when evaluating an especially attractive justification. In-
terpretation, to put the point differently, may be narrow or broad.
Narrow interpretations stick closer to the actual constitutional con-
ventions, while broader interpretations transcend these conventions.
The interpretive turn takes constitutional change seriously and
therefore is conducive to the task of identifying constitutional revolu-
tions.46 Constitutional revolutions are statements of principle that do
not, in any obvious manner, flow from the Constitution or Supreme
Court decisions. These decisions are pragmatic47 choices which are de-
rived from principles of morality and politics, not from well-accepted
legal sources.48
out in greater detail. Does it rule out the possibility of constraints on interpreta-
tion? If not, is this a sufficient response to the indeterminacy argument? If tex-
tual meaning is fundamentally cultural, constraints may exist that defeat or
dissipate the force of the indeterminacy argument. Cf. White, Thinking About
Language, 96 YALE L.J. 1960,1973 (1987)(describing meaning as cultural and com-
munal and residing in a background of unstated assumptions).
44. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 3.
45. R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 52.
46. Because "Ilegal interpretation is never just exposition of an 'existing' principle; it
is also a positing of the very principle it reads into the case law through the enun-
ciation of the 'should be' inherent in the justification of principles." Cornell, In-
stitutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential for
Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1144 (1988).
47. See infra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
48. Dworkin insists it is a mistake to argue that legal principles must be derived from
well-accepted legal conventions. According to his view, such principles are de-
rived from the underlying scheme of principles that explain and justify our con-
stitutional practice. The problem with this view is that if there is no way of
guaranteeing agreement concerning the principles contained in that scheme, we
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C. The Pragmatic Turn
In this Article, the term "pragmatic legal theory" refers to any the-
ory maintaining that judges should "tr[y] to do what is morally correct
in each case."49 Legal pragmatism has a prospective dimension coun-
selling judges to "make whatever decisions seem to them best for the
community's future, not counting any form of consistency with the
past as valuable for its own sake."5o Pragmatism51 counsels judges to
are committed to legal justificatory solipsism. That is, we are committed to a
view that 'reason' functions only in an egocentric context in which an individual
judge determines the fundamental justificatory principles underlying our system
of constitutional law. See Lipkin, supra note 14, at 698. Once an individual judge
determines which justificatory principles to choose, that ends the matter. There
are no inter-subjective principles for choosing one judge's decision over the
others.
49. Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dwor-
kin's Theory of Law, 6 LAW & PHIL. 419, 432 (1987)(arguing against Dworkin's
characterization of legal pragmatism as the view that judges should try to "ad-
vance the community's goals in each case").
50. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 3, at 95. Coercion is justified by showing how it contrib-
utes to making "the community's future brighter, liberated from the dead hand of
the past and the fetish of consistency for its own sake." Id. at 151. Non-pragmatic
legal theories, such as conventionalism and coherence theories, contend that a
judicial decision is sometimes justified simply because it follows from legal au-
thorities, such as precedent, not because it has any substantive merit as the best
decision.
Pragmatism, as a legal theory, has other meanings. A pragmatic approach to
law can be concerned with making legal decisions on a case-by-case basis rather
than enunciating sweeping legal principles. Pragmatism can be understood as
common sense decisions not guided by logic or theory. Another kind of pragma-
tism holds that reason, as opposed to sentiment, is inappropriate to explain legal
practice. Pragmatism might also refer to a consequentialist or utilitarian ap-
proach to ethics and political theory. For an illuminating discussion of pragma-
tism in English law see generally P. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN
ENGLISH LAw (1987). See also R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN
LEGAL THEORY 20-22 (1982)(describing pragmatic instrumentalism). One brand
of pragmatism concerns itself with reason as opposed to tradition, seeking change
based on reason and experience rather than depending upon formal structures in
legal theory. R. SUMMERS, PRAGMATISM, STATESMANSHIP AND THE SUPREmE
COURT 40-41 (1977). Pragmatism may also be described as "the view that the ulti-
mate test is always experience." Farber, supra note 10, at 1341. Some forms of
pragmatism contend that there are usually diverse perspectives on any issue.
Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition. The Prag-
matism of Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr., 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 541, 587 (1988).
My use of "pragmatism" maintains only that judicial decisions should be eval-
uated in terms of whether the decision would make a positive contribution to the
community's future. Other meanings of the term might be pragmatic in this
sense, but I am not committed to endorsing any other judicial strategy. In my
view, a pragmatic theory might embrace principles or theories; it can be monistic
or pluralistic. A pragmatic theory of law can include consequentialistic or non-
consequentialistic conceptions of what is right and what is good. Therefore, the
type of pragmatic theory I am concerned with should not be confused with "prag-
matic instrumentalism," which is an essentially consequentialist legal theory.
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evaluate a legal decision in terms of how it contributes to bringing
about this goal. 52 On a pragmatic view of adjudication, the Constitu-
tion, statutes and case law must be interpreted with the future in
mind,5 3 liberated from the dead hand of the past.54 Consequently, ac-
See Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Theory
of Law, 92 HARv. L. REv. 444, 437-38 (1978). For clarity, I have suggested that we
call "superpragmatic" any theory of adjudication primarily concerning itself with
how judicial decisions contribute to the future of the republic. Lipkin, supra note
14, at 729. There are more radical forms of philosophical pragmatism that have
important implications for legal theory. See generally R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY,
IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989). I critically examine Rorty's liberal ironism in
Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide
Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REv. (1990)
(forthcoming).
51. Pragmatism must be distinguished from conventionalism and coherence theories
of adjudication. Conventionalism maintains that whenever possible, a judge
should decide a case by appealing to explicit constitutional paradigms. When
there are no such paradigms, a conventionalist judge should use judicial discre-
tion in deciding the case. Coherence theories maintain that judges should decide
cases in terms of the justifactory principles underlying the legal system.
52. I am not suggesting particular judges are self-consciously pragmatic in this way.
The pragmatic turn appeals to extrinsic factors for interpreting foundational con-
stitutional provisions, such as moral and political. Common sense might also be
an extrinsic factor for interpreting foundational provisions. Consider the follow-
ing "It will be apparent how much of our constitutional law is merely getting at
the common sense of the matter when we consider how few of the questions of
constitutional law are answered by any specific language in the Constitution.
When the language is really specific questions seldom arise." Powell, The Logic
and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, in ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 85,89 (R.
McCloskey ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as ESSAYS IN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW].
The pragmatic turn may involve an appeal to custom as a source of law. One
writer defines "custom" as "the uniformity of conduct of all persons under like
circumstances." J. CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN GROWTH AND FUNCTION 122-23
(1974). All law, with the exception of legislation, is custom. Id. at 173. Custom,
the source of law, makes legal propositions knowable and objectively justified.
Id. at 191. Custom tends to make law coherent. Id. at 331. Custom also tends to
make law uniform. Id. at 334. Customs continuously change and, therefore, on
the view of law as customs, law must change also. Id. at 258. Custom includes
habitual rules of conduct as well as ethical principles. Id. at 120-21.
53. The notion of a better future as the test of truth and justice is an essential tenet
of pragmatism. See G. JACOBSOHN, PRAGMATISM, STATESMANSHIP AND THE
COURT 51 (1977). Consider the contrary view:
People are always shouting they want to create a better future. It's not
true. The future is an apathetic void of no interest to anyone. The past
is full of life, eager to irritate us, provoke and insult us, tempt us to de-
stroy or repaint it. The only reason people want to be masters of the
future is to change the past.
M. KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETTING 22 (1981).
Isn't that what it means to be a master of the future?
54. This is the principle focus of superpragmatism. Superpragmatism can include
any substantive moral theory. It can be utilitarian, libertarian, deontological or
egoistic. See Lipkin, supra note 14, at 729-30. In fact, my brand of pragmatism is
compatible with natural law theory. Cf. Barnett, Judicial Pragmactivism: A Def-
inition, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY 205 (J. Domn & H. Manne
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cording to constitutional pragmatism, neither the Constitution nor
case law dictates constitutional decisions.55 Instead, these decisions
are derived from some source extrinsic to constitutional law.56
The Constitution symbolizes different, sometimes incompatible,
moral and political visions of the best society.5 7 When the Court
chooses one set of principles, it is choosing between different visions of
the good society. The Constitution represents a non-binding con-
straint on judicial decisions.58 The Constitution's symbolic function
eds. 1987)(defining "pragmactivism" as a judicial philosophy testing judicial deci-
sions by their practical results).
55. This does not suggest that constitutional constraints do not exist. It does suggest
that except for some procedural constraints, constitutional constraints are de-
rived from our participation in a cultural constitutional interpretive community.
Constraints on constitutional interpretation flow from this community. As such,
an interpretation is precluded only if limited by that cultural interpretive com-
munity. Furthermore, an interpretation not presently included in the cultural
interpretive community may not always be excluded. Cf. Greenstone, Against
Simplicity: The Cultural Dimensions of the Constitution, 55 U. C. L. REV. 428,
431-32 (1988)(constitutional interpretation must reflect social realities).
56. Superpragmatism may still value consistency, precedent and other formally con-
straining factors. Simply put, the pragmatic attitude insists that we should solve
social problems unless these constraining factors weigh too heavily to the con-
trary. See R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHmOSOPHY OF LAW 97-98 (1922).
But see W. KENNEDY, PRAGMATISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 63, 69-70 (1925).
Yet, naturalism also has a role to play in this process. Concerns for perennial
rights can outweigh certain kinds of solutions to social problems. Moreover, such
concerns might even lead to progressive solutions to such problems. Id. at 73.
57. Indeed, the Constitution determines the parameters of the constitutional debate
about what constitutes a good and just society. Determining the parameters of
the debate need not entail determining the debate's content or its conclusions. In
fact, the content or conclusions of the debate might need to be reconstituted with
every passing generation. See J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE MEANING 265-66
(1984).
58. How can the Constitution (or any written document) dictate the choice of princi-
ple? Does this mean that there is ever one and only one possible answer to a
given constitutional problem? Even when the constitutional text appears to yield
just one answer, there are other answers possible, given a change in the needs of
the interpretive community. For example, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5, says that
a president must be thirty-five years of age. Suppose after President Nixon re-
signed and President Ford assumed office it was revealed that President Ford was
only thirty-four. In this situation must the Court disqualify him as ineligible for
the presidency? Instead, could one argue that the constitutional provision con-
cerning the age of the president did not apply to these unforeseeable circum-
stances? Or, perhaps a better argument would be that the framers had in mind a
sufficient degree of maturity as a requirement for the presidency. If this example
does not convince you, try the following.
Suppose a new epidemic attacks all those thirty-five and over. Is there any
doubt that some thirty-four year old would constitutionally serve as president at
least until a suitable amendment was passed? The simple point is constitutional
provisions have both a constraining and creative dimension. However, we cannot
specify in advance what results these two dimensions will have in any given case.
See Fish, Still Wrong Again After All These years, 6 LAw & PHIL. 401, 404 (1987).
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merely rules out certain choices. For example, under present circum-
stances no constitutionally persuasive argument could establish the le-
gitimacy of a monarchistic or theocratic state. However, within these
constraints, different theories of interpretation 59 have generated very
different conceptions of equality, due process and liberty. Tradition-
ally, this has enabled the Court to be a creative force supplying the
Constitution with meaning.60 In other words, the Court has, from its
very inception, initiated constitutional revolutions.61
A constitutional revolution occurs when the Court pragmatically
creates a formal62 or substantive63 principle of constitutional adjudica-
tion. Marshall's foundational decisions concerning the Court's role in
reviewing federal legislative acts and state judicial decisions represent
articulations of formal constitutional principles.64 The decision in
Brown v. Board of Education65 represents a substantive principle.
Both kinds of pragmatic choices are designed to improve our constitu-
tional democracy. Typically, pragmatic choices are based upon factors
extrinsic to actual constitutional practice.66 These extrinsic factors
are comprised of moral and political considerations derived from the
wider political culture or from abstract ethical or political theory.
1. Sources of Pragmatic Choices
Pragmatic choices are based on many factors. Common sense or
economic theory are just two examples of such sources. Ordinary lan-
59. But see Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contribu-
tions of Special Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 209, 213 (1983).
60. Shaman, The Constitution, the Supreme Cour and Creativity, 9 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 257, 258-66 (1982). See also Shaman, Constitutional Fact- The Percep-
tion of Reality by the Supreme Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 236, 253 (1983).
61. Lipkin, supra note 14, at 649 nn.4 & 6.
62. A formal constitutional principle is concerned with how a certain result is
reached. For example, the principle of judicial review is a formal principle of
constitutionalism. It does not resolve the substantive issue of whether a statute is
unconstitutional or whether an individual's right to free speech has been violated.
63. A substantive constitutional principle determines a particular result, for exam-
ple, that segregated schools are constitutionally invalid.
64. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Hunter v. Martin's
Lessee 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Fletcher v. Peck 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 187
(1810); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66. Constitutional practice includes the text, the framers' intent, as well as the his-
tory, structure and logic of the Constitution. Where these conventional factors
resolve a problem, the result is derived from something intrinsic to the Constitu-
tion. Typically, in the case of early constitutional history, there were at least two
possible ways to resolve an issue: a Federalist solution and an Anti-Federalist
solution. Consequently, history itself does not determine the result. In such
cases, a judge's decision would be based on his conception of the best reading of
history. Whenever history permits two possible interpretations, P and not-P, the
stage is set for revolutionary adjudication.
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guage, reason and the collective conscience of humanity are other ex-
amples of factors leading to pragmatic choices. Ultimately, on the
appropriate level of abstraction, pragmatic choices are influenced by
moral and political considerations. These considerations can be sys-
tematized in moral and political theories.
a, Pragmatic Naturalism
Pragmatic choices can be grounded in natural law.6 7 When a prag-
matic theory insists upon yet undiscovered natural rights, it repre-
sents a theory that is both pragmatic in its concern with the future and
naturalistic in its concern with rights, the existence of which is not
completely dependent upon positive law.6 8 I refer to this theory as
"pragmatic naturalism." Though some may consider this barbarism, 69
pragmatic naturalism is the view that there are natural rights, not yet
recognized or recognized only dimly, that should be appealed to over
precedent.
Pragmatic naturalism acknowledges two kinds of "natural" or non-
conventional rights: absolute and relative natural rights. Absolute nat-
ural rights exist independently of a particular system of positive law.
Relative natural rights are created as a result of the interaction of ab-
solute natural rights and living political institutions. They are derived
from particular legal and cultural circumstances,7 0 but have not yet
been declared to be positive law. Pragmatic naturalism contends that
basic rights-relative natural rights--exist that depend in part on the
fundamental principles of a particular political society.7 ' A pragmatic
67. See Lipkin, supra note 14, at 654 n.27.
Pragmatic naturalism is naturalistic in yet another sense. It is concerned with
human flourishing;, it offers a pragmatic strategy for understanding the concept
of human nature and for applying it to concrete social circumstances.
68. Positive law refers to explicit legal conventions such as written constitutions,
statutes, judicial decisions and administrative codes. See generally H.L.A. HART,
supra note 3.
69. One reason for alarm at the notion of "pragmatic naturalism" is due to the sound
historical reason that the original purpose of pragmatic legal theory was to
counter natural law. Hence, how can there be a pragmatic natural law theory?
In my estimation, traditional natural law theory had three fatal defects. First,
some versions of natural law had questionable ontological commitments. Second,
natural law often failed to provide an adequate epistemological basis for legal
theory. Finally, natural law theories are typically derived from a legally, mor-
ally and politically conservative ideology. A natural law theory claiming new
rights, i.e., rights that have emerged as a result of historical evolution, is neither
conservative nor necessarily epistemologically or ontologically inadequate.
70. See Dworkin, "Naturalism" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 183-84
(1982)(arguing that instrumentalism, a form of pragmatism, denies the existence
of such rights).
71. This Article is committed to the view that during our republic's founding, prag-
matic naturalism was the operative legal theory. See B. BAiLYN, THE ORIGINs OF
AMERICAN PoLrrcs 161 (1944). At that time, property rights and individual liber-
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naturalist might also endorse the view that once these rights are cre-
ated, their importance in reflecting the justificatory principles under-
lying the positive law permits them to be considered as part of an
abstract moral and political system. In other words, these rights de-
velop contextually, but once developed and identified, their impor-
tance transcends the particular culture in which they developed.
Interpretation supports pragmatic naturalism. Interpretation is a
process that analyzes, redefines, and creates new constitutional values.
Essentially, pragmatic naturalism leads a judge to create new law.
However, new law must be based upon the judge's conception of how
existing law should progress towards reaching an ideal state. A judge
must look to various theories of this progression, theories that de-
scribe and explain prior law and provide a vision of its progression to
the ideal. Such theories can be described generally as "constitutional
background theories."
2. Constitutional Background Theories
Constitutional background theories are moral and political theo-
ries bearing a special relationship to the Constitution. There are two
general categories of constitutional background theory: intrinsic and
extrinsic background theories.72 Intrinsic theories are intimately con-
nected to the text, intent, history, structure and logic of the Constitu-
tion.73 Extrinsic constitutional background theories informally
influence the evolution of constitutional law. Intrinsic theories can
explain and sometimes justify constitutional practice, while extrinsic
theories can only justify such practice. Only a theory that is intimately
connected to constitutional law can explain constitutional practice.
When a theory justifies constitutional practice, it may do so either be-
cause it brings cultural values to bear on the evolution of constitu-
tional law, or because it provides an ideal toward which constitutional
law should aspire.74 The theory of constitutional revolutions is based
ties were a great revolutionary concern. See R. MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE
CONSTITUTION (1987).
72. Lipkin, supra note 14, at 738.
73. Again let me express the simple caveat that when history clearly yields one par-
ticular interpretation, it is an intrinsic factor. When history is indeterminate, it
becomes an extrinsic factor. For a contemporary judge to decide a case in terms
of a view of some, but not all, of the framers' and ratifiers' beliefs he must appeal
to an extrinsic constitutional factor. When history is indeterminate in this man-
ner, it is difficult to see how two contradictory principles can be intrinsic to the
Constitution.
74. In ideal circumstances, a background constitutional theory explains and justifies
constitutional practice. In non-ideal circumstances, where actual practice does
not live up to the ideal, the best explanatory principle will be an inadequate jus-
tificatory principle. We can, of course, avoid this result by giving up the quest for
a justificatory principle reflecting the best moral and political principle tout
court. If we give up this quest, then the best justificatory principle will closely
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on three types of constitutional background theory, the first is an in-
trinsic background theory, while the second and third are extrinsic
background theories. The three types of theories are: relativized con-
stitutional theories, critical cultural theories and abstract moral and
political theories.
a. Relativized Constitutional Theories
The term "relativized constitutional theory" should be understood
as standing for a set of principles that are implied by the Constitution
or by foundational constitutional decisions5 The principle of judicial
review in Marbury v. Madison 76 is a relativized constitutional princi-
ple as that term is defined in this Article. Similarly, the general right
of privacy created in Griswold v. Connecticut77 is now a principle con-
tained in our relativized constitutional theory.
Relativized constitutional theories must reflect the foundational
constitutional provisions in the particular constitution they explain.
For example, if a constitution includes an implied notion of equality
that does not permit segregation, then the relativized constitutional
theory explaining that constitution cannot permit segregation. The
Supreme Court determines the meaning of foundational constitu-
tional provisions. Consequently, the relativized constitutional theory
must explain foundational constitutional decisions. The difference be-
tween a relativized constitutional theory and a list of actual constitu-
tional decisions is that the former systematizes the latter and in some
cases its principles are more general than the actual constitutional
decisions.
b. Critical Cultural Theories
Critical cultural theories78 include principles that would be ac-
cepted upon reflection by a reasonable citizen of a particular society,
irrespective of whether such principles have been declared to be law.79
reflect the explanatory principle. For example, if the best explanatory principle,
the one that best fits actual constitutional decisions, is a principle tying sexual
privacy to heterosexuality, then the justificatory principle must be one that
closely reflects this explanatory principle, and not a more general principle con-
cerning personal autonomy generally.
75. See Note, Dualistic Legal Phenomena and the Limitations of Positivism, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 823, 826 (1986).
76. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
77. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
78. See D. BEYLEVELD & R. BRowNswoRD, LAW AS A MORAL JUDGMENT 423 (1986).
79. Critical cultural theories include abstract components, but, in addition, they take
particularized cultural conditions more seriously than do abstract moral and
political theories. In fact, a critical cultural theory is related to common sense
and reasonableness. See Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law,
in ESSAYS IN CONSTiTUTiONAL LAW, supra note 52, at 85, 87. A principle is in-
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Of course, identifying these principles may be controversial, but the
important point here is that critical cultural principles are those that a
reflective citizen believes best explains and justifies our political cul-
ture.8 0 For example, most Americans would probably now agree that
an individual is entitled to be free from official state-imposed segrega-
tion.8 1 Political culture is in harmony with the Constitution when the
relativized constitutional theory is consistent with the critical cultural
theory. However, this is not always the case.8 2 Historically, the criti-
cal cultural theory may conflict with the relativized constitutional the-
ory.83 A constitutional crisis occurs when critical cultural principles
cluded in a critical cultural theory if a reasonable citizen, upon reflection, would
endorse it. Such a procedure may not always yield one unequivocal answer. In-
deed, there may exist more than one reasonable answer to many important con-
stitutional matters. It may be a general feature of practical reasoning that while
being able to rule out many proposals, one is always left with two or more com-
peting views, neither of which is decidable in terms of reason, morality or law. In
fact, two or perhaps three irreducible, general, moral and political perspectives
may exist that yield incompatible answers.
Justices often appeal, albeit tacitly, to principles of critical cultural theory in
deciding cases. See C. CuRTs, JR., LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 332 (1947). If there
are more than one equally reasonable competing principles in a critical cultural
theory, a judge's appeal to this theory will produce a different constitutional re-
sult depending upon the judge. Id.
80. Cf. A. BICKEL, supra note 28, at 86 (arguing that justification of a constitutional
judgement "turns on issues of moral philosophy and political theory, which we
abstract from the common political process.").
81. With a few notable exceptions, I believe this principle, or one very much like it,
would be accepted by most Americans regardless of political persuasion. Fur-
thermore, such a principle must now be included in our relativized constitutional
theory. It does not follow, of course, that there was a consensus about any such
principle prior to Brown.
Dworkin argues that "[lt seems plain that the Constitution mandates some
individual right not to be the victim of official, state-imposed racial discrimina-
tion." R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 382. But if Plessy controlled the meaning of
the equal protection clause and therefore the meaning of equal protection in the
relativized theory, how can the Constitution mandate such a right? Dworkin be-
lieves that "[t]he American people would almost unanimously have rejected [the
rule in PMessy], even in 1954, as not faithful to their convictions about racial jus-
tice." Id. at 387.
There are two important problems with Dworkin's argument. First, even if
most people rejected the rule in Plessy in 1954, it does not follow that the princi-
ple in Brown was contained in the relativized constitutional theory of our Consti-
tution. If foundational constitutional decisions define what the Constitution
means, then prior to Brown the Constitution permitted state-imposed racial seg-
regation. Lipkin, supra note 14, at 740-49. Second, as an empirical matter, it just
seems wrong to contend that the right Dworkin advocates was part of the polit-
ical culture of the time. Perhaps, some reasonable citizens endorsed such a right,
but other reasonable citizens did not.
82. The civil rights movement was predicated on the conviction that constitutional
practice was inconsistent with our critical cultural theory as well as abstract
moral and political theory. Therefore, constitutional practice had to be altered.
83. Presently, our relativized constitutional theory permits abortion. Anti-abortion
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find no obvious place within constitutional practice.8 4 When this oc-
curs, the citizenry must abandon the conviction that these principles
should be law or the Court must interpret constitutional law to in-
clude the controversial principles. When it does so, the relativized
constitutional theory then contains the same principle as the critical
cultural theory. Brown v. Board of Education 85 is a good example of
this process. Prior to Brown, constitutional practice, or the relativized
constitutional theory, was controlled by Plessy v. Ferguson.86 Though
constitutional practice followed the rule of separate but equal treat-
ment,8 7 many people began to question the compatibility of equality
and segregation. Ultimately, the Court effected a constitutional and
social revolution which would permanently alter our conception of
equality and racial justice. This illustrates how newly acquired cul-
tural values become constitutional law.
c. Abstract Moral and Political Theories
Abstract moral theories consist of principles derived from systema-
tized intuitions concerning virtue and justice. These philosophical
theories need not be tied to specific historical conditions in the same
manner as relativized cqnstitutional and critical cultural theories.88
Abstract moral and political theories attempt to describe universal,
objective elements of human personality and society. These theories
eschew the concrete in an attempt to provide a foundation for, and a
advocates contend, probably incorrectly, that most reflective people abhor abor-
tion. In our terms, their argument can be described as insisting that there is a
radical break between the relativized constitutional theory and the critical cul-
tural theory.
84. Sometimes, the relativized theory and the critical cultural theory imply one deci-
sion, while abstract moral and political theories imply a contrary decision. For a
long time, that was probably the case with regard to slavery; both the Constitu-
tion and critical cultural theory sanctioned slavery, while abstract theory did not.
85. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
86. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
87. Just prior to Brown, several cases progressively revealed discomfort with Plessy.
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Gong Lur v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Cum-
ming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899). The seeds of the revolution can
be observed in a discrete number of prior cases; this is one way a constitutional
revolution occurs.
88. Relativized constitutional theories must be tied to the foundational provisions of
the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Critical cultural theories
must be tied to historical circumstances and to the reflective sentiments of rea-
sonable citizens. Abstract moral theories need not be tied either to the legal sys-
tem or to the historical circumstances existing in a particular society. Abstract
moral theories are utopian in the limited sense that they tell us what is right for
anyone and any society. If you do not believe in utopian theories, critical cultural
theories will embody the extent of your moral and political vision.
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method of, criticizing and correcting existing social systems.8 9
The methodology for formulating an abstract moral and political
theory consists of the following. Seeking a critical point of view, an
individual collects his considered intuitions or pre-theoretical moral
and political beliefs in order to determine which intuitions he wants to
stand behind or endorse. He then seeks to determine whether his intu-
itions implicitly express any general principles.90 If so, these princi-
ples represent the rationale- the explanation and justification-of his
considered intuitions. After formulating these principles, he puts
them in some sort of theoretical order.9 1 He then has an abstract
moral and political theory with which to guide his actions and criticize
social and political structures. If no such principles exist, the individ-
ual must embrace skepticism concerning the possibility of construct-
ing a viable theory of ethics and politics.92
Abstract moral and political theories center around systematizing
one's considered intuitions about moral and political practice. The
central questions here are how closely must a principle or theory
match our considered intuitions,93 and how do we resolve a conflict
between our moral intuitions and a proposed ethical theory? There
are at least three conventional approaches to these questions: ethical
intuitionism,94 ethical formalism95 and reflective equilibrium. 96
89. Such theories need not be foundationalist in a Cartesian sense. Rather, they may
simply provide a foundation for other kinds of constitutional background
theories.
90. In considering a principle, we test it against our considered intuitions as well as
certain formal or metatheoretical factors. A theory should conform to our con-
sidered intuitions, but it should also be elegant. A theory is elegant when it is
simple, general, fecund and reenforced or supported by theories in other do-
mains. W.V.O. QuiNE & J. ULLaN, THE WEB OF BELIEF (1970); Quine, Posits and
Reality, in THE WAYS OF PARADOX (1966)(describing various metatheoretical vir-
tues such as fecundity and simplicity).
91. By theoretical order, I mean a person must decide whether his theory is monistic
or pluralistic. If it is monistic, one theoretical factor explains and justifies his
judgments. If a theory is pluralistic, several theoretical factors explain and jus-
tify his judgments. In this event, the individual must determine how these differ-
ent principles can be ranked, the weight to be accorded to different principles and
so forth.
92. Most skeptical attacks against the possibility of constructing such a theory are
directed at abstract moral and political theories.
93. Constructing a critical cultural theory also requires answering these questions.
Describing the relativized constitutional theory, on the other hand, requires sys-
tematizing actual judicial decisions. One must systemize judicial decisions,
whether or not these decisions are correct, from the vantage point of critical cul-
tural or abstract theories.
94. Ethical intuitionism holds that a moral theory should be elegant and must match
each considered intuition. If the theory fails to match an intuition, the theory
must be rejected. According to this view, our pre-theoretical intuitions are sacro-
sanct and remain constant throughout history. Whenever there is a conflict be-
tween one's intuitions and theory, one's intuitions win. A theory may provide a
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How a person resolves the problem of intuition over principle de-
short-hand device for referring to a set of considered intuitions, but the theory
never has any independent epistemic significance. The theory cannot be a means
of deriving novel ethical knowledge, or of requiring the abandonment of a consid-
ered intuition. A corollary of the intuitionist position is that there is always the
possibility of several irreducible intuitions with no more general principles under
which they can be subsumed. Indeed, these intuitions may encompass a plurality
of moral principles and values. See also W.D. Ross, FouNDATIoNs OF ETHICS
(1960) (describing the ethical intuitionist program and its hostility toward ethical
theories); Shiffrin, supra note 28, at 1201 (arguing that a theory of rights must be
based on persistent intuitions). Cf. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE Lm-
ERAL STATE 349-55 (1980)(arguing against intuitionism). Notice there is an ambi-
guity in the notion of "intuition." It might stand for a pre-theoretical belief or it
might refer to an infallible process of obtaining knowledge. My use of the term
"intuition" is restricted to the first sense only.
There are, of course, standard objections to ethical intuitionism and formal-
ism. First, ethical intuitionism has been criticized for taking intuition too seri-
ously. According to this objection, there is no reason to regard intuitions as
incorrigible or unrevisable. Intuitions derive from a particular society and con-
tain the prejudices of that society. Regarding intuitions as sacrosanct constitutes
nothing more than dignifying the prejudices of that society. Additionally, such a
methodology leaves us bereft of a procedure for determining which intuition is
right when the intuitions of different people or societies conflict. Because there
is no obvious intuitionist answer to this problem, ethical agreement is illusory.
Perhaps, more importantly, a single person's intuitions often conflict. If there is
no way to go beyond intuitions in ethical reasoning, there would be no way for a
solitary practical reasoner to generate his own moral judgments. Only by at-
tempting to devise moral theories as, among other things, a way of testing or
criticizing moral intuitions can we hope to avoid ethical skepticism.
To demand a theory match all our considered intuitions is to require too much
of the theory because it is unlikely any rationale will fit all our intuitions. At
least, there is no a priori reason to think that it should. Some intuitions will, no
doubt, be inconsistent with others, and thus some will have to be abandoned.
This should remain a possibility even if it, in fact, should turn out to be false. If a
moral theory is to be more than a mere rationalization or apology for our
prejudices, we must consider the possibility that some intuitions are false. To
require the theory match all our considered intuitions is to rule out this possibil-
ity in advance.
95. If ethical intuitionism denigrates theory, ethical formalism distrusts intuition.
Instead, formalism seeks to find systematic principles of reason or language that
are elegant and provide a way of determining which moral judgments are true. A
theory need not match any considered intuitions as long as it is elegant and gener-
ates judgments with which we can live. When there is a conflict between theory
and intuition, it is the intuition that must give way. For example, suppose one
devises a theory showing the absolute necessity of telling the truth. This theoret-
ical principle conflicts with the intuition that we should lie to a murderer when
he, asks the whereabouts of an innocent victim the murderer intends to kill. On a
formalistic view, the intuition should be abandoned. See I. KANT, GROUNDWORK
TO A METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1964); I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
(1951). See R. Hare, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT 11
(1981) (contrasting the allegedly different epistemic roles of linguistic and moral
intuitions). See also Hare, Liberty and Equality: How Politics Masquerades as
Philosophy, in LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 1, 3, 6 (1985)(all illustrating Hare's ethical
formalism); Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice, in READING RAWLS (N. Daniels ed.
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
pends on her meta-moral theory, that is, her views regarding the
methodology appropriate to moral and political theory construction.
Intuitionists decide the issue in terms of the considered intuitions.
Formalists, such as Kant, Hare and some act-utilitarians97 decide in
favor of the principle. Those endorsing Rawls' method of reflective
1975). See Bayles, Intuition in Ethics, 23 DIALOGUE 439, 452 (1984); Singer, Sidg-
wick and Reflective Equilibrium, 58 THE MONIST 490, 516 (1974)(denigrating the
role of intuitions in ethical theory). Cf. Quinn, Truth and Explanation in Ethics,
96 ETHIcs 524, 530 (1986)(distinguishing three kinds of moral intuitions).
Ethical formalism has been criticized for not taking intuitions seriously. Per-
ennial intuitions help define our ethical conceptual scheme. Though our intu-
itions may not be sacrosanct, they are an important starting place for, and a test
of, newly developing ethical theories. Denying this role to intuitions would be
tantamount to admitting the possibility that all our intuitions are false. And such
a result is absurd. Since intuitions are the subject matter or building blocks of
ethical theory, some intuitions must be true.
The supposition that an elegant theory may be acceptable despite not match-
ing any of our considered intuitions is implausible. There does not seem to be any
reason for constructing such a theory in the first place. Taking a formalistic view,
our intuitions simply provide a stepping stone for developing a moral theory. The
theory then has a life of its own and its value lies in its having implications with
which we can live. If the theory has unacceptable implications, then we abandon
the theory. We must be prepared to let the theory generate whatever judgments
it implies--and hope we can live with the results.
96. Reflective equilibrium presumably avoids the defects in ethical intuitionism and
ethical formalism while retaining their virtues. According to this method, a the-
ory must be elegant and match some of the more centrally considered intuitions.
In this view, it is generally improper to choose theory over intuition or vice versa
as a matter of methodological principle. Sometimes we abandon the theories and
other times we abandon the intuitions. Our goal is to hold a set of our intuitions
and a theory in a "reflective equilibrium." In doing this, we sometimes modify
our considered intuitions to fit the theory, while other times we revise the theory
to fit our considered intuitions. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51
(1971)(describing how reflective equilibrium works). See also A. GOLDMAN, EPIs-
TEMOLOGY AND COGNITION 66 (1986) (endorsing reflective equilibrium as a method
in epistemology); Daniels, Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points, 10
CAN. J. PHIL. 83 (1980).
Imagine an ethical conceptual scheme consisting of concentric circles, each
circle representing principles deriving from reflective intuitions. The more cen-
tral a principle is, the less likely we will abandon it in favor of a theory. On the
other hand, if a particular theory helps us systematize and order our ethical con-
ceptual scheme, i.e., if it has significant explanatory power, even a central princi-
ple may be abandoned. Based on this view, no principle is immune from revision;
none must be retained at all costs. We can even abandon well entrenched moral
principles even though we cannot do it all at once. On the other hand, principles
contained in a moral theory must be tested, in part, by determining how well they
preserve the truth of more central intuitions. Without anchoring a moral theory
(at least temporarily) in more central intuitive principles, the theory loses its con-
nection with its subject matter and loses the right to be called a moral theory.
97. Act-utilitarians contend that a particular act is right if, and only if, it maximizes
happiness. Act-utilitarians differ from rule-utilitarians since rule-utilitarians be-
lieve that an act is right if it follows from a rule which, if adopted, would maxi-
mize happiness.
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equilibrium do not decide this issue in advance. When a principle is
very attractive, one abandons the intuition. When the intuition is cen-
tral to one's ethical conceptual scheme, one repudiates the principle.
There is a pragmatic element in this process. No a priori rules exist
telling us to always choose intuitions over theory or theory over
intuitions.
This process of "reflective equilibrium" has an application to con-
stitutional theory. There are no a priori answers to the question of
how we decide a case when precedent and normative attractiveness
collide. What we must do is to pragmatically evaluate the precedent's
comparative value against the value of the novel principle and decide
which is more important in a given case.98 This is a pragmatic proce-
dure, one which eschews a mechanical or lexical method for deciding
how closely a principle must fit our intuitions.99 Our decisions, in
cases of conflict of this type, are influenced by a moral and political
theory.
D. The Nature of Constitutional Revolutions
1. Foundational Constitutional Provisions
Constitutional provisions are foundational in the sense that they
determine the meaning and application of critical constitutional con-
cepts throughout the legal system. So, if the Court defines equal pro-
tection in a certain manner, all other areas of relevant adjudication
must reflect that foundational interpretation. Furthermore, if there
were two constitutional provisions that bear on the same issue, and
one of these provisions is foundational and the other not, the first pro-
vision provides constraints on the interpretation of the second provi-
sion. One principal question in constitutional law is how foundational
constitutional provisions acquire their meaning. The traditional pic-
ture of constitutional adjudication postulates the existence of a fairly
recognizable methodology which is neutral between the parties; this
methodology can determine which party should prevail in a given
case.100 The theory of constitutional revolutions, on the other hand,
denies the existence of such a methodology and instead maintains that
98. This process does not necessarily simply entail a balancing procedure as the ulti-
mate standard of evaluation. Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Bal-
ancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987)(evaluating the major forms of constitutional
balancing).
99. Essentially, we seek a fit between some subset of all possible moral principles,
their justifying theories and our considered judgments, as well as the considered
judgments of society. In other words, we seek a wide reflective equilibrium. K.
NIELSEN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY: A DEFENSE OF RADIcAL EGALITARIANISM 27
(1985).
100. Furthermore, the traditional view insists that the solution to the problem exists
in constitutional law prior to a judicial determination.
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foundational constitutional provisions acquire their meaning through
constitutional revolutions.101
2. Foundational Decisions
A Supreme Court decision is the final authoritative statement of
American constitutional law.102 Until such a decision is overruled,
that decision becomes a controlling constitutional principle. More-
over, a constitutional foundational principle occupies a central place in
the background theory, specifically, in the relativistic constitutional
background theory. It makes no sense to declare that a foundational
constitutional decision says one thing, but that the principle upon
which the decision is based is not reflected in the relativistic back-
ground theory. For example, if separation of the races is constitution-
ally permissible, then the separate but equal principle controls the
concept of equal protection in the relativized constitutional back-
ground theory. The constitutional background theory is the systema-
tized set of foundational decisions of the Court interpreting key
provisions of the Constitution. Consequently, the actual declarations
of the Court must find refuge in the relativized theory.
3. Constitutional Revolutions
Constitutional revolutions 0 3 are landmark decisions that deter-
mine what the law is in a given area.10 4 Constitutional revolutions
101. Constitutional revolutions are changes in the meaning of constitutional provi-
sions. See Lipkin, supra note 14.
102. Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1044-45 (1977).
103. By "constitutional revolution," I mean a legal change not clearly authorized by
the Constitution. See R. HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, THEIR NATURE,
PowERs AND LIMITATIONS 33 (1917). Such unauthorized change is not necessarily
illegitimate. If the possibility of this type of change is a feature of constitutional
practice, we can jettison revolutionary methodology only by abandoning or radi-
cally altering the practice. Achieving this monumental counter-revolution itself
requires numerous revolutions throughout constitutional law. Explaining our
federal judiciary is impossible without the notion of a constitutional revolution.
104. Constitutional revolutions fundamentally change the character of the legal sys-
tem. See H. KELSEN, supra note 3, at 368 (stating "the State and its legal order
remain the same only as long as the constitution is intact or changed according to
its own provisions"). A constitutional revolution may involve defining an ab-
stract constitutional provision, or overriding a prior Supreme Court decision.
There are, of course, other types of revolutionary legal change. See A. WATSON,
THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 110 (1985). See also J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL
SYSTEM (1970)(discussing the identity and individuation of laws); Finnis, Revolu-
tions and Continuity of Law, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 44 (A. Simp-
son ed. 1973) (discussing what counts as a change in the identity of a legal system).
Interestingly, the process of constitutional revolution is an alternative process
of amending the Constitution. Generally, this Article presupposes that any con-
stitutional scheme, or system of practical rules, not having an easily accessible
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may break new ground or reverse prior decisions.105 In any case, a
constitutional revolution is revolutionary because it does not follow
formal process of amendment, will develop an alternative revolutionary process.
The formal amendment process in American constitutionalism is difficult to de-
ploy; hence, revolutionary adjudication is inevitable. If the founders had created
a less cumbersome process for amending the Constitution not controlled by Con-
gress, the nature of American revolutionary constitutionalism might be very dif-
ferent. On Congress' role in the amending process see Dellinger, The Legitimacy
of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARv. L. REV.
386 (1983). But see Dellinger, Constitutional Politics: A Rejoinder, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 446 (1983); Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Re-
strained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1983).
Constitutional revolutions can be explained only by appealing to factors ex-
trinsic to constitutional law. See Lipkin, supra note 14, at 738. There is some-
thing inevitable about the revolutionary constitutional process. Consider this
statement: 'Despite its tone, and despite the way we often talk about it, the Con-
stitution has no force except to the extent that it is invoked and used by individ-
ual Americans pursuing actual goals. Until used it is inert. Alone it can do
nothing." J. WHiTE, supra note 57, at 244.
Others have recognized that the form and content of judicial review are based
upon neither the text, intent, history, structure or logic of the Constitution, nor,
until Marbury, upon precedent. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Grey, supra note 9; Grey, supra note 15;
Shaman, The Constitution, the Supreme Cour and Creativity, 9 HASTiNGS
CONST. L.Q. 257, 258-66 (1982); Shaman, The Rule of Reasonableness in Constitu-
tional Adjudicatm Toward the End of Irresponsible Judicial Review and the
Establishment of a Viable Theory of the Equal Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS
CoNsT. L.Q. 153, 171-72 (1975).
Consider also:
Our own Federal Constitution is an admirable specimen of written law.
Its framers, well knowing the folly of attempts to foresee the future,
confined themselves to large general enactments under which any of the
policies which experience in the actual course of human events should
advise might be adopted. If it had been pointed out to them that under
the instrument they had framed with a jealous care to limit the central
power, banks could be chartered, railroads constructed, seceding States
reduced to subjection by war, the privileges of the mail service denied to
lotteries in which many of the States themselves participated, and the
President of the United States exercise authority to permanently rule
over populations of millions inhabiting territories in distant seas, it
would have commanded the assent of but a feeble minority, but had they
lived to the present time all or most of these successive extensions of
Federal power might have been acquiesced in by them as authorized by
their own language.
J. CARTER, supra note 52, at 319.
105. The Court itself describes a revolutionary strategy when it says that:
[w]e must realize that they [the words of the Constitution] have called
into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a cen-
tury and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that
they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light
of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hun-
dred years ago.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 433 (1929).
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directly106 from the Constitution itself or from any intrinsic constitu-
tional background theory.107 Constitutional revolutions, when justi-
fied, are decisions based on pragmatic grounds, namely, that the
decision makes our constitutional democracy better from the perspec-
tive of moral or political theory. When a constitutional revolution oc-
curs, for example, in free speech cases, adjudication in that area
reflects a new model for deciding controversial cases.'08 Once the
revolution is completed, constitutional adjudication in that area be-
comes normal. In normal adjudication, the new constitutional para-
digm provides the precedental authority for deciding cases in that
area. The new paradigm provides answers to such questions as which
facts raise a relevant constitutional issue, what standard of review is
appropriate, upon whom does the burden lie, and which facts will be
dispositive. Normal adjudication generates decisions that, although
not self-evident, are readily seen by members of the litigating commu-
nity as flowing from the paradigm.10 9 At times, the precise nature of
the revolutionary paradigm achieves no consensus and adjudication in
that area cannot be stabilized.110
E. Stages of Constitutional Adjudication
The Kuhnian distinction between revolutionary and normal sci-
106. Of course, one could argue that most decisions follow indirectly from the Consti-
tution but what does "indirectly" mean? Terms like "indirectly" and "implicitly"
are weasel words used when we believe, often without evidence, that something
follows from the Constitution, but, however hard we try, we cannot prove it. I do
not mean to suggest it is impossible to construct a theory of "indirection." How-
ever, until we have such a theory, talk of a decision flowing indirectly from the
Constitution, and rights implicit in the Constitution, are virtually meaningless.
107. Talking about constitutional revolutions is compatible with, but does not entail, a
revolutionary political stance. Essentially, constitutional revolutions are concep-
tual revolutions, revolutions concerning how we envision and dispose of impor-
tant constitutional problems. However, since these constitutional problems can
also be political and moral problems, constitutional revolutions may exhibit some
of the features of political revolutions. Therefore, a constitutional revolution
falls somewhere between a scientific revolution and a political revolution. A sci-
entific revolution is a conceptual revolution; whereas a political revolution is a
romantic concept, "designed . . . to re-create the self of the [revolutionary] by
transforming the world he lives in." J. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME
276-77 (1971).
108. For example, with respect to the advocacy of unlawful conduct, the clear and
present danger model has been redefined by the paradigm in Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
109. This statement does not mean that there are no advances in normal adjudication.
Normal adjudication involves problem-solving which creates incremental
changes in the paradigm, but does not change it conceptually.
110. If one believes that normal adjudication is the goal of revolutionary adjudication,
then this is an unacceptable eventuality. In times of instability, the Court must
finally define the paradigm with precision in order to permit the implementation
of normal adjudication.
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ence"I together with Rorty's distinction between revolutionary and
normal discourse' 2 serve as models for understanding constitutional
adjudication.113 In this section, I will use these distinctions 14 to ex-
plain the dualistic nature of constitutional law.
In order to fully appreciate the dualistic dimension of the evolution
of constitutional law, it will be useful to describe both the traditional
and Kulnian conceptions of science. Both these conceptions address
the question: how does science progress?
1. Scientifw Change
a. The Traditional Conception
The traditional conception contends that there is cumulative
growth in scientific knowledge. New scientific discoveries add to the
prior body of scientific knowledge. On this view, a scientific theory
explains phenomena and therefore pictures reality.1"5 If that theory
is then discarded, it is due to its failure to explain all the relevant phe-
nomena. Though discarded, it still pictures a part of reality. A theory
that replaces the first theory explains both what the first model ex-
plained and what it failed to explain. Scientific knowledge is there-
fore cumulative. Each successive theory provides information that
increases scientific knowledge.116 Consequently, on the traditional
view of scientific development, scientific development occurs ration-
ally because each change can be explained by reference to a prior the-
111. T. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION (1977) [hereinafter ESSENTIAL TENSION]; T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvoLUTioNs (1969) [hereinafter SCIEN-
TIFIC REVOLUTIONS]; Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in CRITICISM AND THE
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (1970) [hereinafter CRITICISM]. The analogy between
constitutional and scientific revolutions is far from perfect. However, attending
to the structure of scientific revolutions is a promising heuristic device for begin-
ning a systematic explanation of revolutionary and normal moments in constitu-
tional adjudication.
112. Consider Rorty's statement of this distinction:
[N]ormal discourse [adjudication] is that which is conducted within an
agreed-upon set of conventions about what counts as a relevant contribu-
tion, what counts as answering a question, what counts as having a good
argument for that answer or a good criticism of it. Abnormal discourse
[adjudication] is what happens when someone joins in the discourse [ad-
judication] who is ignorant of these conventions or who sets them aside.
R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 320 (1979).
113. Lipkin, supra note 14, at 734-37. For an independent application of Kuhn's con-
ception of scientific revolutions to law, see Castro, The Erie Doctrine and the
Structure of Constitution Revolutions, 62 TULANE L. REV. 907 (1988).
114. Since Rorty's distinction is derived from Kuhn's, I will concentrate on Kuhn's use
of the distinction.
115. I do not mean to imply that the traditional conception of scientific progress is
inextricably connected to a correspondence theory of truth.
116. Similarly, law develops cumulatively, with each new decision extending and re-
vising prior law.
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ory. This process enables scientific knowledge to move closer and
closer to a complete view of reality.
b. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Thomas Kuhn has argued persuasively that scientific development
and change does not occur in this fashion.117 Scientists or the scientific
community acquire paradigms or models that determine the concepts,
methodologies and scientific laws in a given area of science. 1 s8 The
paradigm functions as the model,119 exemplar'2 0 or "master-theory" 12 1
which is part of a "disciplinary matrix" 2 2 employed by the scientific
community1 23 in a particular scientific enterprise. 124 In these circum-
stances, scientists agree on the basic concepts and methods of their
respective disciplines. As a result of this agreement concerning the
scientific paradigm-a period called "normal science"'125 -scientists
117. I do not mean that I believe that Kuhn is clearly correct. Rather, my use of his
model depends only upon the fact that his theory must be taken seriously.
118. Kuhn's use of the notion of a "paradigm" is not without its difficulty. See Mas-
terman, The Nature of a Paradigm, in CRITICISM, supra note 111, at 59, 61-65 (ar-
guing that Kuhn uses "paradigm" in 21 different senses).
119. A model supplies a particular scientific community "with preferred or permitted
analogies and metaphors" for carrying on normal scientific investigation. SCIEN-
TIFIc REVOLUTIONS, supra note 111, at 184.
120. An exemplar is the paradigmatic application of a theory to phenomena. See F.
SUPPE, THE STRUCTURE OF ScIENTIFIc THEORIES 139 (2nd ed. 1977).
121. S. TouumIN, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 100 (1972).
122. ScIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 111, at 182.
123. Kuhn gives the notion of the scientific "community" an important status in un-
derstanding the relation between normal and revolutionary science. See gener-
ally W. HAGSTROM, THE SciENTIFIc COMMUNITY (1965)(describing the role of the
scientific community in deriving scientific knowledge). Essentially, the scientific
community socializes practitioners by inculcating in them particular scientific
norms. See G. WISE, AMERICAN HISTORICAL EXPLANATIONS 2D 124 (1980).
124. When the scientific community adopts a novel paradigm, the new paradigm de-
termines what counts as good reasoning in that area. Shapere, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, in PARADIGMS AND REVOLUTIONS: APPRAISALS AND AP-
PLICATIONS OF THOMAS KUHN'S PHILOSOPHirY OF SCIENCE 27, 36 (G. Gutting ed.
1980) [hereinafter PARADIGMS AND REVOLUTIONS]. A radical consequence of such
a view is that there are no good reasons for adopting the novel paradigm.
Whether Kuhn is committed to such a conclusion is not something we can answer
here. However, whether true of scientific revolutions or not, constitutional revo-
lutions have a matrix of potentially good reasons for adopting the novel constitu-
tional paradigm. These reasons usually derive from moral and political theory,
but can also result from economics and social science.
125. For Kuhn, "normal science" means research firmly based upon one or more past
scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community
acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundations for its further practice. SCI-
ENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 111, at 10. During such "normal periods there
is a consensus on the guiding principles of research.., a consensus reinforced by
the dogmatic style of scientific education." Musgrave, Kuhn's Second Thoughts,
in PARADIGMS AND REVOLUTIONS, supra note 124, at 41.
According to Kuhn, coherent scientific traditions develop once a paradigm is
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are able to solve a myriad of problems defined by the paradigm.
Within normal science, progress is cumulative as scientists extend and
refine the nature of the paradigm.1 26
Generally in normal science, dissent over the foundations of the
domain is suppressed. Scientists cannot accumulate knowledge when
there is continuous debate as to the nature of the paradigm governing
their scientific efforts.1 27 As long as normal science succeeds in solv-
ing problems within the confines of the paradigm, suppressing dissent
is perfectly acceptable.= 8 A crisis occurs, however, when scientists
are no longer able to make progress within normal science.129 In these
circumstances, dissent becomes possible. If the crisis cannot be over-
come, a scientific revolution occurs and a familiar paradigm is aban-
doned and replaced by another.13 0
According to Kuhn, the second paradigm is revolutionary; it cannot
be explained by reference to the prior paradigm.13 ' In fact, sometimes
the successive paradigms are completely incompatible. Surprisingly, a
paradigm may not answer precisely the same question as its predeces-
decided upon. SCIENTIFc REVOLUTIONS, supra note 111, at 10. A shared para-
digm determines the appropriate means for solving problems within that scien-
tific enterprise. Id. at 23. A scientific paradigm, 'like an accepted judicial
decision in the common law... is an object for further articulation and specifica-
tion under new or more stringent conditions." Id.
Normal science develops within a framework, which "must be lived with and
explored." Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in CRMcisM, supra note 111, at 242.
This development "is generally a cumulative process by which the accepted be-
liefs of a scientific community are fleshed out, articulated, and extended." Id. at
251. Of course, this assumes that we can distinguish between conceptual change
within the same enterprise and conceptual change that creates a new enterprise.
But see Toulmnin, Does the Distinction Between Normal and Revolutionary Sci-
ence Hold Water?, in CnrrIcIsm, supra note 111, at 49.
126. The process of normal science has a simple epistemological point. Obtaining
knowledge only takes place when practitioners share the same framework for
solving problems in that area. In normal science, practitioners agree on the
methods for problem solving while, in revolutionary periods, this agreement is
absent.
127. Certainly, questions about the precise nature of the paradigm can arise. How-
ever, such questions must be infrequent or the explanatory power of the para-
digm and the possibility of normal science diminishes.
128. Pragmatically, if a working paradigm enables scientists in a particular scientific
domain to solve what they consider to be important problems, then there is no
need for dissent over the foundations of the domain.
129. Kuhn modified his view about the relationship between crises and revolutionary
science. Crises usually precede revolutions; however, they are not a necessary
precursor to all revolutionary science. SCM=NrC REVOLUIONS, supra note 111,
at 181.
130. In Kuhn's view, one never abandons a scientific paradigm without replacing it
with another. Changes in constitutional paradigms occur in a similar fashion.
131. SCIENTIFIC REvOLuTIONs, supta note 111, at 103 (arguing that "[t]he normal-sci-
entific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible
but often actually incommensurable with that which has gone before").
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sor.'
3 2 Since paradigms do not always address the same problems, one
paradigm cannot be explained as the rational outgrowth of a former
paradigm. Scientific communities change paradigms for pragmatic
reasons, i.e., because the new paradigm is a better predictor, not neces-
sarily because one paradigm is ideally or rationally superior to its
predecessor. 33
2. Constitutional Paradigms
Constitutional paradigms are interpretations of foundational con-
stitutional provisions. 3 4 Like scientific paradigms, constitutional par-
adigms determine how a particular constitutional problem is to be
conceptualized as well as what arguments and facts are relevant to
disposing of the case.1 3 5 Specifically, a constitutional paradigm deter-
mines the following: (1) the type of facts that give rise to the relevant
constitutional question; (2) the standard of review to be employed; (3)
the analytic framework for discussing and evaluating the facts; (4) the
rules of law to be applied; and (5) the available remedies.
The present equal protection paradigm illustrates the nature of a
constitutional paradigm. According to this paradigm, the Court
should engage in heightened scrutiny whenever a piece of legislation
burdens a suspect classification or a fundamental right. In cases not
involving a suspect classification or fundamental right, the Court
should, according to the present paradigm, defer to the legislature.136
While this basically describes the concept of equal protection, the
132. Indeed, two successive paradigms may not relate to the same reality. Since para-
digms in part determine reality, "[t]here is not one reality against which all puta-
tive knowledge can be measured." R. TRIGG, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL SCIENCE 28
(1985).
133. Depending upon the level of generality, all paradigms address the same problem.
For example, if we want to know how the planets move, both Ptolemaic and Co-
pernican models provide an answer to this same question. However, asking a
more refined question concerning Copernican movement may not be translatable
into a Ptolemaic scheme.
Kuhn's conception of scientific revolutions blurs the distinction between sci-
ence and art. In fact, Kuhn's theory rejects the dichotomy between scientific and
artistic revolutions. G. VATTIMO, THE END OF MODERNITY: NIHILISM AND HERME-
NEUTICS IN POST-MODERN CULTURE 91 (1985).
134. A case of first impression usually calls for revolutionary adjudication.
135. There are many different kinds of constitutional paradigms. Some paradigms
pertain to the entire discipline of constitutional law such as judicial review as
stated in Marbury. Other paradigms are sub-disciplinary, such as the levels of
review in equal protection analysis.
136. Recently, there has been some movement to toughen this level of review in cer-
tain cases. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)(invali-
dating social legislation on an invigorated rational basis scrutiny); Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)(suggesting that the rational basis
standard is not entirely toothless).
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present paradigm is slightly more complex.137 When a classification
involves gender, an intermediate level of scrutiny is invoked. Some
Justices would like to see something like this middle level of judicial
review replace the fundamental rights strand of the two-tier ap-
proach.s3 8 If successful, this would involve a restructuring of the pres-
ent constitutional paradigm.' 3 9
The holding in Plessy v. Ferguson includes a constitutional para-
digm. The Plessy paradigm states that when the physical facilities are
the same, equal protection is satisfied even when the races are segre-
gated.140 In other words, given its best reading, the holding in Plessy
rested on the conviction that the equal protection clause was satisfied
so long as both races were given access to equal physical surroundings
on trains. The Plessy court refused to constitutionalize the psychologi-
cal stigma suffered by blacks as a result of segregation. According to
the paradigm in Plessy, if the physical environment was the same, psy-
chological stigma was constitutionally irrelevant to the question of
equal protection.
Brown v. Board of Education was a constitutional revolution over-
ruling Pkssy.14 1 The Brown paradigm, based on extensive, if some-
what dubious social scientific evidence,142 states that in educational
137. Some might say that the paradigm is slightly more confused. One problem here
is whether it makes sense to speak of three standards of review, or whether one
standard of reasonableness is sufficient.
138. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. The new paradigm would concern itself with "the character of the classification
in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted
state interests in support of the classification." Id. at 521 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
140. Another interesting feature of constitutional paradigms is that old paradigms,
though repudiated formally, do not always entirely lose their influence. For a
parallel with science see Martins, The Kuhnian 'Revolution' and Its Implications
for Sociology, in IMAGINATION AND PRECISION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 13, 35
(1972).
Multiple or competing paradigms often characterize constitutional develop-
ment and change. One might even characterize constitutional law as a multiple-
paradigm discipline. Cf. G. RrrzER, SOCIOLOGY: A MULTIPLE PARADIGM SCIENCE
12 (1980)(describing a multiple paradigm science as one "in which there are sev-
eral paradigms vying for hegemony within the field as a whole"). The standard
tensions within constitutional debate suggest that there is more than one para-
digm operating and "that supporters of one paradigm are constantly questioning
the basic assumptions of those who accept other paradigms." Id. In constitu-
tional theory there exist several competing paradigms of such important concepts
as nationalism, federalism, individual rights and so forth.
141. Strictly speaking, Brown did not overrule Plessy. Brown's holding applied only to
educational contexts.
142. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954), states the social scientific
basis of the contention that segregation impedes education. Does this contention
really require the support of social scientific evidence?
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contexts racial segregation precludes equality of education.143 Under
the old paradigm, equality in physical accommodations satisfied con-
stitutional requirements. The new paradigm dispensed with the possi-
bility of such proof, holding that segregation itself precludes equality.
Together, Brown and several subsequent cases represent a broader
constitutional paradigm concerning equality in public facilities.144
This broader paradigm stated that segregation in public facilities was
intolerable.145 In issuing the decisions perfunctorily, the Court "obvi-
ously meant to teach that Brown was to be read broadly as a declara-
tion of American policy that race relations will not be solved by
apartheid."146
3. Revolutionary Adjudication
A jurisprudential theory must be evaluated from two different per-
spectives. The first perspective, a temporal perspective, concerns it-
self with legal practice over time, while the second perspective
concerns itself with legal practice on a case-by-case basis.147 From the
temporal perspective, constitutional revolutionary adjudication is cyc-
lical.148 Creative periods are followed by uneventful periods.149 Peri-
ods of revolutionary adjudication are followed by periods exalting
precedent.150 The salient feature of constitutional revolutions is that
143. The argument in Brown need not rely on social scientific evidence. Just as the
Court in Plessy appealed to so called "common knowledge," the appeal in Brown
can be understood as an appeal to common sense knowledge about the effects of
exclusion.
144. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963)(abolishing segregation in courtroom seat-
ing); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962)(abolishing segregation in
airport restaurants and restrooms); State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S.
533 (1959)(abolishing racial segregation in athletic contest); Florida ex reL Haw-
kins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956)(abolishing racial discrimination in
admission to tax-supported law school); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903
(1956)(abolishing racial segregation of buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S.
879 (1955)(abolishing racial segregation in public golf facilities); Mayor of Balti-
more v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)(abolishing racial segregation in public
beaches and bathhouses); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971
(1954) (abolishing segregation in parks).
145. If Brown is taken to rest primarily on the contention that segregation impedes
educational progress, how does the paradigm in Brown extend to public facilities
such as golf courses? The Court would have been much more candid had it de-
clared in Brown that invidious racial discrimination must not be tolerated regard-
less of questions concerning stigma or educational progress. Alternatively, the
Court might have stated that segregation stigmatizes, and such a stigma is incom-
patible with treating an individual as an equal member of society.
146. Craven, Paean to Pragmatism, 50 N.C.L. REv. 977, 990 (1972).
147. R. DwoRKiN, supra note 3, at 135-36 & 157.
148. As in science, there are many different types of revolutions in constitutional adju-
dication. See W. HAGSTROM, supra note 123, at 259-60.
149. See G. GILMoRE, supra note 18.
150. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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they find their source in factors extrinsic to the Constitution.' 5 '
Constitutional revolutions occur in the "context of social, eco-
nomic, and ideological upheaval." 52 Constitutional revolutions are
designed to resolve conflicts, to order and control social change.53
Constitutional revolutions occur when the Constitution fails to pro-
vide a readily accessible procedure for accommodating such change.154
More often than not, constitutions fail to provide such procedures, cre-
ating the need for revolutionary adjudication. Indeed, the notion of
adopting a "constitution" as opposed to a legal code is to license and to
direct'5 5 the areas in which constitutional revolutions should occur.' 5 6
In that sense, though particular constitutional revolutions are not im-
plied by their constitutions, the idea of constitutional revolutions is
151. If it is true that a principle of law follows from the Constitution several condi-
tions must be met. First, the principle must be explicitly stated in the Constitu-
tion. For example, the free speech protection of the first amendment. Second, it
must have a sufficient degree of specificity. For example, that Congress may de-
clare war, or that a President must be thirty-five years of age.
In some cases, principles directly implied by the text of the Constitution
clearly exist. For example, free speech implies free thought. If the government
could constitutionally deny free thought, free speech would be impossible for the
simple reason that speech expresses thought. Consequently, the first amendment
must protect thought as well as speech. The theory of constitutional revolutions
maintains that this strategy of inferring principles from the Constitution is
strictly limited. According to this theory, the claim that most important Supreme
Court decisions are implied by the Constitution is unpersuasive. Whether this is
true depends on the breadth of one's conception of implication. If one has a nar-
row conception of the term "implication," one will agree with me. If one's con-
ception of "implication" is expansive, one will find that the Constitution implies
many, if not all, important moral and political values. In my view, there is no
epistemological way to establish an expansive conception of "implication." Fur-
thermore, there is no way to decide between the narrow and expansive view of
implication. The only way of settling these issues is by an existential leap of faith.
152. Bestor, The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis, 69 AM. HIST. REV.
327, 328 (1964).
153. Consider.
A constitution, after all, is nothing other than the aggregate of laws, tra-
ditions, and understandings-in other words, the complex of institutions
and procedures-by which a nation brings to political and legal decision
the substantive conflicts engendered by changes in all, the varied aspects
of its societal life.
Id.
154. The process for amending the Constitution is not such a procedure.
155. Arguably, the ninth amendment licenses and directs constitutional revolutions.
156. Constitutional progress comes about when change brings us closer to achieving
the Constitution's ideals. On this view, we can say that Dred Scott, though revo-
lutionary, did not help us achieve these goals. G. JAcoBsoHN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE DECLINE OF CONsTITUIONAL AsPIRATION 108 (1986). Hence,
Dred Scott was decided incorrectly and should have been overruled by the Court,
as it was by the fourteenth amendment.
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the life-blood of any morally and politically acceptable constitution.15 7
Any society taking morality and politics seriously sets the stage for
revolutionary adjudication. Once revolutionary adjudication becomes
an integral part of constitutional practice, two factors make it impossi-
ble to abandon. First, it is a sign of the moral vitality of the legal sys-
tem that revolutionary adjudication has a structured, disciplined role
in legal practice.1 58 By "a structured, disciplined role in legal prac-
tice," I mean a role that shows how revolutionary adjudication con-
tributes to the solution of moral and political problems, as well as to
the stability of the legal system. The theory of constitutional revolu-
tions connects revolutionary adjudication and normal adjudication.15 9
The capacity of a legal system to select moral and political solutions to
its problems from the larger culture, and then incorporate these solu-
tions into conventional law has obvious survival value for any legal
system.160
157. Any acceptable constitution must be durable and flexible. Without revolutionary
adjudication this is impossible. But consider:
The refinements to which the Supreme Court of the United States
has resorted... have brought it about that the law is uncertain and that
the actual decisions reached by that august body are by some accounted
for by the personal predilections of the individual members of the court
rather than by the logical application of legal principles. Our constitu-
tional law is losing what legal character it may once have had, and is
becoming more or less a system of political science which at one time
favors the demands of the advocates of the maintenance of the status quo
in the domain of political relations, and at another is influenced by con-
ceptions of present economic and social needs.
F. GOODNOW, SocIAL REFORm AND THE CONST=U'ON 15-16 (1911). The error
here is to suppose that the Court ever functioned differently in constitutional
contexts. In short:
[t]he Supreme Court of the United States has really become a political
body of the supremest importance. For upon its determination depends
the ability of the national legislature to exercise powers whose exercise
is believed by many to be absolutely necessary to our existence as a dem-
ocratic republic. What we need more than anything else at the present
time is a consistent theory of constitutional interpretation, which will
permit of our orderly development as a nation in accordance with our
economic and social needs, and is not confined within the political and
legal conceptions of a century or more ago.
Id. at 16.
The theory of constitutional revolutions is a theory based on the belief that
"the political and legal conceptions of a century or more ago," as illustrated by
the Marshall Court, never restricted the role of the judiciary.
158. Revolutionary adjudication is unlikely in closed societies having a fixed moral
and political structure.
159. In American constitutional practice, revolutionary adjudication seeks its own sta-
bilization and normalcy. Through a process of creative change, a constitutional
revolution becomes a conventional feature of the legal system.
160. Typically, constitutional revolutions are successful. When a Court is inclined to
institute a revolution, it usually becomes an integral part of constitutional prac-
tice. The exceptions to this rule are notable. First, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419 (1793), was overturned by the adoption of the eleventh amendment.
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Second, once revolutionary adjudication is in place, an exhortation
to change is itself revolutionary. Consequently, there is something in-
consistent in calling for the end of revolutionary adjudication. Of
course, it is conceptually possible to call for a revolution to end all
future revolutions. However, it is difficult to see what apocalyptic vi-
sion could possibly justify this exhortation.
4. Normal Adjudication
Normal adjudication, like normal science, takes place within the
context of a shared paradigm which members of the legal community
use to define relevant facts, constitutional questions, appropriate ana-
lytic frameworks, arguments, conclusions and remedies. The Consti-
tution's text itself serves as a constitutional paradigm. Normal
adjudication can be based on constitutional language. When normal
adjudication is based on the text of the Constitution, its authority is
apparent. When a constitutional argument rests on history, the histor-
ical result must be uncontroversial. For example, no one can dispute
that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended the equal
protection clause to protect blacks. Any interpretation of that clause
that did not apply to blacks would be preposterous.161 When a consti-
tutional provision's historical purpose is controversial, it may not be
persuasive for that reason. The purpose of originalism is to settle con-
stitutional controversies, not to replicate them at the level of interpre-
tation. Similarly, the structure and logic of the Constitution is useful
in deciding constitutional issues when their implications are clear.
When implications are themselves controversial, these devices cannot
settle the issue and instead condemn us to eternal controversy. Nor-
mal adjudication functions by appealing to constitutional text, intent,
history, structure and logic. One can, of course, contend that all con-
stitutional decisions are derived from one or more of these conven-
tions. In my estimation, however, not only is such a contention
erroneous, but more importantly, constitutional scholarship demon-
strates just how erroneous it is.162 Despite the objections to the rea-
soning in Marbury v. Madison, for example, constitutional scholars
Second, Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), was partially
overturned by the incorporation theory. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1856), was overruled by the civil war amendments. A series of cases over-
ruled Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
473 (1954), overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Many hope, for very
different reasons of course, that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), have a similar destiny. Revolutionary adjudication
almost always resolves a moral or political problem that could not be resolved by
a direct application of the Constitution itself.
161. My point is that an interpretation excluding blacks from the protection of this
provision is impossible, not that such protection must be limited to blacks.
162. See infra note 214.
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still regard it as good law. Surely something other than the decision's
logic persuades scholars to endorse it.
There are three phases of normal adjudication: adjudication that
perfects the revolution, adjudication that stabilizes the revolution and
routine or ordinary adjudication.
a. Perfecting and Refining the Revolution
A constitutional revolution is a judicial decision establishing a
model for disposing of constitutional cases in that area of law. Once a
revolution occurs, the Court must then attempt to refine and perfect
the revolution so that the paradigm extends to every similar case. 163
Sometimes the paradigm entails a set of rights conflicting with
another set of rights.164 In such cases, the Court must find some crite-
ria to determine whose rights prevail. This does not necessarily entail
a balancing procedure. It might be that one set of rights, according to
the paradigm, is significantly more important than the other. Conse-
quently, the paradigm might explain why rights in these circum-
stances must be lexically ordered. This context should be
distinguished from a situation where a particular right is restricted by
irrelevant considerations, the purpose of which is to impede the activ-
ity the right entails.165 When this occurs, normal adjudication is
sabotaged. Because an irrelevant factor operates here, possibly even
the desire to overturn the paradigm, the paradigm is arbitrarily re-
stricted.166 As a result, we are deprived of discovering the full scope of
163. This is just the sort of process involved in normal science. B. BARNEs, T.S. KUHN
AND SociAL SCIENCE 46 (1982)(describing normal science as "a process of ex-
tending and filing out the realm of the known").
164. This can be illustrated by the cases dealing with the right of a parent or husband
to be informed about or to consent to an abortion. Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Ascroft, 462
U.S. 476 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The abortion
paradigm must determine whose rights take precedence in these cases.
165. The decisions disallowing federal payment for abortions are cases of this sort.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)(holding that federal payment is not required
for medically necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)(holding that
federal payment is not required for elective abortions). See Perry, Why the
Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Com-
ment on Harris v. McCrae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1120 (1980)(arguing that Mc-
Crae is "inconsistent with the narrowest possible coherent reading of Roe");
Simson, Abortion, Poverty and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 13 GA. L. REV.
505 (1979)(arguing that the restriction in Maher violates equal protection). See
also R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 176-84.
166. Such restrictions might be warranted in cases involving controversial moral ques-
tions. A forthright judge, however, will concede that her vote to restrict the right
is based on her conviction that no such right exists in the first place, rather than
pretend that there are neutral reasons for the restriction.
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the paradigm.167
Sometimes the creation of a paradigm does not settle every prob-
lem in that area. In Brown, the foundational paradigm for equal pro-
tection enunciated in PLessy was overturned. Racial segregation was
no longer consistent with the preferred equal protection paradigm.
Two questions immediately arise. The first question centers around
whether invidious discrimination is constitutionally invalid only in
cases involving racial discrimination or whether it applies as well to
other types of discrimination..68 When the Court proceeds beyond ra-
cial discrimination it alters the paradigm and extends the revolu-
tion.169 In such cases, the revolution is not complete until the law
becomes settled in the equal protection area.
The second question involves remedies. Do certain kinds of reme-
dies, such as affirmative action, follow from the new paradigm, or does
such a proposed remedy itself violate the paradigm? Until the appro-
priate remedies are determined, the revolution is incomplete. A rem-
edy itself might be revolutionary relative to what is thought possible
concerning remedies in that area.
The central concern during the period in which the paradigm is
perfected and refined is coherence with the paradigm. Coherentism
does not merely appeal to the paradigm as a precedent. Instead, it
attempts to create general principles which adequately state the essen-
tial values embodied in the paradigm. The logical limits of a paradigm
might not be obvious until the paradigm is perfected and refined. The
precise nature of the paradigm's values are not revealed until the logi-
cal limits of the paradigm are determined.
It is important to say something more about the character of the
methodology employed when the paradigm is perfected and refined.
What sort of methodology is employed in this context? Is a pragmatic
or conventionalist methodology applied?17o Or is it some combination
of these approaches to constitutional law?
167. Arguably, Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977), are examples of this process.
168. There is an equal protection argument against supposing that the fourteenth
amendment can be restricted to racial classifications only. If special protection is
appropriate for those subject to racial classifications, and other groups have suf-
fered relevantly similar discrimination, then they deserve the same protection.
169. Such alterations need not be inappropriate. There might be a good argument for
generalizing the paradigm's core value. If so, the value should be stated not as
"equality for blacks," but "equality for an oppressed group." Typically, there is
no way to generalize the core value without an appeal to factors not contained
within the paradigm. Therefore, contrary to contemporary philosophical consen-
sus, there is a pragmatic element in the very process of generalization. For an
examination of contemporary philosophical attempts to analyze the concept of
generality in ethics see R. HARE, supra note 90. See also M. SINGER, GENERALIzA-
TION IN ETmICS (1961).
170. If coherence has a distinctive application, it is only during this period.
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Dworkin's theory, law as integrity,17 1 contends that a constitu-
tional decision must closely fit the constitutional paradigm. When two
possible decisions fit the paradigm, we should choose the one that pro-
vides the best interpretation of the constitutional practice from the
point of view of the community's moral and political convictions. Cul-
tural, moral and political considerations enter into this process. But
they enter into the process only insofar as they help identify the legal
paradigm decided in the revolutionary moment. Furthermore, these
considerations are only relevant when there are two or more possible
decisions consistent with the revolutionary paradigm. When there is
only one decision consistent with the paradigm, routine adjudication
occurs. While routine adjudication essentially adopts a conventional-
ist approach to constitutional law, revolutionary adjudication adopts a
pragmatic approach. Adjudication in the period of perfecting and re-
fining the revolution incorporates both conventionalist and pragmatic
elements in reaching constitutional decisions.
b. Stabilizing the Revolution
Once the revolutionary paradigm has been fully explored, the
revolution is refined and perfected. At that point, the Court begins to
stabilize the paradigm.172 Court decisions begin to explicitly deny the
extension of the paradigm. Sometimes this occurs when lower courts
fail to extend the paradigm and the Supreme Court denies certiorari.
Other times, the Court will take the case in order to prevent the ex-
tension of the paradigm.173 Once the Court responds in either of these
ways, the paradigm is completed and the revolution is stabilized.
Conceivably, perfecting the revolution could conflict with the
revolution's stabilization. In these circumstances, some courts appeal
to the revolutionary paradigm, while other courts continue to extend
and refine the paradigm. Such a process may continue indefinitely.
Usually, however, a higher court will decide whether the paradigm
needs further refining or whether it is time for stabilization.
c. Routine Adjudication
Routine adjudication is comprised of decisions that depend upon
171. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 3.
172. Ultimately, the inability of normal adjudication to stabilize the paradigm indi-
cates that a counter-revolution is likely. Sometimes a revolutionary paradigm is
stabilized, followed by routine adjudication, yet, a counter-revolution occurs any-
way. The period of revolutionary adjudication followed by normal adjudication
and then counter-revolution has been accurately described by Holmes as "that
period of dry precedent which is so often to be found midway between a creative
epoch and a period of solvent philosophical reaction." 0. HOLMEs, THE COMMON
LAW 72 (M. DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963).
173. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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well-accepted legal paradigms.174 By "well-accepted" I mean princi-
ples about which there is a consensus in the legal community regard-
ing the relevance of certain facts, the analytic framework and the
arguments and remedies to be deployed. Adjudication based directly
on a textually pellucid clause of the Constitution, or one that directly
follows from a controlling statute or Supreme Court decision, is rou-
tine adjudication. For example, deciding an economic or social welfare
case by adopting rational basis review is often routine.175 Such a case
unequivocally applies the framework set up by the paradigmatic case
or set of cases. Normal and routine adjudication took place in the
cases upholding separate but equal facilities following Plessy.176
Routine adjudication need not involve open and shut cases. The
facts might be complex and their proper interpretation and evaluation
might be unclear at the start. Routine cases, furthermore, may even
add a small wrinkle or nuance to the analytic framework set up by the
paradigm in that area of law. On the other hand, routine adjudication
may involve cases that never get litigated, or are handled summarily
by a court. According to the theory of constitutional revolutions, rou-
tine "adjudication" refers to what occurs in the courtroom, as well as
an attorney's office. In the latter case, routine adjudication occurs
when an attorney advises a client that he, the client, doesn't have a
cause of action or if he does, that his case is weak and he should settle.
F. Precursors to Revolution
In describing key constitutional cases as revolutionary, I do not
mean to imply that they are made of whole cloth. Nor do I mean to
say that constitutional revolutions have no constitutional basis upon
which to build. On the contrary, some are perfectly predictable.
There are important judicial precursors to some constitutional revolu-
tions which may be described as prerevolutionary adjudication.177
Indeed, the seeds of the revolution in Brown were evidenced by
two lines of cases. In 1944, the Court created the strict scrutiny strand
of equal protection analysis, making classifications based on racial
characteristics "immediately suspect."178 If no "pressing public neces-
174. Constitutional text or controlling Supreme Court precedent usually supply well-
accepted paradigms.
175. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
176. This is not to suggest that routine adjudication is always conceptually trivial or
easy to deploy. Many methods of routine adjudication exist such as following
precedent, distinguishing precedent, using statutory construction and logical
analysis, to name just a few. See D. RHODE & H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DEcI-
SION MAKING 34-49 (1976).
177. Generally, prerevolutionary adjudication is one stage of revolutionary adju-
dication.
178. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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sity"179 could justify the classifications, it had to be struck down. The
Court finally made it clear that racial antagonism1 8 0 could not justify a
statute that classified individuals according to race.
Although I believe that the strict scrutiny strand of equal protec-
tion analysis was a precursor to the principle in Brown, it is astound-
ing that it is not mentioned in Brown.1 8 1 The cases mentioned in
Brown were cases in which the Plessy doctrine was upheld, but inte-
gration was ordered due to unequal facilities.1 8 2 These cases indicate
the uneasiness the Court felt at this time with the doctrine in Plessy.
Precursors to revolutionary decisions come in different forms. The
difference between Korematsu v. United States183 and the cases up-
holding Plessy consists of this: the cases upholding Plessy were not
revolutionary in themselves. Instead, they were harbingers of a revo-
lutionary decision. Korematsu, on the other hand, was a revolutionary
decision in itself, laying the ground work for an even more significant
revolution.1 84 The revolution in Brown, combined with the revolu-
tionary Korematsu decision and the per curiam decisions after Brown,
represent a total rejection of the separate but equal doctrine.285 Sub-
sequently, the Brown revolution was extended from the segregation of
public facilities to associational values.1 8 6
179. Id.
180. Does "racial antagonism" include benign racial preference? The present Court
appears to be working towards such an inclusion.
181. Thurgood Marshall raised the Korematsu issue in the appellants' brief. However,
no mention of it or strict scrutiny can be found in the Brown opinion itself. Fur-
thermore, Marshall raised the issue of racial classifications and strict scrutiny at
oral argument, but Chief Justice Warren redirected Marshall to discuss the issue
of judicial power. B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME
COURT 83 (1983) [hereinafter SUPER CHIEF]. Perhaps Warren's desire for an opin-
ion "written in understandable English [avoiding] legalisms" explains the absence
of Korematsu or any mention of strict scrutiny analysis in the opinion. Id. at 97.
Still, strict scrutiny analysis would have made the Court's job that much easier.
The Court could have based its decision, even a rejection of Plessy, on Korematsu.
182. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Cumming v. County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S.
528 (1899).
183. 323 U.S. 214 (1944)(holding that legislation curtailing the civil rights of a single
race must be strictly scrutinized).
184. The revolution in Korematsu is limited to its statement of the strict scrutiny test
regarding statutes using racial classifications, not the decision to support the in-
carceration of Japanese Americans.
185. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTITrIONAL LAW 576 (3d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
186. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(striking down antimiscegenation statutes);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)(striking down a statute prohibiting
cohabitation between white and black people).
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G. Revolutionary Decisions as Responses to Crises
1. Constitutional Crises
Generally, a revolutionary constitutional decision is a response to a
perceived constitutional or social crisis. Crises occur for many rea-
sons. A crisis may occur when there is an intractable problem in con-
stitutional law itself, for example, when there is no paradigm in an
area involving much social and political upheaval. Crises also occur
when the current paradigm is indeterminate 8 7 or radically defective,
generating inconsistent decisions or decisions inconsistent with a good
paradigm in some other area of constitutional law.
A crisis may also occur when there is a constitutional paradigm
which conflicts with the political and moral convictions of some social
majority. Such a paradigm no longer solves the general social or
moral problem it was designed to solve. For example, the paradigm in
Plessy precipitated a constitutional and social crisis which led to its
replacement in Brown. A paradigm precipitates crisis when it is the
"correct" legal solution to a problem, but conflicts with deeply held
cultural or moral convictions. In these circumstances, something must
give.
The American Civil War represented a constitutional crisis. Eco-
nomic domination, human rights, states' rights and differences in re-
gional cultures all contributed to the crisis facing the nation during
the middle part of the nineteenth century. The limiting instance of a
constitutional crisis is one that is not satisfactorily resolved by the
courts or other governmental agencies and ultimately expresses itself
in war.18 8
Interestingly, a society's critical cultural convictions can then be
187. Many scholars associated with the Critical Legal Studies Movement contend that
every legal paradigm is indeterminate. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihil-
ism in Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
188. The American Civil War was such a crisis. Consider.
Within the span of a single generation-during the thirty-odd years that
began with the annexation of Texas in 1845 and ended with the with-
drawal of the last Union troops from the South in 1877-the United
States underwent a succession of constitutional crises more severe and
menacing than any before or since.
Bestor, supra note 152, at 327.
Furthermore, there is an even more interesting sense that the war between
the states was a constitutional crisis. Indeed:
"the very form that the conflict finally took was determined by the pre-
existing form of the constitutional system." The way the opposing forces
were arrayed against each other in war was a consequence of the way the
Constitution had operated to array them in peace. Because the Union
could be, and frequently had been, viewed as no more than a compact
among sovereign states, the dissolution of the compact was a conceivable
thing. It was constitutional theorizing, carried on from the very birth of
the Republic, which made secession the ultimate recourse of any group
that considered its vital interests threatened.
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seen as a foundation for, and a test of, the evolution of legal doctrine.
Within the confines of a stabilized paradigm, these convictions may be
appealed to only in exceptional circumstances. One need not ask
whether a case, clearly solvable in terms of the paradigm, is consistent
with the society's critical cultural convictions. One only asks whether
the case conforms to the constitutional paradigm. However, this is
only one possible outcome. When a number of these cases are decided
according to the paradigm, but still conflict with common sense or the
society's critical cultural theory, it is because the critical cultural per-
spective has changed. In such circumstances, a conscious shift in the
paradigm's meaning is appropriate.18 9
2. Revolutionary Theory Versus Formalism
The theory of constitutional revolutions contends that American
constitutionalism cannot be explained or understood without appeal-
ing to the concept of constitutional revolutions. No neutral or formal
methodology, for deciding constitutional cases, explains the actual de-
cisions. This has both explanatory and normative implications. If the
concept of revolutionary adjudication is necessary to explain our par-
ticular brand of constitutionalism, we ought to deploy it. We should
deploy this methodology barring a demonstration that our republic
and its distinctive brand of constitutionalism is morally pernicious and
therefore should not survive.
H. Dualistic Constitutional Methodology
Constitutional adjudication requires two distinctive types of meth-
odology. The first, revolutionary methodology, occurs when the Con-
stitution fails to provide an obvious solution to a pressing moral or
political problem. In these circumstances, judges solve the problem by
appealing to constitutionally extrinsic factors. The second, normal
methodology, perfects, refines and stabilizes a constitutional paradigm
until it becomes routine. The justification for our brand of constitu-
tionalism is pragmatic in that it has created the sort of society we de-
sire. Furthermore, it captures a conspicuously human virtue, namely,
a penchant for creative growth followed by an exploration and stabili-
zation of what has been created.
Id. at 329.
The decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), invalidat-
ing the Missouri Compromise and the permissibility of slavery in the territories,
was an ill-advised constitutional revolution. Limiting or doing away with slavery,
both in economic and moral terms, was clearly the way of the future. Invalidat-
ing a progressive solution to this problem, the Court paved the way for the most
destructive constitutional crisis of all.
189. When a paradigm no longer solves the moral, social, political or economic
problems it was designed to solve, it should be abandoned.
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III. REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
A. Introduction
The theory of constitutional revolutions is supported by the critical
accounts of the defective reasoning 90 in many pivotal constitutional
cases.191 Constitutional conservatives and liberals alike ascribe to
these criticisms.192 Of course, the decision may be sound as a piece of
political philosophy. 9 3 Although there is little point in my replicating
these discussions, it is necessary to provide some examples of the de-
fects in reasoning contained in some constitutional revolutions. Con-
sequently, I will discuss examples from two periods of constitutional
revolutions:194 the formative revolutions of the Marshall Court and
certain foundational equal protection and due process revolutions
from the Warren Court.195 Though there is room for dispute, I would
take it as a critical defect in the theory of constitutional revolutions if
a good number of the following cases were not considered revolution-
ary. Of course, there are different degrees of revolutionary adjudica-
tion. Some decisions are revolutionary per se; other decisions are
revolutionary within the context of a constitutional paradigm that is
itself a revolution. We can, therefore, analytically distinguish between
macro-revolutions and micro-revolutions. Macro-revolutions are deci-
sions creating new paradigms and are based entirely on pragmatic fac-
190. By "defective" I mean that the judicial conclusion does not follow from the
claimed authorities, that is, logically, the rule adopted is a non sequitur. Some-
times the conclusion follows only by presupposing the very issue in dispute.
191. Van Alstyne's examination of Marbury is an exemplar in this regard. Van Alys-
tyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1. See also infra
note 214.
192. Everyone appears to realize this, though few are willing to candidly admit it. See
Shaman, supra note 104.
193. For example, even if judicial review is revolutionary, it might still be desirable
relative to a particular conception of democracy, nationalism or both. To call ju-
dicial review revolutionary simply means that no normal constitutional or legal
argument can establish its legitimacy.
194. American constitutional history can be divided into three periods. During the
first period, from Marbury through the Civil War, the central constitutional
theme "was directed toward forging as strong a national union as law could pro-
duce." Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality, in JUDICIAL REviEw AND THE
SUPREME COuRT 1, 198, 213 (L. Levy ed. 1967). But see L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at
3 (arguing that the Marshall period was based on the model of checks and bal-
ances and a federalism giving the states their proper autonomy). The second pe-
riod, from 1870 to 1937, found the Court struggling with the appropriate role of
government in economic and social affairs. Finally, the last period, from 1937 to
the present, saw the greatest movement toward the protection of individual civil
rights and liberties. A complete statement of the theory of constitutional revolu-
tions must provide a method of classifying the different kinds of revolutions and
paradigms occurring during these periods.
195. This selection in no way purports to be an exhaustive account of constitutional
revolutions or the process by which constitutional adjudication evolves into nor-
mal adjudication.
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tors. Micro-revolutions are creations of sub-paradigms within the
overall purview of a major paradigm. Micro-revolutions are generated
by an appeal to both extrinsic pragmatic considerations, as well as an
appeal to the defining features of the paradigm. 96
What directs revolutionary adjudication is a moral or political ar-
gument that is not contained in the Constitution or in the relativized
constitutional theory. Occasionally, within a revolutionary paradigm,
a sub-paradigm is required for the original paradigm to succeed. Natu-
rally, a sub-paradigm is warranted only if the original paradigm is de-
sirable. Furthermore, the sub-paradigm must not conflict with any
other constitutional paradigms, or with extrinsic moral and political
factors. If the sub-paradigm is objectionable in either of these ways,
support for the original paradigm may be withdrawn. The decision
whether to retain an original paradigm must be made pragmatically.
Many of the following examples are cases that we could not now
imagine repudiating, however dubious their original justification. This
suggests that everyone supports revolutionary adjudication, even
those judges heralding originalism and judicial restraint. 97
There are several different types of constitutional revolutions. A
constitutional revolution occurs when the Court gives meaning to a
vague or indeterminate constitutional provision such as due process or
equal protection. Almost any important Court decision regarding
these provisions will be revolutionary. Consequently, vague or inde-
terminate constitutional provisions invite revolution. A constitutional
revolution also occurs when the Court creates standards for applying
constitutional provisions. For example, the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech involves revolutionary adjudication when the
Court formulates an elaborate framework for applying the provision.
Constitutional revolutions also occur when the Court renders a consti-
tutional provision a dead letter, as illustrated by the Court's interpre-
tation of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment.198
196. Revolutions, whether scientific or constitutional, come in different sizes. The es-
sential feature of either type of revolution is that it is "a special sort of change
involving a certain sort of reconstruction of group commitments. But it need not
be a large change, nor need it seem revolutionary to those outside a single com-
munity ...... ScIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 111, at 181.
197. For example, consider the words of Judge Anthony Kennedy during his confir-
mation hearings as a nominee for the Supreme Court of the United States:
Well the Miranda rule, as I say is in place, it was a sweeping, sweeping
rule. It wrought... it was almost a revolution. And it was not clear to
me that it necessarily followed from the words of the Constitution. Yet
it is in place now and I think it's entitled to great respect.
In response to Questions by Senator Leahy, Dec. 15, 1987.
198. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)(interpreting the fourteenth
amendment's privileges and immunities clause to provide no additional protec-
tion over the protections of U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2).
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One particularly interesting revolution occurred regarding article
IV, section 3 of the Constitution.19 9 Apparently, the framers had dis-
cussed and rejected the inclusion of a clause stating that new admit-
tees into the Union would be admitted on an equal basis. Their reason
for not including the condition was based on a desire not to bind future
congresses. Despite the original rejection of this concept, the Court
ultimately interpreted the provision to include this condition.2 00 In
this case, the text of the Constitution, in conjunction with the explicit
omission of the provision, should have bound the Court. Instead, the
Court embraced the previously abandoned condition on pragmatic
grounds. According to the theory of constitutional revolutions, the
Court's interpretation of this provision is not dictated by the Constitu-
tion's text, intent, history, structure or logic. The propriety of this de-
cision must be found elsewhere in cultural or abstract moral and
political values.20
199. For a description of the history of this provision see C. CURTIS supra note 79, at 4-
7.
200. This is a clear example of what Clinton and Perry characterize as contraconstitu-
tional interpretation, as distinguished from extraconstitutional interpretation.
The former permits a reading of a constitutional provision that conflicts with the
original interpretation of its language. Extraconstitutional interpretation permits
"whatever interpretive means are appropriate to breathe precisely the same evo-
lutionary interpretive life into the Constitution that Madison envisioned in The
Federalist No. 49." Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the In-
terpretation of 'This Constitution," 72 IowA L. REv. 1177, 1265 (1987). On this
view, extraconstitutional interpretation is evolutionary and legitimate, while con-
traconstitutional interpretation is revolutionary and illegitimate. Id. See M.
PERRY, supra note 9, at 20. I doubt that this distinction can be consistently
drawn. But even if it can, I believe it can be shown that constitutional interpreta-
tion as employed by the Marshall Court was revolutionary, and therefore more
contraconstitutional than extraconstitutional.
201. The theory of constitutional revolutions accurately describes one salient feature
of constitutional adjudication, namely, that most landmark decisions are based on
constitutionally extrinsic factors. Indeed, the source of law in such cases usually
comes from our rich political and moral culture, not from the four corners of the
Constitution.
The problem is that while most people are aware of how such decisions come
about, the myth of basing decisions on the Constitution's text, intent, history,
structure or logic still persists. However, the problem here is "not that the Court
acts on a myth, but that the talk about it heads the Court in the wrong direction.
It backs into questions it ought to face. It's like going up a one way street in
reverse." C. CURTIS, supra note 79, at 3. Stated differently, no ordinary, intelli-
gent citizen would spontaneously say that Marshall's decision in Marbury was
"ordained [by the words of the Constitution] in the beginning." A. Cox, THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 12 (1976). He must go
to law school to say that. But "[elven a lawyer must strain to extrapolate support-
ing evidence from the words." Id. Law school teaches students how to dress ex-
trinsic factors in "acceptable" constitutional arguments.
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B. The Counter-Majoritarian Question and the Legitimacy of Judicial
Review
Judicial review is a structural feature of American constitutional-
ism 2O2 that implicates two fundamental features of American govern-
ment: separation of powers and federalism. This raises the question
of whether judicial review is legitimate. Essentially, the challenge
here is to reconcile judicial review with democracy.203 Since judges
202. There are many different senses to the term "judicial review." Two broad senses
of this term roughly correspond to a procedural/substantive distinction. Van Al-
styne, supra note 191, at 23-24. Furthermore, the character of judicial review var-
ies in different political and judicial systems. See generally Deener, Judicial
Review in Modern Constitutional Systems, 46 AM. POL. SCI. 1079 (1952). See also
E. MCWHINNEY, JuDIcIAL REVIEW IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD (3d ed.
1965).
Some argue that the kind of judicial review the Marshall Court instituted is
very different from the contemporary practice of judicial review. Wolfe, A The-
ory of U.S. Constitutional History, 43 J. POL. 292,313-14 (1981)(arguing that there
are three kinds of judicial review: narrow, broad and loose). One writer even
suggests that Marshall instituted "interpretivist review" while contemporary re-
view is "noninterpretivist." Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution
in a Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 12 (1981). My hunch is that con-
temporary objections to noninterpretivist review is merely an extended skepti-
cism concerning the legitimacy of Marshall's revolutionary decision in Marbury.
Consider: "The important point is that if Marshall's defense of interpretivist judi-
cial review is not compelling, we should be cautious about extending the Court's
power to include noninterpretivist methodologies." Id. But see Sedler, The Legit-
imacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An Assessment and a Different
Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 113 (1983)(arguing that "the Court's institutional
behavior does not indicate that the Court recognizes any distinction between in-
terpretive and noninterpretive review"). See also A. MILLER, supra note 15, at 22
(stating that it is a literary myth that the Court is the authoritative constitutional
interpreter).
Consequently, Grano's view is a non sequitur. One can as easily argue that
since Marshall's decision in Marbury was revolutionary, revolutionary judicial re-
view is central to constitutional practice and should not be artificially restricted.
Moreover, it is mystifying how one can believe that Marshall's decision in Mar-
bury "could be rendered by reference to the text, intent, history and structure of
article III." Grano, supra, at 11. Furthermore, interpretivist review requires a
political justification, a justification not found in the Constitution's text, history,
structure or logic. Thus, interpretivism, if true, can only be justified by an appeal
to noninterpretivist principles.
203. Textualists and originalists are especially bothered by the question of legitimacy.
They argue that the counter-majoritarian problem is resolved or diminished by
following the text of the Constitution, or where interpretation is required, by
interpreting the Constitution in terms of the framers' original understanding.
However, neither textualism nor originalism resolves the counter-majoritarian
challenge. Both methods permit judicial review and the cancellation of
majoritarian policies. See E. CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTrTUON 11
(1987). Furthermore, a careful inspection of the formative years makes it clear
that a written constitution was not designed to replace appeals to extrinsic consti-
tutional sources. See Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1127 (1987) (arguing that the founders intended both the written Constitu-
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are not elected by the people, nor directly accountable to them except
in rare circumstances, 204 their role in the republic is potentially
counter-majoritarian. 205 How can such officials justifiably strike
down legislation produced by democratically elected leaders?206 The
literature concerning this challenge is abundant, and I will not ex-
amine this problem here, except to say that any careful study of the
Constitution and the American republic shows that democracy is only
one part of its structure. Much of this structure is decidedly
countermajoritarian. 207 Moreover, one can characterize judicial re-
view as protecting the permanent majority, "the people," from the will
of a transient contemporary majority.2 08
My concern is to provide a framework through which we can un-
derstand the actual operation of judicial review. The theory of consti-
tutional revolutions is not an answer to the counter-majoritarian
tion and natural law to serve as sources of law). See also B. BAILYN, THE IDEO-
LOGICAL ORIGINs OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 184-98 (1967)(describing the
reliance on natural law during the period prior to the revolution).
One writer contends that the relevant "original understanding" or "inten-
tions" are not the founders', but that of the parties to the compact, the states.
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV L. REV. 885
(1985). See also Grey, Constitutionalism. An Analytic Framework, in CONsTrru-
TIONALISM 189, 202-03 (1979)(arguing that normative principles of ethics and poli-
tics have always been an accepted source of constitutional norms); Powell, Rules
for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987)(describing the limited role of history in
constitutional interpretation).
204. U.S. CoNsT. art. H, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. H, § 3.
205. The Constitution itself, however, is a counter-majoritarian document. See J.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw AND THE NATIONAL POuTICAL PROCESS 61 (1980)(stat-
ing that "the Constitution consists of a mass of anti-majoritarian imperatives.").
See also Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486 (1982).
Short of amendment, contemporary Americans do not choose the form of govern-
ment they live under. This raises problems for "consent theories" of political
obligation.
206. The counter-majoritarian problem becomes troublesome depending upon whose
ox is gored. Conservatives raise the problem when the Court is liberal. Liberals
raise the problem when the Court is conservative. Cf. Mendelson, Jefferson on
Judicial Review: Consistency Through Change, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 327 (1962)
(describing Jefferson's attitude toward the Court depending upon how tyrannical
in any given period he thought the Court was).
207. Federalism is also decidedly counter-majoritarian. Congressional legislation rep-
resenting the majority position on an issue can be struck down by judicial review
because it conflicts improperly with state sovereignty. Cf. B. STRAYER, THE CA-
NADIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTs 53 (1983)(describing the counter-
majoritarian problem concerning the Canadian constitution).
208. Of course, the permanent majority never actually votes. However, judicial re-
view can be understood as the vote of a reflective, transtemporal citizen. See B.
STRAYER, supra note 207. See also Cappelletti & Adams, Judicial Review of Leg-
islation " European Antecedents and Adaptions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1224
(1966)(characterizing the value of judicial review as a "sobering and ennobling
experience that befalls those who check their acts against their principles and
strive in performing the former never to lose sight of the latter").
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problem. Rather, it is an attempt to describe and explain the dualistic
dimensions of constitutional adjudication as it existed from Marbury
v. Madison2O9 to the present day.
C. The Formative Revolutions
1. The Revolution to Launch All Judicial Revolutions: Marbury
v. Madison
Judicial review was first asserted as a means of striking down a
federal legislative act in Marbury v. Madison.210 In this revolutionary
case,211 Marshall attempted to do several things. First, he tried to es-
tablish the legitimacy of review,2 1 2 namely, that acts inconsistent with
the Constitution are void.213 Second, Marshall assumed that review
209. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
210. The first instance of judicial review by the Supreme Court occurred in Hylton v.
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796)(upholding a congressional tax on car-
riages). In this case, the three separate opinions "paid little heed to the Constitu-
tion's words." Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 48 U. CHI. L. REv.
819, 855 (1981). Instead, "[p]olicy considerations dominated all three opinions."
Id. at 856. The concept of judicial review goes back at least as far as Dr. Bonam's
Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610). There, Lord Coke adopted a naturalist concep-
tion of law, insisting that acts of Parliament were void when inconsistent with
"common right and reason." Id. at 652.
211. The results of the Philadelphia Convention were themselves revolutionary in
that scrapping the Articles of Confederation and designing a new constitution
exceeded the authority of the Convention. THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY xix (M. Kammen ed. 1986) [hereinafter
ORIGINS].
212. This was in itself revolutionary, since the Constitution nowhere stated or implied
any sort of judicial review. Of course, there are many arguments purporting to
establish that some sort of review necessarily follows from the notion of a written
constitution, or a constitution setting up a limited form of government. However,
none of these arguments are completely persuasive.
213. Marshall not only established judicial review as a legitimate judicial function, he
established a very strong form of review. One could imagine a principle of review
which stated that the Court should interfere with acts of other branches of the
government only when it is clear that the Constitution has been violated. If he
had fashioned such a rule, our constitutional history would be very different, and
the Court's role weakened. However, the question of legitimacy would be ren-
dered less vexatious. Thayer talks about such a rule when he argues that the
Court can disregard a legislative act "when those who have the right to make
laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one--so clear
that it is not open to rational question." Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, in ESSAYS IN CONsTrruTIONAL LAW,
supra note 52, at 71. See also L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15-18 (1958). Such a
rule would permit judicial review and the invalidation of legislation only in ex-
treme cases. I think such a rule would be a bad rule, but not because the Consti-
tution, its text, intent, history, structure or logic entail a stronger one. Rather, on
pragmatic grounds, a stronger rule is required for the kind of constitutional gov-
ernment we desire. Cf. McCloskey, Introduction, in ESSAYS IN CONsTrITUTIONAL
LAW, supra note 52, at 12 ("If judicial review as we know it in America can be
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must be a governmental function, in contradistinction to letting the
citizenry throw the scoundrels out. Third, he argued that review must
be an exclusively judicial function.
There is an enormous amount of literature describing the errors in
Marshall's decision in Marbury.214 I do not intend to repeat the nu-
merous allegations concerning the impropriety of the reasoning in
Marbury. My central thesis is that there was no compelling basis for
Marshall's decision. Instead, Marshall assumed the power of judicial
review.21 5 Furthermore, Marshall's assumption of power in this case
was the beginning of a series of constitutional revolutions centralizing
power in the federal government.
justified at all, it must be justified as an attempt by men to think coherently
about the ordering of human affairs .... ).
214. Marshall has been criticized on several grounds for his reasoning in this case. For
perhaps the most comprehensive critique on this subject see Van Alstyne, supra
note 191, at 37 ("There is . . . no doctrine of national, substantive judicial
supremacy which inexorably flows from Marbury v. Madison itself .... ").
Others include: Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Re-
view, 12 MIcH. L. Rnv. 538 (1914); Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129, 143-44 (1893)(arguing that
judicial review might have been construed to apply only when the legislature's
mistake "is not open to rational question"); CONSTrruTIONAL LAW, supra note
185, at 8; 1 C. WAREuN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 232, 242-
43 (1924)("It seems plain ... that it would have been possible for Marshall, if he
had been so inclined, to have construed the language of the section of the Judici-
ary Act which authorized writs of mandamus, in such a manner as to have ena-
bled him to escape the necessity of declaring the section unconstitutional."); L.
HAND, supra note 213, at 1-11 (1958); J. ELY, DEmOCRACY AND DiSTRUST 186 &
n.11 (1980); L. LEVY, JUDICIAL REvIEw AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967).
Some argue that although Marshall's reasoning is defective, the conclusion is
still good. Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARv. L.
REv. 217, 219 (1955)('The courage of Marbury v. Madison is not minimized by
suggesting that its reasoning is not impeccable and its conclusion, however wise,
not inevitable."). Consider Tribe's comments:
[On the issue of judicial review] the Constitution is indeterminate. Mar-
shall resolved the indeterminacy, in essence, by postulating that federal
courts have the power independently to interpret and apply the Consti-
tution; it is no argument against Marshall's postulate to point out (cor-
rectly) that it is not a corollary.
L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 25.
Tribe is certainly right that arguing that judicial review is not a corollary, but
instead a useful postulate. However, Tribe must then concede that constitutional
interpretation involves a process of revolution. That is, great constitutional pos-
tulates are the result of the Court following prudence, morality or common sense,
not the text, intent, history, structure or logic of the Constitution.
215. This is not to say that Marshall created the idea of judicial review from whole
cloth. Several states assumed the practice of judicial review as part of state con-
stitutional law. However, the evidence for this is usually overstated. The prac-
tice did not enjoy widespread acceptance. 2 W. CROSSKEY, PoLrrIcs AND THE
CONSTITUTION 944-75 (1953). Furthermore, Hamilton believed judicial review to
be an essential part of judicial prerogative. Nevertheless, the practice of judicial
review was an assumed power. ORIGINS, supra note 211, at xii.
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For Marshall's decision to be the result of normal adjudication,
there must be some obvious constitutional paradigm sanctioning the
result.216 No such paradigm exists. Commentators have conclusively
shown that the decision in arguments against the reasoning in Mar-
bury is not entailed by the text, intent, history, structure or logic of
the Constitution.217
Denying that the holding in Marbury inextricably follows from the
Constitution or constitutional practice does not, according to the
theory of constitutional revolutions, indicate that it is bad law. In-
deed, pragmatically one could argue that Marshall's conclusion in
Marbury is good law.2 18 However, this means that we must revise our
conception of what constitutes "good law." We may no longer assume
that under these circumstances good law can be explicated only in
terms of either conventionalistic or coherence conceptions of law.219
Instead, we must recognize that as early as Marbury justices were cre-
ating revolutionary constitutional decisions that can only be explained
pragmatically.
Ronald Dworkin is one of the few contemporary commentators
who defends Marshall's decision in Marbury.220 Dworkin writes:
He [Marshall] was right to think that the most plausible interpretation of the
developing legal practices of the young country, as well as of its colonial and
British roots, supposed that an important part of the point of law was to sup-
ply standards for the decision of courts. History has vindicated the substan-
tive dimension of that interpretation. The United States is a more just society
than it would have been had its constitutional rights been left to the con-
science of majoritarian institutions.2 2 1
But how do we determine that this was "the most plausible inter-
pretation of the developing legal practices of the young country, as
216. In other words, the constitutional paradigm must be obvious and uncontestable.
During the first century of the republic, judicial review certainly was not uncon-
testable. F. AUMMAN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 193 (1969).
217. There are two kinds of criticism of Marshall's reasoning in this case: logical or
formal deficiencies, on the one hand, and practical deficiencies on the other. Log-
ical deficiencies are mistakes in reasoning, practical deficiencies are the misuse or
abuse of common sense knowledge, precedents or history. For an illuminating
thesis that Marshall misused or abused precedents and history see generally
Bloch & Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in Marbury v.
Madison, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 301.
218. Such an argument consists of demonstrating, morally and historically, that the
principle in Marbury has been conducive to bringing about a certain type of pol-
ity. There is some evidence that Marshall achieved this goal. A. Cox, supra note
201, at 16, 29-30.
219. For a conventionalistic account of the decision in this case to be illuminating, the
argument must entail judicial review. I submit that there is no such argument.
Neither can we base such an argument on general principles required to justify
our constitutional scheme. See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
220. I do not mean to suggest that most scholars contend that the decision in Marbury
is wrong. Marshall's "judicial reasoning" comes under attack, not his result.
221. R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 356.
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well as of its colonial and British roots.?"2 22 What specific legal docu-
ments, statutes, or judicial decisions tell us what the legal practice
was?2 23 More importantly, how can our "colonial and British roots"
be part of the developing judicial practice? Wasn't the break with
England and the subsequent ratification of the Constitution a paradig-
matic example of "beginning a new story?"224
What Dworkin overlooks is that in the beginning there was no dis-
cernible structure to our political environment capable of showing the
way to the future, save for certain explicit constitutional conventions
or paradigms such as the Constitution and case law.2 25 A fledgling
republic does not have a discernible structure other than these
conventions. 226
No doubt Dworkin could reply that even at the beginning of the
republic American law exhibited a structure inherited from colonial
life and English common law. But American constitutional law can-
not be identified with English common law. Moreover, the fact that
American constitutionalism can be traced to inchoate beginnings in
English law does not prove that there must have been a well-defined
structure in early American constitutional law, i.e., a structure that
can be a criterion for determining unique answers to hard cases.227
222. Id.
223. One standard argument is that there were pre-constitutional precedents for judi-
cial review in the state governments. But see supra note 215.
224. Dworkin regards the distinction between "continuing the same story" and "be-
ginning a new story" as a constraint of judicial interpretation. Consequently, in
interpreting prior judicial practice, a judge must have some intuitive conception
of what the practice is. Surely, American constitutional practice could not begin
prior to the ratification of the Constitution.
225. Dworkin uses the model of a chain novel to explain constitutional adjudication.
R. DWoRKIN, supra note 3, at 228. But see Lipkin, supra note 14, at 669-77. How-
ever, it is not at all clear that at the early stages of a novel there must be, or that
there can be, a discernible structure indicating the right way to continue the
story.
226. There is an obvious reason for this lack of structure. Though American constitu-
tional law stems from English law, it also derives from English and French polit-
ical philosophy. See generally M. WHrrE, PHmosoPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE
CONSTIUION (1987). Indeed, American constitutional law stems from multifari-
ous sources. However, the source of law is not the law itself. When a nation truly
has a revolutionary beginning its legal system must itself contain new paradigms,
even if these paradigms are also in some sense part of the older tradition. Legally
and politically the United States began a new legal tradition with the adoption of
the Constitution. Hence, the sort of relativistic moral theory associated with a
developing constitutional tradition had little opportunity to develop at the time of
Marbury. At that time, constitutional law could be identified with explicit consti-
tutional conventions. General principles, conspicuous of a relativized constitu-
tional theory, had not yet emerged.
227. Similarly, it is insufficient to argue that constitutional revolutions must be
viewed epistemologically as occurring within the scope of a single coherent intel-
lectual history. Here, I am taking liberties with MacIntyre's interesting argu-
ment concerning the superiority of scientific paradigms. Macntyre argues that
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The fact that American constitutional law derives from English law
does not show the latter to be the normative authority of the former.
According to the theory of constitutional revolutions, Marbury is a
paradigmatic revolutionary decision. Prior to this case, the notion of
judicial review had been debated with no clear victory for either
side.228 The Constitution itself makes absolutely no mention of judi-
cial review as either a permissible or mandatory judicial power.229 Be-
sides the language of Marshall's opinion, nothing in the intent, history,
structure or logic of the Constitution makes judicial review inevita-
ble.23 0 Had Marshall not created this judicial power, the United States
would have survived, though it might have turned out to be a very
different type of republic.231 Essentially, Marshall created judicial re-
view as a pragmatic response2 32 to the problem of the role of the judi-
ciary in the constitutional scheme. Judicial review is conducive to
bringing about a certain kind of national republic.23 3 And that is what
Marshall sought.
epistemological crises are remedied by reconstructing the tradition in which two
apparently incompatible paradigms operate in order to compare and evaluate
them. MacIntyre, Crises, Narrative and Science, in PARADIGMS AND REVOLU-
TIONS, supra note 124, at 54, 70. MacIntyre's theory echoes Dworkin's argument.
Each writer believes respectively that the best scientific or the best jurispruden-
tial methodology is the one making the history of the field-science or law-the
best it can be. Id. at 120. See DwoRKIN, supra note 3, at 52.
228. Marbury was the first case in which the Court struck down a federal statute.
However, in Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), the Justices, sitting on
the circuit courts, decided that the Court could not be compelled to give advisory
opinions to the President. Additionally, in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 171 (1796), the Supreme Court held that a federal tax on carriages was
constitutional. Finally, in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), the Court
held a state law to be an ex post facto law, and therefore unconstitutional.
229. Indeed, Hamilton, in THE FEDERALIST No. 78, clearly states that judicial review
does not follow from the Constitution. On his view, judicial review follows from
the meaning of a limited constitution; hence, judicial review would be part of any
limited constitution. In other words judicial review follows a priori from the con-
cept of constitutionalism.
230. One should be struck with the irony of Marshall's argument. At the same time
that he is extolling the importance of a written constitution, a constitution creat-
ing a limited government, he is assuming power for the judiciary that the Consti-
tution neither stated nor implied.
231. Obviously, in such a situation, the federal judiciary's power would be diminished.
Consequently, only majoritarian structures could protect individual rights.
232. Recently, one commentator contended that Marshall's form of constitutional ad-
judication fused political science (reason) with popular consent (will). The object
of consent was the Constitution, and the content of the Constitution was expli-
cated in terms of political science. In short, Marshall appealed to factors extrinsic
to the Constitution-reason and science-to be the source of constitutional mean-
ing. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98
YALE L.J. 449, 479-87 (1989). This view supports the contention that Marshall's
form of constitutional interpretation was pragmatic and revolutionary.
233. The argument that judicial review is a necessary feature of a constitutional re-
public is unpersuasive. In hindsight, what now appears necessary at the time of
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Pragmatic arguments, I maintain, are perfectly acceptable constitu-
tional arguments in the context of revolutionary adjudication. The
important point to realize is that Marbury is a revolutionary decision.
Ordinary constitutional conventions cannot be appealed to as a justifi-
cation. Relativistic constitutional theory cannot explain the creation
of judicial review. Rather than explaining or justifying judicial re-
view, the relativistic constitutional theory itself depends on judicial
review for its existence. Normal adjudication may appeal to the Con-
stitution's text, intent, history, structure and logic; 234 revolutionary
adjudication cannot.
2. The Federal Judicial Supremacy Revolution: Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,235 the Court, through Justice Story,
held that the Supreme Court may invalidate state supreme court deci-
sions. Again, the arguments for this decision are familiar. If there
was no federal supremacy, insuperable problems would abound. First,
there would be no uniformity in state court decisions interpreting the
Constitution. Second, the Supreme Court would have a limited pur-
view over state courts. No doubt, from a contemporary perspective,
this decision was a sensible one. Assuming the sort of federalism we
have today is desirable, Martin was instrumental in bringing about a
logical balance of power between the states and the national govern-
ment. Nevertheless, Martin is a revolutionary decision because it did
not flow from the text, intent, history, structure or logic of the
Constitution.236
its occurrence appears only to be useful. In interpreting the past, a successful
means takes on a certain grandeur, it appears as if it is conceptually essential.
Generally speaking, it is dangerously misleading to identify present historical
and legal structures with what is essential, privileged or necessary when in fact
these structures are at best contingent, and at worst fortuitous. See Gordon, Crit-
ical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 71 (1984). It is just this sort of identifica-
tion that precludes personal and social development and evolution.
Since the past appears frozen, it also appears simple and pellucid. Once un-
derstood, the various elements comprising our past appear obvious and essential.
Constitutional principles appear necessary. Federal judges seem to be "the
watchdogs of eternal constitutional verities." See Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric
of Constitutional Law, in ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 52, at 85.
This retrospective is inevitable. A changing, conflictual past always appears to
the present as fixed and permanent. However, this is a seductive delusion which
must be resisted.
234. Many provisions of the Constitution do not lend themselves to revolutionary ad-
judication. Instead, these provisions are constitutional paradigms that control
normal adjudication. In such circumstances, ordinary constitutional conventions
such as the Constitution's text, intent, history, structure or logic can be used to
decide constitutional issues.
235. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
236. In fact, some states challenged the right of the Supreme Court to issue writs of
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a. The Historical Agreement Argument
Martin was one of the formative revolutions occupying a unique
place in constitutional adjudication. 237 Some argue that a decentral-
ized government would have been good for the Republic.238 The possi-
bility of different state courts interpreting the Constitution in
different ways is the price one pays for pluralism. Though different
from our conception, this is a possible ideal of a just society. Conse-
quently, the result in Martin is a pragmatic result.
There is an argument in Martin that must be confronted if the the-
ory of constitutional revolutions is to succeed. Because this is a funda-
mental point, I quote Justice Story's opinion at some length:
[It] is an historical fact, that this exposition of the constitution, extending its
appellate power to state courts, was, previous to its adoption, uniformly and
publicly avowed by its friends, and admitted by its enemies, as the basis of
error to state courts. See Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the
Supreme Court of the United States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the
Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 1, 161 (1913).
237. The Constitution authorizes Congress to create federal appellate jurisdiction.
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 created federal jurisdiction over state
court decisions. Consequently, one could argue that the Constitution and congres-
sional discretion warrant federal appellate review of state court decisions. Hence,
Martin cannot be a revolution, since it merely confirms Congress' legitimate au-
thority under Article III. However, article III, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion gives Congress authority to affect the appellate jurisdiction of federal courts.
It must surely be revolutionary, though not unwarranted for that reason, to as-
sume that Congress can use this authority to give the federal courts jurisdiction
over state courts.
Since the Court could have held that section 25 was unconstitutional because
it conflicted with state sovereignty, legitimatizing section 25 was a revolutionary
Court decision. The Court argued that the language of article III and uniformity
of federal law requires the decision. However, a plausible federalist argument
cuts the other way.
238. Indeed, one central point of contention between the Federalists and Anti-Feder-
alists was the belief that there was a distinction between national consolidation
and true confederation, and that the latter was preferable. ORIGINS, supra note
211, at xvi. Perhaps a true confederation would have been more likely if the fed-
eral judiciary had no power to overrule the decisions of state courts. Conse-
quently, the republic could have developed according to an Anti-Federalist vision.
There is an interesting parallel between the argument over federalism that ex-
isted between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, and the contemporary debate be-
tween those favoring a strong federal government to guarantee individual rights
against state majorities and those who want state majorities to be supreme. Anti-
Federalists would come down on the side of individual rights against the federal
government. Federalists would endorse a strong national government and a lim-
ited conception of individual rights. Since the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the controversy must be realigned. Conservatives come down on the side
of state majorities against individual rights guaranteed by the federal courts. Lib-
erals choose a strong federal court system guaranteeing individual rights against
state majorities. Marshall and Jefferson initiated this controversy, although it
began in different terms. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 169-230 (1922).
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their respective reasoning, both in and out of the state conventions. It is an
historical fact, that at the time when the judiciary act was submitted to the
deliberations of the first congress, composed, as it was, not only of men of
great learning and ability, but of men who acted a principal part in framing,
supporting or opposing that constitution, the same exposition was explicitly
declared and admitted by the friends and opponents of that system. It is an
historical fact, that the supreme court [sic] of the United States has, from time
to time, sustained this appellate jurisdiction, in a great variety of cases,
brought from the tribunals of many of the most important states in the Union,
and that no state tribunal has ever breathed a judicial doubt on the subject, or
declined to obey the mandate of the supreme court, [sic] until the present
occasion.2 3
9
This argument maintains that when both sides to a constitutional
controversy agree about what a constitutional provision means, then
that is the provision's meaning. Consequently, if Federalists desired,
and Anti-Federalists feared, that article III subjects state court deci-
sions to federal appellate review, then that is precisely what article III
means. The Federalists believed the Court had the power to review
both federal and state court decisions. The Anti-Federalists feared
that this would make the central government too strong. However, it
simply does not follow that because the Anti-Federalists feared such
an interpretation, this interpretation was inevitable. The Anti-Feder-
alists feared that the relevant provisions would be interpreted as im-
plying a federal limitation on state courts, not that the relevant
provisions must be so interpreted. Indeed, Marshall himself at one
time believed that such an interpretation was absurd.240
The point here is that Story could have decided the case either
way. Hence, his decision depends upon factors extrinsic to the Consti-
tution.2 41 Indeed, Story's decision is a Federalist argument infused
with political theory.
b. The Federalism Argument
Many commentators have argued that the decision in Martin nec-
239. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 350 (1816).
240. Interestingly, Story's decision in Martin conflicts with statements Marshall made
at the Virginia ratifying convention, to wit: "I hope no gentleman will think that
a state will be called at the bar of federal court .... It is not rational to suppose
that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court!' Note, Judge Spencer
Roane of Virginia: Champion of States'Rights--Foe of John Marshall, 66 HARv.
L. REV. 1242, 1256 (1953).
241. The question here is the nature of constitutional meaning. Is constitutional
meaning politically neutral, following logically from the Constitution? Is consti-
tutional meaning dependent upon a particular moral and political perspective?
The conventional wisdom is that constitutional meaning is, or should be, politi-
cally neutral. However, that view is a charade. Marshall contributed to this cha-
rade by presenting his arguments as following from the text, intent, history,
structure and logic of the Constitution when, in fact, Marshall was fashioning a
strong central government conducive to those with Federalist sensibilities.
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essarily follows from the concept of federalism.= 2 After all, how
could there be a federal republic if the states need not bow to federal
interpretation of the Constitution?24 3 Hence, the decision in Martin
encourages uniformity of federal constitutional law.244
This is not a very persuasive argument. What is so troubling about
the argument is its univocal conception of federalism. 245 Perhaps our
242. Charles Black's comments are most persuasive:
iThere is nothing in our entire governmental structure which has a
more leak-proof claim to legitimacy than the function of the courts in
reviewing state acts for federal constitutionality. [It) seems to me Con-
gress could have provided for this even without an article III, simply by
creating a court and endowing it with the power to perform this neces-
sary and proper function. Insofar, then, as legitimacy in origin is relevant
to judicial or public attitude toward the judicial work, the Court ought to
feel no slightest embarrassment about its work of reviewing state acts
for their federal constitutionality. It seems very clear, moreover, that all
present-day political considerations strongly impel toward the same con-
clusion. In policing the actions of the states for their conformity to fed-
eral constitutional guarantees, the Court represents the whole nation,
and therefore the whole nation's interest in seeing those guarantees pre-
vail, in their spirit and in their entirety.
C. BLAcK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW 74-75 (1969).
See L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 11 n.7 (arguing that the result in Martin was com-
pelled by the structure of our federal system). See also 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERs 295-96 (1920)("I do not think the United States would come to an
end if [the Court] lost [its] power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think
that the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the
laws of the several States. For one in my place sees how often a local policy
prevails with those who are not trained to national views and how often action is
taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was meant to end."). Holmes'
point is better stated as referring to a particular conception of the Union, rather
than the Union itself.
Some commentators contend that Martin follows readily from Marbury.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 185, at 17 ("The theory of the federal judicial
power to review the acts of state governments is easily justified once the basic
concept of judicial review of federal statutes is granted."). But see Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court The Powers of the Federal Courts 1801-35, 49
U. Cm. L. REV. 646, 685-86 (1982).
243. A useful definition of federalism is "that system of political order in which pow-
ers of government are separated and distinguished and in which these powers are
distributed among governments, each government having its quota of authority
and each its distinct sphere of activity." McLauglin, The Background of Ameri-
can Federalism, 12 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 15 (1918).
244. Of course, this assumes that federalism requires uniformity. It does not explain
why uniformity is required. Common law rules are not always uniform across
the states. If state sovereignty is sufficiently important, the possibility of differ-
ing state interpretations of the Constitution may be desirable. See G. STONE, L.
SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TusHNET, CONsTITUTIONAL LAw 43 (1986). Whether
or not desirable, the decision in this case follows from a particular political philos-
ophy or common sense perspective, not from the Constitution.
245. It becomes even more troubling when we remind ourselves that in the 1780s, the
states truly regarded themselves as sovereign. C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND SOVEREIGN STATES 3-13 (1972).
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current conception of federalism is conceptually tied to the Martin de-
cision. However, it is a non sequitur to conclude that every type of
federalism requires this decision. Furthermore, even if federalism re-
quires the decision in Martin, why is the Martin remedy the only one
possible?2 4 6
We might have had a federalist system that encouraged Congress
to withhold funds from states that were not in compliance with fed-
eral judicial interpretation. Alternatively, we might have left it to the
people to chastize state courts straying from federal interpretations of
the Constitution. We might have had a system that permitted the rad-
ical independence of state courts in the name of pluralism and diver-
sity. No doubt such possibilities would be less efficient than the
present one. However, if the value of states' rights is sufficiently im-
portant, arguably, efficiency might be sacrificed.
The point is not to seriously propose an alternative form of federal-
ism.247 Rather, I only want to demonstrate that the Martin decision
follows from a certain conception-perhaps the best and most likely
conception-of federalism.248 Relative to that conception the decision
246. In other words, is it conceivable for the Supreme Court to have authority to de-
clare acts of the co-equal branches of the federal government to be unconstitu-
tional, and still resist its authority to enforce a judgment against a state court?
Such an argument indicates two different kinds of constitutional norms, to wit:
those that are fully enforced and those that are not. Consider.
Where a federal judicial construct is found not to extend to certain offi-
cial behavior because of institutional concerns rather than analytical
perceptions, it [is] strange to regard the resulting decision as a statement
about the meaning of the constitutional norm in question ...
[Clonstitutional norms which are underenforced by the federal judiciary
should be understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual limits,
and federal judicial decisions which stop short of these limits should be
understood as delineating only the boundaries of the federal courts' role
in enforcing the norm: By "legally valid," I mean that the unenforced
margins of underenforced norms should have the full status of positive
law which we generally accord to the norms of our Constitution.
Sager, Fair Measure; The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978).
Following this lead, Martin could have held that the federal judiciary was
supreme in interpreting the federal constitution, statutes and treaties, but render
this decision a legally valid underenforced constitutional norm for institutional
reasons.
247. This alternative conception of federalism, known as states' rights, had its strident
defenders throughout the first third of the nineteenth century. For a useful dis-
cussion of this history see Warren, supra note 236.
248. Essentially, American federalism attempts to "enable the American people to se-
cure the benefits of national union without imperilling their republican institu-
tions. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, in ESSAYS IN CONSTrUIONAL
LAw, supra note 52, at 185, 207. Not everyone believed that states' sovereignty
would survive ratification of the Constitution. Federalists insisted that it would,
while Anti-Federalists believed that ratification would create a perpetual union.
Stampp, The Concept of a Perpetual Union, 65 J. AmER. HIST. 5, 18 (1978).
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in Martin is warranted. This is very different from the conventional
view that Martin is necessitated by a structure of constitutionalism
created by the Constitution.249 Consequently, though the revolution
in Martin was probably grounded more in the structure of the Consti-
tution than the decision in Marbury, Martin is still a constitutional
revolution. It required a Court to decide that federal courts were
supreme over state courts in interpreting the Constitution. The Court
could have decided differently. If this case could have been decided
differently, the reasoning does not necessitate the conclusion.250
On the view presented here, the controversy surrounding the Mar-
tin paradigm was a political controversy over the nature of the union.
One side-the states' rights side-wanted a federal union, ie., a com-
pact among independent and sovereign states. The other side wanted
a national union with limited state powers and a supreme central
government. 25 '
249. Currie argues persuasively that the principle in Martin was permissible, but not
required. Currie, supra note 242. The question arises whether Supreme Court
decisions which the Constitution permits, but does not require, are constitutional
revolutions. Arguably, these decisions are constitutional revolutions. Many judi-
cial solutions to national problems are constitutionally permissible. However, the
Court chooses only some of these solutions. If among the class of possible consti-
tutional decisions only some are chosen, it follows that there is an independent
standard for choosing which possible decisions to pursue. The Court might ap-
peal to moral and political factors, the exigencies of the historical circumstances
or common sense in deciding which constitutional course to follow. The theory of
constitutional revolutions reflects this structure. The theory informs us that the
Constitution does not determine constitutional law in revolutionary contexts.
250. The Martin revolution established federal judicial supremacy over state courts.
In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), the Court extended the deci-
sion in Martin by holding that it had appellate jurisdiction over state criminal
cases, thereby further restricting the sovereignty of the states. Martin held that
the states had voluntarily surrendered their sovereignty to some degree. We now
see this as a logical point; whereas at the time, Jefferson regarded this "as an-
other step in the scheme of the Supreme Court to destroy the federal constitu-
tional system by consolidating all authority in the central government." A.
KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONsTrTUTION: ITS OIGINS AND DEVEL-
oPMENT 287-88 (1970).
Interestingly, in Cohens Marshall stated a revolutionary judicial doctrine simi-
lar to that enunciated in McCulloch:
[A] constitution is framed for ages to come, and is designed to approach
immortality, as nearly as human institutions can approach it. Its course
cannot always be tranquil. It is exposed to storms and tempests, and its
framers must be unwise statesmen indeed, if they have not provided it,
so far as its nature will permit, with the means of self-preservation from
the perils it may be destined to encounter.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 384 (1821).
251. This controversy over states' rights was ultimately resolved by the civil war.
Note, supra note 240, at 1258-59.
Indeed, it is possible that the original compact was libertarian in nature. The
national government was to be concerned with defense and other national issues,
while the state governments were to be concerned with protecting individual lib-
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The early constitutional revolutions established structural features
of American constitutionalism. By "structural features" I mean deci-
sions which create distributions of power. In Marbury, the Court es-
,tablished the federal judiciary's power over federal legislative and
executive acts. In Martin, the Court exercised federal appellate
power over state courts. A constitutional system possessing these
structural features of government is very different from a constitu-
tional system not having them. Consequently, the Court in these
early cases, rather than implementing structure of the Constitution, in
essence created it.252 Marshall's revolutionary jurisprudence imple-
mented a Federalist conception of nationalism which is the forerunner
of contemporary constitutional nationalism.253
3. The Federal General Powers Revolution-Legislative Means:
McCulloch v. Maryland
The fledgling republic agonized over the legitimacy of a national
bank throughout the first third of the nineteenth century.2 4 The ag-
ony came to an abrupt end in McCulloch v. Maryand,2Z5 when Mar-
shall interpreted the necessary and proper clause expansively,25 6
erty. The argument against this form of libertarianism is historical and prag-
matic: it did not work. The Marshall Court immediately recognized this fact. On
the other hand, the original compact might have had in mind a different form of
libertarianism, one specifically concerned with protecting property-owners from
oppressive state governments. See generally C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRE-
TATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).
252. Structural features of American constitutionalism were established by laying the
groundwork for a strong national government. A. MILLER, THE SECRET CONSTI-
TUTION AND THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 17 (1987). But see R. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 5, at 21 (arguing that Marshall's decisions
were faithful to the Constitution).
253. It is not clear that federalism expresses a unified conception of nationalism.
Rather, it appears to combine some elements of nationalism with tenets of feder-
alism. It is not evident that such a hybrid is conceptually or politically possible.
254. Federalists supported the idea of a national bank, while Anti-Federalists opposed
it.
255. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). In an earlier case, United States v. Fischer, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 358 (1805), the Court interpreted the necessary and proper clause to up-
hold federal legislation.
256. Marshall's interpretation of the necessary and proper clause was at least as broad
as the Federalists' interpretation. Jefferson's conception of the necessary and
proper clause differed sharply from Marshall's interpretation. Indeed, Jefferson
contended that:
the Constitution allows only the means which are 'necessary' not merely
'convenient' for effecting the enumerated powers. If such a latitude of
construction be allowed to this phrase as to give any non-enumerated
power [to Congress], it will go to every one, for there is no one which
ingenuity may not torture into a convenience, in some way or other, to
some one of so long a list of enumerated powers. It would swallow up all
the delegated powers, and reduce the whole to one phrase as before ob-
served. Therefore, it was that the Constitution restrained them to the
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:701
permitting the federal government to have broad powers in solving
national problems.257 Marshall's decision is clearly a political decision,
and cannot be explained in terms of the classical conception of consti-
tutionalism or any other neutral account of judicial reasoning.25 8
Obviously, the necessary and proper clause is vague and indetermi-
nate.25 9 During ratification its indeterminacy was the cause of much
concern.260 However, the logic of the clause seems to suggest that only
those powers that are necessary and not otherwise inconsistent with
the Constitution are permissible. The term "necessary" can mean ab-
solutely required or required relative to circumstances as we know
them. It is doubtful, however, that on any reasonable interpretation,
it can mean useful or expedient.2 61 Yet, that is precisely the meaning
Marshall gave to the clause.262 Marshall's revolution in this case cre-
necessary means, that is to say, to those means without which the grant
of power would be nugatory.
T. JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a Na-
tional Bank, in 19 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275,278 (J. Boyd ed. 1974). But
see A. HAMILTON, Final Version of An Opinion on the Constitutionality of An
Act to Establish a Bank, in 8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 102-03 (H.
Syrett ed. 1965).
257. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 185, at 124-30.
258. Marshall's decision also deploys non-political forms of analysis. Among these
forms of analysis are: linguistic analysis, conceptual analysis, common sense and
rationalism. However, in the end, Marshall's argument is political, not judicial.
In fact, he was implementing a Federalist political philosophy. But see B. SIEGEN,
THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTION 11-14 (1987)(arguing that the decision in
McCulloch reflects a very different political philosophy than the one endorsed by
Hamilton and Madison).
259. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 238, at 500.
260. Id.
261. The implausibility of interpreting "necessary" in this manner was noted in 1820
soon after the decision was handed down. J. TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED
AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 177 (1970)("But this interpolation of the words,
'convenient, useful and essential,' into the constitution is in my view not even a
plausible argument. It is merely a tautology of the phrase 'necessary and proper,'
but excluding the restriction attached to the latter."). Marshall's interpretation
of this clause was controversial even to his contemporary, interpretive
community.
262. One argument Marshall advances equates "necessary means" with "best means".
On this view, if M is the best means to E, then M is necessary. To deny that
Congress may take action in this sense of "necessary," is:
[t]o have declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone,
without which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to
deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to ex-
ercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances. If
we apply this principle of construction to any of the powers of the gov-
ernment, we shall find it so pernicious in its operation that we shall be
compelled to discard it.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415-16 (1819).
This suggests that reason compels us to accept the principle of legislative dis-
cretion. Consequently, if you want a legislature, you must accept legislative dis-
cretion. Yet, this proposition is clearly false. Having a legislature such as ours
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ated another structural feature of American constitutionalism, 263
namely, where the federal or national government has power, it has
supreme power.264 McCulloch gives the federal government virtually
unlimited power to decide which means to adopt in bringing about
constitutionally permissible ends.
In discussing the question whether the Constitution includes
unenumerated powers, Marshall's view is strikingly similar to the the-
ory of constitutional revolutions:265
A Constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which
its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could
scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would, probably, never be under-
stood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines
should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients
which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects them-
selves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American consti-
tution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from
the language. Why else were some of the limitations, found in the ninth sec-
tion of the first article, introduced? It is also, in some degree, warranted, by
their having omitted to use any restrictive term which might prevent its re-
ceiving a fair and just interpretation. In considering this question, then, we
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.2 6 6
may require legislative discretion. However, a more limited government does not
need this discretion, and, indeed, it was the hope of some that the American legis-
lature would be limited.
263. Marshall's constitutional methodology involves reconstructing the consciousness
of members of the political community to reinterpret the relationship between
state and federal government. J. BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE MEANING 24-
63 (1984). His rhetorical genius consisted in his ability to reconstitute judicial cul-
ture without giving the appearance of departing from the traditional framework.
264. Some of Marshall's critics have argued that his decision, in effect, destroyed a
system of two governments, or, alternatively, that it transformed a government of
limited powers into one of unlimited powers. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Feder-
alism, in ESSAYS IN CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAW, supra note 52, at 7.
265. This process of revolution involves rhetorical methods which help revolutionary
decisions become prosaic. See R. BROWN, SOcIETY AS TEXT: ESSAYS ON RiETo-
Ric, REASON AND REALITY 148 (1987). Prosaic or normal adjudication is the ulti-
mate goal of revolutionary adjudication.
266. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). This led Justice
Frankfurter to reply that "[p]recisely because 'it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding,' we ought not to take liberties with it." National Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 647 (1949)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See
also Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and
Courts "To Say What the Law Is," 23 ARiz. L. REv. 581, 591 (1981).
However, it is not obvious that interpreting a constitution in terms of our con-
temporary understanding is "taking liberties with it." Indeed, there are powerful
arguments that we avoid taking liberties with the language of the Constitution
only by interpreting a Constitution in the context of our contemporary interpre-
tive community.
Several pages later, in discussing the power of Congress, Marshall went on to
say that "[t]his provision, [the necessary and proper clause], is made in a constitu-
tion, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the
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Presumably, "a constitution" for Marshall is a blueprint for future
guidance, but does not fix every important feature of the government.
There is pragmatic merit to this conclusion, but it far from follows
from the Constitution's text, intent, history, structure or logic. One
explanation for the framers writing a document establishing a limited
government2 67 is that they truly wanted it to be limited.268
various crises of human affairs." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
415 (1819). The notion of a constitution intended to endure perennially and apply
to different crises charts a revolutionary strategy, in my sense of "revolutionary."
But see W. BERNS, TAKING THE CoNsTrrUION SERiousLy 207-08 (1987)(arguing,
unsuccessfully in my estimation, that the phrase "adapted to the various crises of
human affairs" modifies the necessary and proper clause, not the Constitution).
267. I take libertarians to be making such an argument. No doubt our society would
be very different had Marshall adopted such a position. Probably, our society
would not be as vibrant. However, that does not change the point that Marshall's
argument is moral and political, not constitutional. A constitutional argument,
strictly speaking, is one that involves normal adjudication. In normal constitu-
tional adjudication, the text, intent, history, structure and logic of the Constitu-
tion determines the outcome.
It is important to note that the current controversy over judicial review has its
roots in the Marshall Court. Those advocating a narrow role for judicial review
are still concerned about its legitimacy. Well, in one very important sense, judi-
cial review, as Marshall conceived it, is not legitimate; it never was authorized by
the Constitution. Indeed, Marshall was the first truly revolutionary Justice:
Chief among the founders of American constitutional law was John
Marshall. A maker rather than a follower of precedents, he never hesi-
tated to argue from principles of right and justice.... Certainly, he [Mar-
shall] did not hesitate to go beyond the express statements of a written
constitution to find bases for his decisions.
B. WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONs OF NATURAL LAW 294-95 (1931).
Marshall wrote that "[i]n exploring an unbeaten path, with few, if any aids, from
precedents or written law, the court has found it necessary to rely much on gen-
eral principles." The Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136
(1812).
On the other hand, Marshall's conception of judicial review is now a funda-
mental tenet of American constitutionalism. Narrowing judicial review flies in
the face of the nature of constitutional practice.
268. Marshall appears to deal with this point when he concedes the following:.
We admit, as all must, that the powers of the government are limited,
and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound
construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature
that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers
are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform
the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the
people.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
Marshall makes this point after providing an argument showing that the place
of the necessary and proper clause in the Constitution, and the nature of its
terms, support his interpretation of the provision. Yet, here he fails to recognize
that had the framers wished Congress to have discretion in selecting means to
bring about enumerated constitutional goals, they would have said so. Instead,
they restricted this discretion by requiring that the choice of means be limited to
only those permissible means that are required for achieving the goal. It is then
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The formal illegitimacy of Marshall's decision is not diminished by
Black's characterization of Marshall's argument as structuralist:
Marshall's reasoning... is... essentially structural. It has to do in great part
with what he conceives to be the warranted relational properties between the
national government and the government of the states, with the structural
corollaries of national supremacy--and, at one point, of the mode of formation
of the Union. [In] this, perhaps the greatest of our constitutional cases, judg-
ment is reached not fundamentally on the basis of the kind of textual exegesis
which we tend to regard as normal, but on the basis of reasoning from the
total structure which the text has created. 2 6 9
Appealing to the Constitution's structure suggests that this struc-
ture is clear and determinate.270 However, if this Article's thesis
is correct, the Constitution's structure was in part created by the form-
ative Supreme Court decisions,271 many of which occurred during
Marshall's stewardship. Consequently, the decision in McCulloch de-
termined the Constitution's meaning, rather than being determined
by it.272
To criticize the reasoning in McCulloch is not to deny the impor-
inconceivable how the test in McCulloch can be the following- "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id.
269. C. BLACK, supra note 242, at 15.
270. Black also argues against linguistic or textual analysis in favor of structuralism.
Consider.
I am inclined to think well of the method of reasoning from structure
and relation. [B]ecause to succeed it has to make sense-current, practi-
cal sense. The textual-explication method, operating on general lan-
guage, may often-perhaps more often than not-be made to make
sense, by legitimate enough devices of interpretation. But it contains
within itself no guarantee that it will make sense, for a court may always
present itself or even see itself as being bound by the stated intent, how-
ever nonsensical, of somebody else. [Using a structural approach] we can
and must begin to argue at once about the practicalities and proprieties
of the thing, without getting out dictionaries whose entries will not re-
ally respond to the question we are putting, or scanning utterances, con-
temporary with the text, of persons who did not really face the question
we are asking. We will have to deal with policy and not with grammar.
Id. at 22-23.
Thus stated, Black's account of structural analysis sounds very much like
pragmatism.
271. In other words, decisions made by the Court and other governmental actors cre-
ate the structure of the Constitution, not vice versa.
272. Even if it is conceded that the national government has implied powers to bring
about enumerated ends, Marshall's conclusion concerning the unconstitutional-
ity of the Maryland tax requires an independent argument. After all, it is only by
assuming that the power to tax is an unlimited power that this power becomes
the power to destroy. Had Marshall recognized that such a power is a matter of
degree, he could have accepted a state tax just as long as it did not have the ten-
dency to significantly interfere with the existence of the bank. Justice Holmes
correctly pointed out that the "Court... can defeat an attempt to discriminate or
otherwise go too far without wholly abolishing the power to tax." Panhandle Oil
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tance of the principle Marshall established. The best way to under-
stand Marshall's argument is to view it as a pragmatic statement,
predicated on the supposition that the best way for the fledgling re-
public to develop into a strong national government would be by hav-
ing an appropriately qualified principle of legislative discretion.273 To
many observers, history has certainly vindicated Marshall's vision.2 74
Conventional wisdom now endorses the view that a strong national
government is essential for the United States to function as a constitu-
tional democracy in today's treacherous world.275 If so, we may con-
clude that revolutionary adjudication is necessary to the proper
development of American constitutionalism.
4. The Federal General Powers Revolution-Legislative Ends:
Gibbons v. Ogden
During his tenure as Chief Justice, Marshall's strategy27 6 was to
create a certain type of federal or national government. The early rev-
olutionary decisions established the supremacy of the federal judiciary
regarding the proper interpretation of the Constitution. Yet, Marshall
was not satisfied with this result.277 His strategy included creating a
Co., v. Mississippi ex. rel. Knox., 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928)(Holmes, J., dissenting).
Consequently, "[t]he power to tax [in itself] is not the power to destroy." Id.
273. As such, Marshall's decision found its source in political theory. Marshall's argu-
ment in McCulloch was not original, "[b]ut he deserves the credit for stamping it
with the die of his memorable rhetoric and converting it from a political theory
into the master doctrine of American constitutional law." R. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 67 (1960). Constitutional revolutions usually create
law out of moral and political theory.
274. One writer argues that "[d]iversity and pluralism are... [the essence] 'of federal-
ism,'" suggesting that kind of federalism we have today is less than ideal. Van
Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States And the Tenth Amendment. Adrift in
the Cellophane Sea, 1987 DuKE L.J. 769, 775.
275. At the time, states' rights advocates denounced Marshall's decision in McCulloch.
However, "it was clear to Marshall, as it has been to posterity, that a national
government restricted in its powers by Maryland's narrow interpretation would
be incapable of the great tasks that might lie before it." R. MCCLOsKEY, supra
note 273, at 66. Whether or not the narrow interpretation would have such dire
consequences, it is apparent that had the narrow interpretation prevailed, we
would not now have a national government as we know it.
276. I leave open the question whether Marshall was fully aware of this strategy.
277. Though Madison argued that the federalism in the new Constitution was not pure
federalism, but rather a blend of federalism and nationalism, Marshall was
clearly a nationalist. For Marshall:
[local government was associated in his mind with the petty bickerings
of narrow ambition and a dangerous indifference to rights and property.
The need for a strong central government, as the indispensable bulwark
of the solid elements of the nation, was for him the deepest article of his
political faith.
F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE POWER UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WATE
14 (1937). See also 2 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1916). Marshall
clearly desired "to restrain local legislatures from hampering the free play of
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strong central government.2 78 Certainly, Gibbons v. Odgen 279 is one
of the most important revolutionary cases to achieve this goal.280 The
revolutionary decision in this case consists of two elements. First,
Marshall defined commerce 2s' in terms of intercourse; 282 and second,
he insisted that the federal government's legitimate power to regulate
commerce among the states was plenary.283
commerce among the states," but not by "tying the Court to rigid formulas for
accomplishing such restrictions." F. FRANKFURTER supra, at 14.
In a certain sense, Marshall's strident nationalism was the embodiment of
Madison's federalism-nationalism. Federalism creates a scheme of dual govern-
ments with constitutional constraints. Nationalism creates a strong central gov-
ernment. Madison's conception of nationalism would relegate the states to a type
of administrative (non-governmental) agency. Yarbrough, Federalism in the
Foundation and Preservation of the American Republic, in 6 PuBLiUs: THE JOUR-
NAL OF FEDERALISM 43, 45 (1976). There were others who would render the
states impotent at the drop of a hat. It is, however, a mistake to think that these
sentiments were universal. The Federalist leaders knew "that a union which
abolished the states would never win acceptance." Ranney, The Bases of Ameri-
can Federalism, 3 WM. & MARY L. REV. 416, 439 (1946).
In McCulloch, Marshall gave the federal government virtually unlimited
power in deciding upon the means to otherwise constitutionally permissible ends.
He now sought a vehicle for granting the federal government power to determine
ends not specified by the Constitution.
278. See F. FRANKFuRTER, supra note 277.
279. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
280. One reason why this is properly characterized as a revolutionary decision is the
simple fact that "when first confronted with the commerce clause, the Supreme
Court had to create doctrines without substantial guidance or restriction by previ-
ous discussion and analysis." F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 277, at 13-14. Marshall
used the occasion to restrict the authority of local legislatures. Id.
281. Indeed, 'Marshall's version of commerce was an importation; it did not corre-
spond to the accepted usage at the time the Constitution was adopted." R. BER-
GEE, FEDERALISM 124 (1987). Nor did Marshall's version of "commerce" conform
with other obvious authorities. Id. Such "terms of art" generally indicate a revo-
lutionary decision.
282. Intercourse among the states is one of the broadest possible interpretations of
"commerce." Such a broad interpretation is not required by the constitutional
text or the framers' intentions; neither is required by the structure or logic of the
Constitution. Similarly, the particular question in this case, whether commerce
entails navigation, was not decided by referring to the constitutional text or the
framers' original understanding of commerce clause. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND
THE COURT 166 (1960). The fundamental question concerning the scope of the
commerce clause is whether we are to form a strong national government. See Id.
283. Consider Marshall's words:
If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of congress, though
limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, is vested
in congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in
its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are
found in the constitution of the United States.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
In making this judgment Marshall rejected "the Tenth Amendment as an ac-
tive principle of limitation." F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 277, at 40. Marshall,
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Nowhere in the ratification process was this or any other instruc-
tion given concerning how the commerce clause was to be inter-
preted.28 4 Moreover, "[t]he Constitution itself ... does not articulate
the boundaries of this commerce power vested in Congress, particu-
larly when Congress has not spoken. Whether or not the commerce
power is exclusive or to what extent concurrent state regulation may
coexist is not textually demonstrable."285 No doubt, providing the fed-
eral government with the power to regulate commerce was a principal
reason for scrapping the Articles of Confederation and forging a new
constitution. 28 6 But this alone cannot account for Marshall's decl-
sion.28 7 If Marshall wanted to create a real balance between the states
as semi-independent sovereigns and a strong federal government,
there were alternatives to his decision in Gibbons. This was not, how-
ever, what Marshall wanted. 28 8 While apparently paying the requisite
homage to the distinction between regulating commerce among the
states and regulating intra-state commercial activity, in essence Mar-
shall's decision destroys this distinction.28 9
furthermore, "countered with his famous characterization of the powers of con-
gress, and of the commerce power in particular, as the possession of the unquali-
fied authority of a unitary sovereign." Id.
284. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 277, at 12.
285. P. HAY & R. ROTUNDA, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL SYsTEM: LEGAL INTEGRA-
TION IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 71 (1982).
286. More generally, the fundamental defect in the Articles of Confederation was that
the document did not create "a government at all, but rather the central agency
of an alliance." Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory between the Decla-
ration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30
AMER. HIST. REV. 511, 527 (1925). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 15. In other
words, its defect was that it was a compact among the states and not among the
people. For a list of the defects in the Articles of Confederation see Farrand, The
Federal Constitution and the Defects of The Confederation, 2 AMER. POL. SCI.
REV. 132, 14951 (1908). This is not to deny that even the Articles of Confederation
had "a rudimentary federal system." Levy, The Making of the Constitution in A
GRAND EXPERIMENT: THE CONsTrIUION AT 200: ESSAYS FROM THE DOUGLASS
ADAIR SYMPOSIA 1, 5 (J. Moore, Jr. & J. Murphy eds. 1987).
287. The commerce clause invited revolution. It was written of this provision that "[it
is remarkable ... that so important a clause should be so briefly expressed, and
leave so much to future determination." E. PRENTICE & J. EGAN, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 11 (1981).
288. Marshall was not alone in this desire. Alexander Hamilton believed "that the
state governments constituted so much unnecessary furniture for a strong na-
tional government." R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 111 (1983).
289. However, the concept of a federal government presumably not having general
police power requires such a distinction. Had Marshall wanted to, he could have
interpreted the commerce clause in such a way as to limit intrusion into state
sovereignty. The decision in this case no more follows from the commerce clause,
its intent, history, structure or logic than any other of Marshall's revolutionary
decisions. Remember, arguably, the original purpose behind the commerce
clause was merely to give Congress the power to prevent state trade barriers.
Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contempo-
rary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV., 432, 468-81 (1941); Epstein, The Proper Scope of
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In saying that the decision in this case does not follow from any
obvious legal authority, I am not asserting that it was a bad decision.2 0
In fact, it was vital to this nation's ultimate industrialization.2 9' Still,
it was a revolutionary decision based on pragmatic considerations. If it
was the correct decision, it was correct politically, not constitutionally,
that is, it was correct relative to a certain vision of nationhood. Of
course, any successful decision that becomes an integral part of our
national political culture may appear to be written in stone. It does
not follow, however, that at the time anyone could have predicted that
Marshall's pragmatic choice would succeed.292
5. The Failure of the Individual Rights Revolution: Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore
In Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,2 93 Marshall ended the series of
revolutions he began in Marbury. In this case, Marshall found that
the fifth amendment's prohibition on confiscating private property for
public use without just compensation did not apply to state govern-
ments. Marshall went further in his decision in concluding that none
of the first eight amendments applied to the states.294
While Marshall, in the revolutionary decisions discussed above,
reached out to secure sufficient power for the national government to
offset the power of the states, his aspirations dwindled when it came
to protecting individuals from the excesses of state government. Only
the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987)(arguing against the inaccuracy
of a broad interpretation of the commerce clause).
290. It is interesting to speculate on the legitimacy of the dormant commerce clause.
The dormant commerce clause maintains that even without federal legislation,
the commerce clause prohibits states regulating their own commercial activities
in a prejudicial fashion. Doesn't this constitute a mini-revolution? The alterna-
tive would be to say that where Congress does not speak, the commerce clause is
silent. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425
(1982).
291. Moreover, it can be argued that the decisions in McCulloch and Ogden were nec-
essary features of the counter-revolution culminating in the reversal of the Loch-
ner era in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). torwin, John Marsha;ll
Revolutionis4 Maigre Lui, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 9, 21-22 (1955).
292. Pragmatic decisions, consistent with fundamental values and social aspirations,
often appear to be historically inevitable. We must resist this appearance. His-
tory and familiarity give decisions that are far from inevitable the appearance of
inevitability. Remember, the commerce power could have been defined differ-
ently. Had Marshall interpreted the commerce clause differently, that different
interpretation would now appear inevitable. If we are ever to fully understand
the legal dimension of human behavior, we must begin to take cognizance of
these historical and psychological processes that encourage us to accept legal
doctrine.
293. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
294. The Court again examined this issue, finding that the Constitution does not pro-
tect a citizen's religious liberties from state interference. Permoli v. First Mun.,
44 U.S. 589 (1845).
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in the area of human rights did Marshall's belief in the effectiveness of
central power wane.2 95
I am not suggesting Marshall had no basis for his decision. Rather,
I am suggesting that there was also creditable evidence to support the
view that the Bill of Rights applied to the states.296 In such circum-
295. In contemporary discussions, it is taken as an article of faith that the Bill of
Rights was designed to limit the powers of the national government. With cer-
tain notable exceptions, the historical evidence, so the argument goes, over-
whelmingly supports Marshall's decision in Barron. However, not every
commentator shares this faith. Indeed, one writer contends that the historical
evidence goes against Marshall's decision in Barron. W. CROSSKEY, supra note
215, at 1066-76. But see Fairman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional
Limitations on State Governmental Authority, 21 U. CmI. L. REv. 40 (1953).
Crosskey's rejoinder appears in Crosley, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History, "
and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 1
(1954). Crosskey's point is that textualism supports Marshall's decision in Bar-
ron, but only regarding the first amendment and part of the seventh amendment.
The principles in the second through the eighth amendment apply to the states.
Admittedly, there is no explicit textual evidence that the Bill of Rights applies
to the states. However, this only means that if the Bill of Rights can restrict the
states, its authority to do so is implied. Since many of Marshall's revolutionary
decisions involve finding implied powers, why did he hesitate to find implied
rights?
If the Bill of Rights consists of such fundamentally important rights, it is im-
plausible to argue that the founders intended to restrict its application to the na-
tional government only? The Bill of Rights expresses the people's desire to
protect fundamental rights. They wanted protection from government, not just
from federal government.
The point here is that amendments II-VIII to the Constitution proscribe con-
duct that was "inherently evil." Consequently, "lt is ... utterly impossible to
suppose that, as to a single one of the matters the amendments cover, the true
intention of the First Congress was to create sole and exclusive state powers to do
the things forbidden." W. CRossKEY, supra note 215, at 1059.
Of course, the argument restricting the application of the Bill of Rights to the
federal government does not sanction state governments in violating the sub-
stance of these amendments. It merely says that a different vehicle for restrict-
ing the states must be found.
296. Consider the following clear statement of the principle:
I am, however, inclined to the opinion, that the article in question [the
fifth amendment's proscription of double jeopardy] does extend to all
judicial tribunals in the United States, whether constituted by the Con-
gress of the United States, or the states individually. The provision is
general in its nature, and unrestricted in its terms; and the sixth article
of the constitution declares, that the Constitution shall be the supreme
law of the land; and that the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding. These general and comprehensive expressions extend
the provisions of the constitution of the United States to every article
which is not confined, by the subject matter, to the national government,
and is equally applicable to the states.
People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. (N.Y.) 187, 200 (1920).
One early commentator argued that some amendments other than the first
apply:
to the state legislatures as well as that of the Union. The important prin-
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stances, when normal adjudication-adjudication based on traditional
authoritative devices-does not settle the issue either way, Marshall
could have effected a revolution concerning individual rights, which
would have been no more revolutionary than his other revolutionary
decisions. Instead, he mysteriously chose to stabilize his own revolu-
tionary efforts.
6. The Marshall Court
Part III of this Article has described the important constitutional
revolutions created by the Marshall Court. Each decision is revolu-
tionary because it did not follow directly from the Constitution's text,
intent, history, structure or logic. Moreover, each case could have eas-
ily been decided differently. Each decision is revolutionary because it
read into the Constitution a particular substantive political philoso-
phy,297 not a neutral or objective principle of constitutional law.2 98
Under the guise of constitutionalism, Marshall implicitly or explicitly
appealed to extrinsic political factors on which to base his decisions.2 99
In these cases, the Marshall Court blended a certain conception of
federalism 0o with formal constitutional provisions.30 1 The meaning
ciples contained in them are now incorporated by adoption into the in-
strument itself; they form parts of the declared rights of the people, of
which neither the state powers nor those of the Union can ever deprive
them.
W. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2D
124-25 (1829). See also Angell, Restrictions on State Power in Relation to Private
Property, 1 U. S. L. & INTELLIGENCE REv. 4,64 (1829); W. RAWLE, infra, at 119-43;
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.), 1 (1820); Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.), 235 (1819). For a discussion of these cases and of state court
opinions supporting the view that the provisions of the second through the eighth
amendment apply to state governments see R. SMITH, PUBLIc PRAYER AND THE
CONSTITUTION 137-44 (1987).
297. Marshall clearly sided with the Federalists against the Anti-Federalists in a
struggle that persists today over the proper role of government. It is not obvious
that the contemporary mind has the capacity to appreciate the fact that the inevi-
table Federalist victory was not, at the time, considered inevitable. See F. BROD-
ERICK, THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 59 (1964)(describing the battle over
ratification in Virginia).
298. Marshall was a dedicated Federalist, not a neutral, impartial judge. See C.
BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 109 (1962)(quoting Justice-
Story's view of Marshall).
299. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,353 (1827)(appealing to political phil-
osophical treatises to understand how the framers used certain political
concepts).
300. Marshall's version of federalism was much closer to a form of nationalism, the
latter being a unitary form of government, deriving its authority from the people
rather than a federation of states. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN
CONSTrTUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 299 (1970). The Marshall revolu-
tions can be characterized as comprised of decisions which created a stronger and
more pervasive national government. This must be considered revolutionary, for
both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists claimed that they disapproved of a na-
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of the Constitution regarding these provisions did not reside inher-
ently in its language. Rather, the Marshall Court placed it there in
order to advance a particular conception of a constitutional democ-
racy.3 02 No doubt Marshall claimed to be fulfilling the intentions of
the framers.3 03 Similarly, Marshall insisted that he was distinguishing
tional form of government. The Federalists denied that the Constitution created
a national government while the Anti-Federalists feared that it did. To pacify
some of these fears, Madison wrote:
The proposed constitution, therefore, even when tested by the rules laid
down by its antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal
constitution; but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not
national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the govern-
ment are drawn, it is partly federal, and partly national: in the operation
of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them again, it
is federal, not national; and finally in the authoritative mode of introduc-
ing amendments, it is neither wholly federal, nor wholly national.
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 195-96 (J. Madison)(M. Beloff ed. 1987).
Madison seemed unaware of the conceptual problems introduced by his hy-
brid conception of government. Unless one is able to coherently integrate feder-
alism and nationalism, the situation is rife for conflict and revolution. Unless we
are able to identify the hybrid under some coherent rubric, simply making a com-
pilation of the ways in which the government was federal and the ways in which
it was national, leads inevitably to usurpation by other political actors to achieve
one or the other. This "other polictical actor" could be the judicial branch. This
is precisely what John Marshall achieved in revolutionary fashion. But see Dia-
mond, Commentaries on The Federalist- The Federalist on Federalism" "Neither a
National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition of Both," 86 YALE L.J.
1273, 1281 (1977)(arguing that "[tihe Federalist's theory of federalism is not only
analytically superior to our contemporary approach in explaining the American
political system as originally devised, but that it also better illuminates the fed-
eral-national balance of the system as it has developed historically").
301. See Kahn, supra note 232.
302. Consider: "Marshall, according to received learning, consciously furthered the
political goals of the Federalist party, first, by stretching the Constitution's mean-
ing to increase national power at the expense of state power .... Nelson, The
Eighteenth Century Background of John Marshall's Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 893, 894 (1978).
303. Original intent discourse is a ritualized style of constitutional rhetoric that ac-
companies an independently derivable constitutional argument. It is a device for
announcing a constitutional conclusion, not deriving it. Whether they approved
or not, the founders surely knew that the original meaning of constitutional dis-
course would be altered. Consider.
What a metamorphosis would be produced in the code of law if all its
ancient phraseology were to be taken in its modern sense! And that the
language of our Constitution is already undergoing interpretations un-
known to its founders will, I believe, appear to all unbiased inquirers
into the history of its origin and adoption.
Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), quoted in 3 THE REC-
ORD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 464 (M. Farrand ed. 1966). See Powell,
The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent (Book Review), 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1513 (1987).
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constitutional law from politics.3 04 Even if this were a defensible dis-
tinction, drawing the distinction between law and politics is itself de-
termined by one's political philosophy.305 Neither Marshall, nor
anyone else, can permanently disguise the overwhelming political ele-
ments in constitutional law.306
D. Contemporary Revolutions
1. The Civil Rights Revolution: Brown v. Board of Education
In our own era, Brown v. Board of Education 307 (Brown I) is para-
digmatic of a revolutionary decision overturning precedent.308 Yet,
this was not merely the reversal of any precedent. It was the overrul-
ing of a foundational constitutional interpretation, an interpretation
that determined the meaning of the relevant provision throughout the
304. Bloch & Marcus, supra note 217, at 336.
Marshall's "rules of interpretation," for the most part, were rhetorical devices
for ensuring the legitimacy of his revolutionary decisions. These rhetorical de-
vices helped Marshall conceal the pragmatic nature of his decisions. Whether
disguised as a rhetorical device or an explicit appeal to extrinsic factors, Mar-
shall's decisions embodied a pragmatic strategy for achieving certain meritorious
political goals.
305. Id.
306. The Marshall period of revolutionary adjudication may indeed be unique. Its uni-
queness may be attributable to Marshall himself. Frankfurter described Mar-
shall's presence as follows:
Certainly he seized every opportunity to educate the country to a spa-
cious view of the Constitution, to accustom the public mind to broad na-
tional powers, and to restrict the old assertiveness of the states. He
imparted such a momentum to these views that it carried the Court in
his general direction beyond his own time.
F. FRANKFuRTER, supra note 277, at 44. Oliver Wendell Holmes described the
time of Marshall's Chief Justiceship as "perhaps the greatest place that was ever
filled by a judge." 0. HOLMES, supra note 242, at 270. Perhaps a modicum of
Marshall's success rests in the fact that American constitutionalism needed to be
created and Marshall reserved that job for himself.
One thing we can say with certainty is that the kind of revolutions occurring
during this period are not surprising. Anytime a freshly minted written docu-
ment is to function as positive law, revolutionary decisions will abound. These
decisions define the possible ways constitutional law will develop. There are
many different, unexplored possibilities to achieve this goal. For example, given
the appropriate interpretation of "high crimes and misdemeanors" what would
have prevented "Congress from using its power of impeachment to override the
President and the Supreme Court at will, on ordinary policy questions, whenever
a sufficiently numerous faction is so moved." SAVING THE REVOLUTION 5 (C. Kes-
ler ed. 1987).
307. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
308. It is hornbook law that Brown did not overrule Plessy, since the Court in Brown
was concerned with the special stigmatizing effects of segregation in education.
Despite such a literalist interpretation of Brown, one can safely say that Brown
and the several subsequent per curiam decisions successfully began to dismantle
segregation. See supra note 144.
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legal system. We must then determine how it is possible to overturn a
foundational constitutional decision. If the decision to be overturned
is law, what then is the constitutional basis of the new decision?09 On
the view presented here, there is no constitutional basis for such a
decision because the new decision is a constitutional revolution.310
Both conventionalistic and pragmatic theories of law allow for the
possibility of constitutional revolutions such as Brown I. According to
conventionalist theories, judges must decide cases according to well-
accepted legal paradigms. When such paradigms run out, a judge is
permitted to use his discretion.11 Pragmatism counsels judges to de-
309. We must guard against thinking that the Constitution's meaning is constant,
while only our conception of its meaning changes. L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at
1478 ("It was not the concept embodied in the equal protection clause that
changed between 1896 and 1954, but only our relevant perceptions and under-
standings."). On the contrary, Frankfurter wrote that "[ilt is not fair to say that
the South has always denied Negroes 'this constitutional right.' It was NOT a
constitutional right 'till May 17/54." SUPER CHIEF, supra note 181, at 108-09.
In Tribe's view, Brown was always the correct interpretation of the equal pro-
tection clause, despite the fact that constitutional practice declared the contrary.
Cf. C. BLAcK, LAW AS AN ART 6 (1978)(stating that "[i]f the Brown decision was
right, then it was right all along"). If we accept such a view, constitutional mean-
ings have a life of their own, independent of judicial practice. The problem with
such a view is that we have no clue as to how constitutional provisions acquire
their meaning. Are constitutional meanings eternal truths? If so, then whatever
the "true meaning" of the Constitution is, it need not have anything to do with
actual constitutional practice. Consequently, actual constitutional practice might
be totally wrong. Of course, it might be that whatever the true meaning of the
Constitution, it is read back into the Constitution despite Supreme Court deci-
sions. However, if that is so, then why even bother with the Constitution and
actual constitutional practice. Why not decide important "constitutional" ques-
tions in terms of abstract moral and political theory?
310. The source of the new principle is not contained in the Constitution or judicial
decisions. Instead, it is derived from critical cultural theory or abstract moral and
political theory.
It is important to note that the new principle is normative, even if empirical
factors are relevant to its justification. In Brown, social scientific evidence was
adduced to support the normative judgment that separate school facilities were
inherently unequal. For a discussion of the desirability of using social scientific
data upon which to base constitutional decisions see M. CoHEN, LAw AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER 380-81 (1933)("If, however, we recognize that courts are constantly
remaking the law, then it becomes of the utmost social importance that the law
should be made in accordance with the best available information, which it is the"
object of science to supply."); Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157-58,
167 (1955). C. Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Right-The Conse-
quences of Uncertainty, 6 J. L. & ED. 3 (1977)(arguing that legal judgments are
interpretive, not merely factual).
311. The term 'discretion' is ambiguous. A weak form of discretion simply means that
a judge must use judgment, ie., that there is no mechanical method of decision.
A stronger conception of discretion authorizes a judge to make a decision within
the parameters of certain standards, but the judge is the final authority in so
deciding. An even stronger conception of discretion permits the judge to decide
what standards he is to use to make such decisions. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING
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cide cases in accordance with the best overall moral and political deci-
sion. Consequently, pragmatism can explain Brown I. With respect to
both conventionalism and pragmatism,312 the decision in Brown I was
new law.3 13 In such cases, judges are clearly making, not merely ap-
plying already existent law.314
2. The Personal Autonomy Revolution: Griswold v. Connecticut
One of the most important and controversial constitutional revolu-
tions in the twentieth century has been the Court's creation of a gen-
eral constitutional right to privacy.315 Griswold v. Connecticut316 is
important both for the substantive right it created and for the method-
ology it instituted to find such a right.3 17 In this case,318 the Court
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 32-33 (1977). It is this sort of discretion that some is involved
in a constitutional revolutions. It is this sort of discretion that some conventional-
ist theories permit.
312. According to both theories, there is a clear distinction between what the law is
and what it ought to be. Minutes before the decision, the principle enunciated in
Brown was what the law ought to be, not what it was.
313. Just as Brown I was a progressive step into the future, the decision in Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), or Brown II - ordering desegregation "with
all the deliberate speed"-was a retrogressive step into the past. Charles Black
correctly observed that "[t]here was just exactly no reason, in 1955, for thinking it
would work better than an order to desegregate at once." Black, The Unfinished
Business of the Warren Cour, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3, 22 (1970).
Was Brown ITs remedy justified? Do we still think the solution in Brown II
was the only sensible route to take? If Brown II had more teeth, it is unclear that
we would have had the tortuous road to integration that ensued. Columbus Bd.
of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S.
526 (1979)(Dayton I1); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977)(Millihen II), Milli-
ken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973); Swann v. Charolotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Could a strong affirmative action rem-
edy have been the remedy called for in Brown II? Do we even know how to
answer questions of this kind? Does it make sense to say that had Brown II in-
cluded a significant affirmative action remedy, the United States might now be
well on its way to overcoming the vestiges of slavery?
314. See infra notes 388-417 and accompanying text.
315. By "general" I mean "a constitutional right of privacy divorced from the specific
privacy-oriented guarantees of the Bill of Rights." Posner, Privacy in the
Supreme Court, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 173, 197.
316. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
317. Consequently, the paradigm in this context tells us what kinds of facts generate
issues of privacy as well as the sort of methodology to use for discovering implicit
constitutional rights. Thus, Griswold is a paradigm for disposing of issues of con-
stitutional privacy as well as a paradigm or general methodology for discovering
rights.
Both the substantive and methodological paradigm in Griswold had a precur-
sor in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)(Douglas, J., dissenting), where Douglas
characterized the right of privacy as emanating "from the totality of the constitu-
tional scheme under which we live." Id. at 521.
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found a general right to privacy stemming from specific parts of con-
stitutional amendments. The Court appealed to a general principle of
privacy or personal autonomy which it thought grounded the particu-
lar privacy values contained in the Bill of Rights. It was necessary to
postulate this general right of privacy in order to achieve a coherent
conception of personal autonomy.319
No one denies that the Constitution explicitly recognizes specific
grants of privacy.320 The question arises whether these specific grants
are constitutionally sufficient to generate a general right of privacy.321
Since we can easily imagine a society which values only certain kinds
of privacy, we cannot insist that the Constitution includes a genera-
lized right to privacy unless it explicitly or implicitly says so.322 Con-
sequently, the substantive result as well as the methodology adopted
318. The principal precursors to the Griswold decision were: Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942)(invalidating, on equal protection grounds, a law permitting
sterilization for certain types of repeat offenders); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925)(invalidating a law requiring students to attend public schools);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)(invalidating a law requiring teaching only
English in grade schools).
319. The Court's unfortunate language states "that specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). This language is unfortunate be-
cause it is merely metaphorical. Without instructions for interpreting and
applying the metaphor, we have no way of determining precisely what the meth-
odology is. We know from the opinion that the right of privacy is derived, in
some manner, from the first eight amendments and not "independently on an
interpretation of the due process clause." Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Ema-
nations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 235,244 (1965). How this right derives from the particular amendments is
still a mystery. Constitutional revolutions creating innovative adjudicative strat-
egies for creating new substantive constitutional meaning must be based on more
than metaphor. See Henly, "Penumbra". The Roots of Legal Metaphor, 15 HAST.
CONsT. L.Q. 81, 96-99 (1987)(discussing some of the problems with "penumbra" as
a spatial metaphor).
320. Such specific rights of privacy are found in the first, third, fourth and fifth
amendments.
321. Sometimes this general right is referred to as "the right to be let alone," a right
that is "implicit in many of the provisions of the Constitution and in the philo-
sophical background out of which the Constitution was formulated." Griswold,
The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960). Consider this eloquent
statement of the right involved:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their be-
liefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They con-
ferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
322. Of course, in these circumstances, it is incumbent upon those asserting that the
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in Griswold are both revolutionary.32 3
The privacy cases provide us with a good example of revolutionary
and normal adjudication. The decision in Griswold functions as a con-
stitutional paradigm. As such, it determined the scope of the general
right to privacy. The period following Griswold was a period of
perfecting and refining the paradigm.3 24 This period was the initial
period of normal adjudication. Courts attempted to determine
whether and to what extent other constitutional problems, for exam-
ple, contraception among unmarried couples,3 25 abortion,3 26 family
living arrangements, 3 27 parental rights, 3 28 the right to marry,3 29 per-
sonal appearance, 330 the right to die331 and so forth, should be solved
according to the paradigm in Griswold.
In carrying out normal adjudication, the precise nature and desira-
bility of the paradigm might be questioned. Bowers v. Hardwick 332
and the recent abortion cases33 3 are examples of such a challenge to
the paradigm. When a paradigm continues to be questioned and modi-
fied, there is evidence that there is a continuing or impending crisis in
that area of law. If so, a revolution, or counter-revolution, is likely.
For example, anti-abortion advocates would like to overturn Roe.3 3 4
To achieve this, some seek to overturn the privacy cases or limit them
Constitution implies a general right to privacy to present a clear and demonstra-
ble theory of implication sufficient to justify such a conclusion.
323. One might query, "Why not just say that these decisions are wrong?" In my esti-
mation, if we take actual constitutional practice seriously, courts have been en-
gaging in revolutionary adjudication from the beginning of the republic. To say
these decisions are wrong is to invalidate large pieces of 200 years of constitu-
tional practice. There are compelling conceptual, as well as moral, reasons
against doing this.
324. If the paradigm cannot be perfected, refined and stabilized, it will be unable to
produce routine adjudication. Consequently, if the paradigm survives, adjudica-
tion in which it is involved will always be somewhat revolutionary.
325. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
326. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
327. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
328. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
329. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
330. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.
1972).
331. In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
332. 478 U.S. 186 (1986)(holding that private consensual homosexual sodomy is not
constitutionally protected).
333. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned
Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983)
334. It is not certain that even with a conservative Court, Roe v. Wade will be over-
turned. However, the process of chipping away at Roe has already begun. See
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). Moreover, the
more extreme anti-abortion advocates will not be satisfied with a decision deny-
ing that the constitutional right to privacy protects abortion. Instead, these advo-
cates urge the Court to outlaw abortion on the ground that it violates a fetal
person's due process right to life. A Court decision striking down Roe v. Wade
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to the facts of the case. 335 Typically, counter-revolutions can replace
the overturned paradigm with a diametrically opposed paradigm. This
occurred with regard to the paradigm in Lochner v. New York.336 The
Lochner paradigm could have been overturned by replacing the free-
dom to contract paradigm with a case-by-case consideration of eco-
nomic issues, sometimes yielding to the freedom to contract,
sometimes not. In fact, the Court chose a superior route by replacing
the Lochner paradigm with a comparatively weak form of review in
economic and social welfare matters.3 3 7 In this instance, it took a
revolution to reverse a revolution.
We now turn from the historical basis of the theory of constitu-
tional revolutions to an evaluation of some important objections to the
theory.
IV. THE CONTOURS OF THE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTIONS
Part IV of this Article examines several important objections to
the theory of constitutional revolutions. These are not the only inter-
esting objections to the theory. However, they are objections which
must be overcome if the theory is to survive initial scrutiny.
A. Objections to the Theory of Constitutional Revolutions
1. Macro and Micro Revolutions
One important feature of the theory of constitutional revolutions is
a distinction between macro and micro constitutional revolutions.
Macro revolutions are changes of paradigms in constitutional law;
whereas micro revolutions are changes within a paradigm. One might
raise the objection that if there are macro and micro revolutions, there
is really no qualitative distinction between revolutionary and normal
adjudication.338
This objection overlooks the fact that despite the existence of dif-
ferent degrees of revolutionary adjudication, there are also forms of
adjudication that have no revolutionary components. During normal
simply returns the decision to the legislatures, unless, of course, the Court en-
gages in revolutionary adjudication.
335. One concern over the possible appointment of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court
was his position that the Constitution did not protect a general right to privacy.
Critics were concerned that Bork would limit the privacy cases to their facts, and
not continue the important process of perfecting, refining and stabilizing the
revolution establishing a general right to privacy.
336. 198 U.S. 45 (1905)(holding that the freedom to contract was a constitutionally
protected right under the due process clause).
337. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel v. Par-
rish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
338. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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or routine adjudication, after a revolution has been stabilized, the par-
adigm alone determines the results of adjudication. More specifically,
pragmatic considerations exclusively determine the nature of a macro
revolution, while micro revolutions are generated by a joint appeal to
the paradigm and pragmatic factors.
However, the interlocutor can pursue this objection. If you con-
cede that there are different degrees of revolutionary adjudication,33 9
how are we to determine when a case involves revolutionary rather
than normal adjudication? All adjudication is both revolutionary and
normal to some degree.3 40 Consequently, the model employed by the
theory of constitutional revolutions, though pluralistic, is unitary after
all.
The existence of macro and micro revolutions or the fact that many
important constitutional decisions have revolutionary and normal as-
pects does not vitiate the importance of this distinction.3 4 ' There are
at least three reasons for this conclusion. First, most normal and all
routine adjudication have absolutely no revolutionary features at all.
Many decisions in federal appellate court are decisions that do not cre-
339. A constitutional revolution involves a change in the meaning of a constitutional
provision. This change need not be dramatic. Cf. ScIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS,
supra note 111, at 180-81.
340. This objection is similar to one lodged at Kuhn's distinction between revolution-
ary and normal science. Consider:
By 1965, he [Kuhn] was conceding that his first distinction between 'nor-
mal' and 'revolutionary' change in science might have been too sharply
drawn; but he was arguing, in reply, that scientific revolutions were in
fact, not less frequent, but more frequent than he had previously recog-
nized. His critics' objections had convinced him that the sciences are ex-
posed to profound conceptual changes ... continually. So he went on to
redescribe theoretical change in science as comprising an unending se-
quence of smaller revolutions or... 'micro-revolutions'. Every serious
theoretical change in science, even if less than a complete 'paradigm-
switch', now committed us to refashioning our concepts in a 'revolution-
ary' way.
Toulmin, supra note 125, at 114. The objection continues:
[A]ny scientific change whatever will normally have both something
'normal' and something 'revolutionary' about it. And, if this were indeed
all that Kuhn had ever meant by his use of the phrase 'scientific revolu-
tions', that choice of phrase was grossly misleading, for it simply dis-
guised a familiar (but atemporal) logical distinction in an irrelevantly
historical fancy dress. Rather than distinguishing two historical kinds of
scientific change, it merely indicated two logically distinct aspects of any
theoretical change in science.
Id. at 115.
341. A case may involve normal adjudication concerning one aspect and revolutionary
adjudication concerning others. For example, all cases involving judicial review
are instances of normal adjudication regarding their reviewability. The judicial
paradigm in this instance is pellucid. Consequently, Brown, a paradigm of revolu-
tionary adjudication regarding equal protection, is simultaneously an example of
normal adjudication regarding judicial review.
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ate law in any interesting way at all.342
Second, the notions of revolutionary and normal adjudication are
employed to explain the source of a constitutional principle. If the
principle has a revolutionary source, it is based on factors extrinsic to
constitutional law. If its source is normal, then it is based upon a con-
stitutional paradigm that was once revolutionary.
Although it adds complexity to the distinction between revolution-
ary and normal adjudication, the introduction of macro and micro rev-
olutions is still useful because it refines our conception of the source of
constitutional principles. In macro revolutions the source of constitu-
tional principles is extrinsic; while in micro revolutions the source is
usually intrinsic, although in some cases it is both intrinsic and extrin-
sic. Consequently, in micro revolutions we must identify two different
sources of the principle. Only if it were impossible to distinguish be-
tween the two different sources of constitutional principles would the
distinction between revolutionary and normal adjudication collapse.
Finally, we can tell the difference between revolutionary and nor-
mal adjudication by attempting to explain the decision in a new case
by an appeal to a constitutional paradigm. If we fail in such an at-
tempt, we know that there must be a pragmatic explanation for the
decision to be legitimate. If, however, the decision must be explained
by an appeal to a paradigm and pragmatic factors, we know that the
decision has both revolutionary and normal features.3 43 Certainly, it
may be controversial whether and to what extent a decision has revo-
lutionary and normal features. However, the existence of controversy
in a given case does not obviate the usefulness for the distinction.
2. Normative Imperatives and Descriptive Generalizations
The second important objection to the theory of constitutional rev-
olutions is that it conflates normative imperatives with descriptive
generalizations. The popular way of stating this objection is that the
theory of constitutional revolutions is guilty of deriving an "ought"
from an "is." Perhaps the theory is descriptively accurate, but that
does not have normative implications for how judges should decide
cases. An additional premise stating the normative element associated
with actual constitutional practice is required to supply the theory's
342. The Sixth Circuit, for example, has a procedural rule for deciding cases without
oral argument or opinion. Presumably, in cases of this sort there is a clear appli-
cation of a substantive rule to the facts of the particular case.
Of course, in one sense every application of a settled rule to a new fact situa-
tion gives us a greater understanding of the rule. However, this is entirely trivial;
the new application does not add to the theoretical or conceptual structure of the
rule and hence no change in the rule is involved.
343. Additionally, we know that the case represents a micro-revolutionary decision
involving a sub-paradigm.
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prescriptive force. Without such an additional premise, the objection
contends, the theory of constitutional revolutions is irrelevant to the
controversy over the correct constitutional methodology.
Several responses are in order here. First, if it is conceded that the
theory of constitutional revolutions captures constitutional practice,
then it is difficult to see how the critic can insist that it has no pre-
scriptive force.344 It will only be plausible to argue that actual practice
has no prescriptive force345 if there is a conclusive moral argument
against actual practice.3 4 6 What would such an argument involve?
Surely such an argument would not involve a direct appeal to the
practice itself. Instead, the critic must appeal to factors extrinsic to
the practice. In making such an appeal, the critic will justify his argu-
ment on pragmatic grounds. If he does so, he will be prescribing a
revolutionary change. Consequently, his argument denying the pre-
scriptive force of the theory of constitutional revolutions depends
upon this very prescriptive force for its apparent plausibility.
Second, the notions of progress, truth and so forth are defined in
terms of actual constitutional practice. If the theory of constitutional
revolutions adequately describes actual constitutional practice, these
epistemic notions are conceptually tied to practice, explicable only in
terms of the theory of constitutional revolutions.
More concretely, the theory of constitutional revolutions helps us
bring about the ordered benefits associated with pragmatism and con-
ventionalism. Permitting justices to make pragmatic choices, such as
in Marbury, enables the emergence of the federal judiciary as a viable
institution in our constitutional democracy. Without the inclination to
make such choices, that co-equal judicial branch will atrophy. Just as
stagnating capitalist enterprises do not survive, so too, vital democrati-
cally based political institutions require the ability to develop and
344. Prescriptive force refers to an exhortation to act according to a normative stan-
dard. See generally R. M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1963).
345. Actual practice has at least a modicum of prescriptive force, because it defines the
context for deliberating over constitutional change. Consequently, the fact that
some procedure is a part of actual constitutional practice means that procedure is
good, all things being equal.
346. What would we do in the following circumstances? Suppose we discovered incon-
trovertible evidence that the founders intended constitutional practice to be very
different than actual practice. Would that render 200 years of actual constitu-
tional practice unconstitutional or illegitimate? In a constitutional republic such
as ours, legitimacy must be defined in part in terms of actual practice, and, con-
cerning actual practice:
Constitutional adjudication is concerned with defining constitutional
provisions, many of which are broadly phrased and open ended and so do
not convey much meaning in their text alone. The Court has done this
ever since Marbury asserted and recognized the power of judicial review.
In establishing the meaning of the Constitution the Court has not recog-
nized any distinction between interpretive and noninterpretive review.
Sedler, supra note 202, at 115.
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grow. This must be an internal capacity, that is, a capacity that is de-
rived from the institution itself. Consequently, any vital judicial enter-
prise must have the internal capacity for growth and self-criticism.
Unfettered pragmatism precludes realizing the conventionalist
benefits of predictability and coordination. Consequently, once a
revolution occurs and is perfected, refined and stabilized, normal adju-
dication takes on a conventionalist dimension, thereby permitting us
to make economic and personal decisions in a stable environment. An
additional virtue of the theory of constitutional revolutions is that
these revolutions have a tendency to avoid violent political revolu-
tions.3 47 Furthermore, even conceding for the sake of argument that
revolutionary adjudication is absolutely illegitimate, whatever that
means, it is difficult to know how to return to the past.3 48 Finally, as
argued earlier, returning to the past itself requires constitutional
revolution.
3. Judicial Restraint and Judicial Activism
The theory of constitutional revolutions permits judicial activ-
ism.3 49 Indeed, it describes American constitutional practice as one
requiring judicial activism in order to explain the evolution of Ameri-
can constitutional practice. One traditional criticism of judicial activ-
ism is that activist judges fail in the primary judicial duty to find or
discover law, not to make it.350 This is a general legal imperative, but
347. H. BERmAN, LAw AND REVOLUTION 21 (1983).
348. One writer seriously considers the possibility of returning to the past. C. WOLFE,
THE RISE OF MODERN JuDIcIAL REVIEW (1986)(arguing that modern judicial re-
view is much more radical than traditional judicial review). This Article's salient
aim has been to demonstrate that this contention rests on a misconception of the
type of adjudication used by the Marshall Court. Marshall was as much of an
activist as any modern judge, although his concerns were different and now ap-
pear obvious to the contemporary observer.
349. Although the theory of constitutional revolutions does not vitiate the distinction
between judicial activism and judicial restraint, it forces us to reformulate the
distinction. Restrained judges will counsel caution in effecting revolutionary ad-
judication, while activist judges will insist upon turning more frequently to revo-
lutionary strategies. Moreover, the rhetoric must be restructured. It is no longer
possible to quarrel over whether judges are ever permitted to make law. History
has clearly and resoundingly answered this question affirmatively. Judges make
law in revolutionary adjudication and interpret the law in normal adjudication.
350. Consider Marshall's admonition:
Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When
they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a dis-
cretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and
when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial
power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the
judge, always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legisla-
ture; or, in other words, to the will of the law.
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 737, 773 (1824).
Marshall was a master at paying lip service to this creed, while simultaneously
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it assumes greater importance in constitutional adjudication. Since
federal judges are not elected, and therefore are not accountable as
are officials of the legislative and executive branches, judicial lawmak-
ing is unremittingly illegitimate.
According to the theory of constitutional revolutions, the distinc-
tion between restraint and activism, as a choice between mutually ex-
clusive alternatives, flies in the face of actual constitutional practice.
In fact, the evolution of constitutional law is cyclical and periodic. A
given period of revolutionary constitutional adjudication often begins
with judge-made law.351 The cycle continues with the first stage of
normal adjudication which attempts to spell out the paradigm in
terms of its intrinsic meaning as well as external pragmatic factors.
This stage of constitutional adjudication is one where micro revolu-
tions and sub-paradigms predominate. During this period, judges con-
tinue to make law, but now in terms of the accepted constitutional
paradigm and some pragmatic factors. During this period the reliance
on revolutionary methods decreases.3 52 Finally, when reliance on
pragmatic factors sufficiently declines or ceases, normal or routine ad-
judication predominates in which judges merely apply the law. In
these circumstances, the judge functions conventionally, seeking well-
accepted constitutional authorities upon which to base his decisions.
When he cannot find such conventions, it may be due to an impending
constitutional crisis.353 In that event, a judge must consider instituting
a revolutionary constitutional decision. Summarizing, the two lead-
ing theories, conventionalism and pragmatism, have a role to play in
effecting constitutional revolutions by infusing his conception of federalism into
the Constitution.
351. It is difficult to understand why this conclusion is so unpalatable. The common
law is largely judge-made law. M. SHnimo, CouRTs 28 (1981). Why doesn't this
raise problems of legitimacy and counter-majoritarianism? Perhaps the distinc-
tion is based on the relative ease with which an ordinary legislature can overrule
a common-law decision, while Congress can not always do so regarding a
Supreme Court decision. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism,: Its Allure and Im-
possibility, 53 fND. L.J. 399, 404 (1978). Of course, Congress can restrict the fed-
eral judiciary's appellate function in a particular kind of case, although it has
been reluctant to do so.
352. In one sense, the revolutionary structure of constitutional adjudication continues
during this period. It is true that there is an accepted paradigm, one that was
once itself the subject of a revolution; but unless the paradigm has a great deal of
intrinsic meaning, the post-revolutionary phase will continue to draw on extrinsic
pragmatic factors to determine the paradigm's precise nature. This clearly oc-
curred in the Griswold paradigm concerning the privacy cases.
353. A constitutional crisis does not occur every time a paradigm fails to provide an
answer to some pressing social question. However, when social forces stifle the
expression of a fundamental human right, judicial action is appropriate. See gen-
erally United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Singer, Catcher in
the Rye Jurisprudence, 35 RuTGERs L. REv. 275, 284 (1983)(suggesting that a
proper role for the court "require[s] the community to come to the aid of the
weak and disadvantaged").
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the dualistic dimension of constitutional adjudication. During consti-
tutional revolutions, pragmatism 354 is the fundamental judicial strat-
egy. During normal adjudication, especially routine adjudication,
conventionalist adjudication prevails.3 55
4. Revolutionary Adjudication and the Rule of Law
When a society is governed by the rule of law, it has an objective,
impartial and fair procedure for settling conflicts. When the rule of
law breaks down, the process for settling conflicts, if any, is subjective,
arbitrary and unjust. The importance of the rule of law in Anglo-
American history356 can be expressed in the following way. Any ac-
ceptable legal system must maintain the rule of law. Consequently,
preserving the rule of law is a constraint or condition of adequacy for
any theory of constitutional adjudication. Since the theory of constitu-
tional revolutions permits important decisions to evolve from factors
extrinsic to the Constitution or explicit constitutional practice, it fails
to preserve the rule of law and, therefore must fail as an adequate
constitutional theory.
More specifically, since the theory of constitutional revolutions
insists on the existence of two different approaches to constitutional
adjudication, it cannot preserve the virtues of predictability, stability
and coordination. Hence, according to the theory of constitutional rev-
olutions, a constitutional system need not preserve the rule of law.35 7
If true, the cogency of this argument admittedly defeats the theory. In
order to assess this argument, let's inquire further into the meaning of
the rule of law and attempt to determine why it is deemed so
important.
First, the rule of law must mean that decisions concerning a citi-
zen's rights and obligations must be predictable and not arbitrary. In
this way, there is no rule of law if your right to free speech is deter-
354. Remember the way I am using this term. Pragmatism need not entail consequen-
tialism or intuitionism. Natural law, contract theory or deontological ethics can
each function as a pragmatic legal theory in revolutionary adjudication.
355. In unsettled, normal adjudication, when the paradigm has not yet been perfected,
refined and stabilized, some combination of pragmatism and conventionalism pre-
dominates. An interesting question arises as to whether there is a principled
manner of expressing such a hybrid theory. In Part V of this Article, I consider
the possibility that coherence theories explain the evolution of constitutional law
in this type of constitutional adjudication.
356. A rough but useful conception of the rule of law informs us that laws cannot be
arbitrary; legal decisions must be public and rationally defensible. See I. HARDEN
& N. LEWIS, THE NOBLE LiE 302 (1986).
357. The argument here is that stability, predictability and coordination are also con-
ditions of adequacy that any acceptable legal system must exhibit. J. FIs, NATU-
RAL LAw AND NATuRAL RIGHTs 270 (1980)(describing the rule of law as "the
specific virtue of legal systems" consisting of certain formal conditions any ac-
ceptable legal system must meet).
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mined solely by what a particular individual, a king or a bureaucrat,
decides it to be. Second, there is no rule of law if law arbitrarily pro-
tects particular classes of people-the wealthy, whites or men for ex-
ample-but not for others. Third, there is no rule of law if there are
substantive laws but no procedural protections for implementing
them. Fourth, there is no rule of law if there are good substantive and
procedural laws but no one to enforce them or if those entrusted with
their enforcement are corrupt.
The theory of constitutional revolutions maintains the rule of law
in each of these instances. Furthermore, it promotes stability, predict-
ability, flexibility and coordination by revealing the existence of two
judicial rhythns, one permitting stability and predictability, while the
other flexibility and coordination. Moreover, it permits the Court to
respond to the urgent demand to recognize undeclared individual
rights that have developed as an integral part of our constitutional
scheme,35s or rights which exist in large part independently of any
system of positive law.359
358. In other words, there may exist undeclared rights that develop in certain cultural
circumstances and not others. For example, rights or entitlements to governmen-
tal financial assistance may be regarded as fundamental rights that have not yet
been declared to be constitutional rights. Such rights might not have developed
in a more libertarian society. Hence, they are non-positive rights that are still
relativistic.
359. There is a conceptual link between the theory of constitutional revolutions and
the ninth amendment, an amendment which insists that there are rights that
exist independently of the constitutional scheme and which makes possible revo-
lutions in the area of individual rights. Consider the following-
The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution is a basic statement of the
inherent natural rights of the individual. On its face this amendment
states that there are certain unenumerated rights that are retained by
the people. It is a mere assertion that while certain unenumerated rights
have been expressly protected by the Constitution, the reservation in the
Constitution should not be taken to deny or disparage any unenumer-
ated right which was not so apparently protected. Nothing could be
clearer than this statement. It is a declaration and recognition of individ-
ualism and inherent right, and such a declaration is nowhere else to be
found in the Constitution. Its absence elsewhere in the Constitution ac-
counts for its very presence in this Amendment.
B. PATrERSON, THE FoRGOrN NNu AMENDMENT 19 (1955).
According to Patterson, "inherent rights, whether enumerated in the Consti-
tution of the United States or not, are entitled to protection, not only against the
Federal Government, but also as against the government of the several states."
Id. at 38; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(Goldberg, J., concur-
ring)(indicating the existence of unenumerated rights); Barber, The Ninth
Amendment Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to Crack, 64 CHI.-KENT L. Rsv. 67
(1988)(arguing that the ninth amendment indicates that some natural rights are
justiciable). See also C. BLACK, DECISIONs ACCORDING TO LAw 44-48 and n.47
(1981); J. ELY, supra note 6, at 34-41; L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 774-75; Barber,
Whither Moral Realism in Constitutional Theory? A Reply to Professor McCon-
nell, 64 Cm.-KEaNT L. REV. 111 (1988); Massey, Federalism and Fundamental
Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HAST. L.J. 305 (1987)(arguing that there are
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5. Constitutionalism and Moral Principles
The final objection to be considered maintains that the theory of
constitutional revolutions consists of external principles for explaining
and justifying constitutional adjudication, thus failing to account for
the internal perspective so conspicuous of Anglo-American law.3 60
According to this objection, the relevant explanatory principles must
provide standards for constitutional actors to use in deciding cases, not
merely a social scientific methodology for describing constitutional
practice. Internal principles of constitutional adjudication show how
constitutional law depends upon coherent moral principles explaining
and justifying the practice. Any theory not preserving the importance
of coherence in constitutional adjudication fails as an explanatory and
justifactory theory of law. This is a significant challenge to any dual-
istic theory of constitutional adjudication. Consequently, we must ex-
plore this challenge in greater detail.
V. COHERENCE THEORY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS
A. The Structure of Coherence Theories
Coherence theories are committed to a unitary paradigm of consti-
tutional adjudication. In short, these theories contend that every con-
stitutional question can be resolved in terms of an appeal to principles
embedded in constitutional practice. According to such theories, a
judge should decide to seek general explanatory and justificatory prin-
ciples in order to determine the decision these principles imply for the
present case.361 Coherence theories favor decisions that follow from
and extend past decisions.362 In this Part, I examine two familiar at-
ninth amendment natural rights that can constitute a check on the federal gov-
ernment and even in a limited fashion against state government); Redlich, Are
there "Certain Rights... Retained by the People"? 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787, 804-05
(1962) (arguing that the purpose of the ninth amendment was to show that the
enumerated rights did not exhaust the rights retained by the people). But see
Caplan, The History and Meaning of the ninth amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223,
261 (1983)(arguing that the ninth amendment can neither be a check on federal
nor state legislation); Note, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment,
33 U. CHI. L. REv. 814 (1966)(arguing that the ninth amendment is not the source
of independent rights nor is it a means for protecting them). But see McConnell,
A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV 1989
(1988)(arguing against the justiciability of ninth amendment natural rights).
360. An internal attitude is the attitude of a participant in a rule-governed activity
such as a game. This attitude includes the concepts of reason and justification.
An external attitude is the attitude of an observer who is concerned with ade-
quately describing the regularity between two or more events. See supra note 37.
361. The principal coherence theories of constitutional adjudication can be found in
the works of Ronald Dworkin. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 3; L. TRIBE, supra
note 11; Fallon, supra note 11; Chang, supra note 11.
362. In the limiting context, a coherence theory dictates consistency with prior opin-
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tempts at establishing a coherence theory of constitutional adjudica-
tion. I conclude by examining a novel version of a coherence theory of
constitutional adjudication.
B. Coherence and Functionalism
One adopts a coherence theory when one insists that apparently
different cases can be subsumed under a general principle, thereby re-
quiring similar treatment. Because there is no relevant difference be-
tween homosexuality and heterosexuality, for example, advocates of
coherence theory insist on constitutionally protecting both. On such a
view, the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick 363 erred by not including con-
sensual homosexual sodomy under the constitutional protection of the
general right to privacy. One liberal argument3 6 4 contends that the
principle of privacy enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut 36-5 extends
to homosexuality.3 66 The enthusiasm for this conclusion is not dimin-
ished despite the privacy cases' explicit restriction of privacy to family,
marriage and procreation.36 7 Moreover, this enthusiasm does not
wane even in the face of the Court's explicit exclusion of homosexual
ions. A more complex conception of coherence requires us to derive our decision
from the scheme of explanatory and justificatory principles underlying the law.
Coherence theories may require that there be one super-principle from which all
subsidiary principles may be derived.
363. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
364. Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 34 N.Y. REV. BKS. 6-8 (Aug 13,1987); L. TRIBE,
supra note 11, at 1422.
365. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
366. One commentator contends that the source of the division of the Court in Hard-
wick was a commitment "to two incommensurable and incompatible systems of
fundamental values: classical liberalism and classical conservativism." Goldstein,
History, Homosexuality and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determi-
nants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1099 (1988). If so, the liberal
argument that the majority opinion commits a judicial mistake is erroneous.
Further, the liberal argument begs the question against the majority opinion.
367. Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961)(Harlan, J., dis-
senting), is taken by many to express the paradigm ultimately made law in Gris-
wold. Justice Harlan stated.
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual pow-
ers may be used and the legal and societal context in which children are
born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication,
and homosexual practices . . . confin[e] sexuality to lawful marriage,
[and] form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social
life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that
basis.
Further, Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold clearly states that the hold-
ing in this case "in no way interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual
promiscuity or misconduct." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99
(1965)(Goldberg, J., concurring). These remarks suggest clearly that the essen-
tial feature of the paradigm in the sexual privacy cases involves the family, mar-
riage and procreation.
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privacy from inclusion in the privacy paradigm.368 The liberal
argument insists upon a more general principle of independence from
state interference,369 or a constitutional value of the freedom of inti-
mate association3 70 which protects consenting adult homosexual
relations.371
The essential feature of the functionalist argument is that where
there is a constitutionally protected activity, such as heterosexual pri-
vacy, which is valued because of the role it plays in an individual's life,
then other activities playing the same role in someone's life must be
afforded the same protection. Many commentators argue that homo-
sexuality between consenting adults should be protected because ho-
mosexuality is a form of intimacy, self-definition or a central feature
of being a person. Consequently, barring some compelling justifica-
tion, the principle of privacy in such cases already extends to homo-
sexual privacy.
Professor Tribe eloquently states the functionalist argument.372
Tribe faults the Hardwick majority for misidentifying the state of the
law in this case. Tribe's first reason for this objection is that:
[t]he Hardwick majority's decision to cut off constitutional protection "at the
first convenient, if arbitrary boundary" drawn by prior cases is not only anti-
thetical to the genius of the common law, it also ignored the warning in Moore
v. East Cleveland, against "clos[ing] our eyes to the basic reasons why certain
rights... have been accorded shelter under the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause." As the dissenters pointed out, "we protect the decision
whether to marry precisely because marriage 'is an association that promotes
368. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961)(Harlan, J., dissenting); Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901
(1976); Lovisi v. Slayton 539 F.2d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 1976)(Craven, J., dissenting),
aff'g 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973).
369. R. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 377.
370. L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 1423; Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Associations, 89
YALE LJ. 624, 634 (1980). See also Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477
(1968) (characterizing privacy as necessary for love, friendship and trust).
371. Let me say at the outset that I agree with the liberal conclusion extending protec-
tion for consensual homosexual sodomy. My criticism of the liberal argument is
not with its conclusion. What I object to is the liberal insistence that this conclu-
sion captures the current state of the law as opposed to what the law should be.
Skepticism is appropriate, in my estimation, when we move from the concept of
what should be a right to what is a right. See, e.g., Richards, Sexual Autonomy
and Right to Privacy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 1006 (1979)(arguing that laws in-
structing us how to have sex, and with whom, are constitutionally invalid absent
a compelling moral justification).
Furthermore, we can avoid the issue of whether adopting a principle protect-
ing consensual homosexual sodomy constitutes sound constitutional practice. In-
stead, we could argue that even if homosexual privacy does not trigger strict
scrutiny, it is irrational in the extreme to criminalize such conduct. It is irra-
tional because the state can have no non-arbitrary goal in criminalizing this con-
duct. Of course, to achieve victory here, rational basis scrutiny must have some
teeth.
372. L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 1421-35.
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a way of life, not cause; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial social projects."' And we protect the family because
it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals, not because of a
preference for stereotypical households. The underlying value in those con-
texts, as in the Hardwick case, is protection for intimate human
associations.3 7
3
This passage raises important conceptual questions about the relation-
ship between a constitutional result and its justification. If the Court
itself fails to connect a particular justification with a constitutional re-
sult, what warrants anyone else in doing so? Why must anyone value
marriage for the reason Tribe does?374 Some people value marriage
because it is sanctioned by their religious beliefs. Must these religious
beliefs be characterized in terms of protection for intimate associa-
tions? Others value marriage because it contributes to the common
good.3 75 Still others value marriage for egoistic or narcissistic reasons.
Why is Tribe's characterization of the value of marriage necessarily
373. Id. at 1422-23. See D. RicHARDs, ToLERATION AND THE CONsTIrTrUON 280
(1986)(presenting a functionalist argument for extending constitutional protec-
tion to consensual sodomy). But see Grey, Eros & Civilization and the Burger
Court., LAw & CoNTEmP. PaoBs., No. 3 1980, at 83, 85 (arguing that Griswold
"contain[s] no hint of any endorsement of the sexual freedom of consenting
adults. Three of the concurring opinions expressly disavowed any notion that the
right of privacy... cast doubt on sex laws. The opinion for the Court... stressed
the ancient and sacred character of marriage as the basis for the decision").
374. Grey argues the Court's decisions in the privacy cases are "dedicated to the cause
of social stability through the reinforcement of traditional institutions and have
nothing to do with the sexual liberation of the individual .... Where the less
traditional values have been directly protected ... the decisions reflect ... the
stability-centered concerns of moderate conservative family and population pol-
icy." Grey, supra note 373, at 88, 90.
375. For example, it can be argued that "[i]mpermanent relationships that perform
some intimate or associational 'functions' cannot claim the same position as mar-
riage and kinship in ensuring a political structure that limits government, stabi-
lizes social patterns, and protects pluralistic liberty through the power of its own
relational permanency." Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship,
and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L.
REv. 463, 482 (1983). But see D. RICHARDs, supra note 373, at 277 ("[t]here is no
good reason to believe that the legitimacy of [sodomy] destabilizes social coopera-
tions").
I do not find persuasive the argument purporting to show that homosexuality
destabilizes. For one thing, even if marriage is important, why should we not
tolerate other kinds of sexual relations? Nevertheless, those opposing consensual
sodomy have a principled position, they simply have the wrong principle. That in
itself cannot show that they are wrong about the paradigm in the sexual privacy
cases. Similarly, the Supreme Court has described marriage as "the most impor-
tant relation in life" and "the foundation of the family and of society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress." Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1988). But see Note, Bowers v. Hardwick- The Right of Pri-
vacy-Only Within the Traditional Family?, 26 J. FAM. L. 373 (1987)(arguing
that the principle in the sexual privacy case has application broader than the
family).
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the right one? 376
One important feature of common-law systems is that there can be
an agreement on result without an agreement on justification. Thus,
everyone might agree that marriage is a fundamentally important
human institution without agreeing why this is so. Consequently, the
reason certain rights are accorded protection under the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause may differ from social group to social
group; yet all may agree on the result.
This distinction between result and justification is one salient dif-
ference between law and morality.377 If we agree on the propriety of a
particular law, we need not agree on the law's justification. However,
sharing an ethical system requires agreeing on the result and the justi-
fication. A legal system can be understood as those rules promul-
gated3 78 and endorsed by diverse moral systems, which are necessary
for social life to be stable and to flourish.379
376. Apparently, Tribe believes that a constitutional principle's level of generality is
determined mechanically. On the contrary, not only is there no mechanical pro-
cedure for determining the appropriate level of generality, there is no reliable
procedure at all.
Presently, the law is indeterminate regarding the level of generality of the
right to privacy. The law must "embrace" a decision to settle the matter. Survey
on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40
U. MIAMI L. REv. 521, 563 (1986). This shows a revolutionary element iin the pro-
cess of perfecting, refining and stabilizing a revolution.
377. This distinction does not necessarily presuppose a positivistic conception of law.
Indeed, this Article has attempted to show that neither conventionalism, pragma-
tism nor any other single jurisprudential theory can explain the different mo-
ments of constitutional adjudication.
There are fundamentally different sources of law. In revolutionary adjudica-
tion, morality is one of these sources. In such circumstances, it makes no sense to
say that the moral principle is already in the law, since, in revolutionary adjudica-
tion, all parties recognize that a new constitutional paradigm is being created.
Legal pragmatism helps us understand the nature of revolutionary adjudication,
while conventionalism helps us understand routine adjudication. Some combina-
tion of coherence and pragmatism is required to explain the period in which a
revolutionary paradigm is perfected, refined, and stabilized.
378. I take as a truism that for a rule of conduct to be a law it must be promulgated.
See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs 44 (arguing that municipal law derives
from the supreme power of the state); J. GRAY, TuE NATURE AND SOURCES OF
THE LAw 84 (2d ed. 1948)(arguing that courts create law); A. Ross, ON LAw AND
JUSTICE 101-02 (1974)(describing the degree of probability as the factor determin-
ing whether a source of law is law itself).
379. It is important to note that fundamental rights are always balanced against social
interests. However, to make the right of privacy unbounded as applying to inti-
macy or moral independence gives almost any activity a presumptive correctness.
Hafen, supra note 375, at 527 ("If the activity, regardless of what it is, is presumed
to be within the 'right of privacy' simply because it was carried out in seclusion or
in 'intimate' circumstances, a strong presumption against any social or state inter-
est is created before any real analysis ... takes place."). On the other hand, most
violent or otherwise obviously harmful activities will easily rebut the presump-
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Furthermore, even if you agree with Tribe's reasons for valuing
marriage,3 8 0 why does this make his conception the constitutional par-
adigm in the privacy cases?S81 Of course, we might say that the consti-
tutional paradigm in a series of cases is identical to the best moral
paradigm. In that case, we abandon the need for justifying our present
decision in terms of how well it fits prior case law. In other words, we
have given up a commitment to coherence as a condition of adequacy
for judicial decisions.382 Instead, we pragmatically seek the best prin-
tion. Other offensive, but harmless activities will be protected as perhaps they
should.
380. Tribe's model may be the appropriate moral paradigm without being the para-
digm referred to in the privacy cases.
381. A constitutional paradigm is a principle or set of rules for resolving constitutional
questions. The paradigm must be the product of formal constitutional statements
uttered by the appropriate actors (legislators or judges), so that people can rely
upon the paradigm, ordering their affairs accordingly. This does not mean that
there cannot be some dispute over the appropriate characterization of a constitu-
tional paradigm. What it does mean is that there is a distinction between what
the legal paradigm in a given area is, and the morally best paradigm. Legal para-
digms indicate the appropriateness of certain relations among individuals in a
political society. See J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURmPRUDENCE 60 (1913)(discuss-
ing the concept of positive law). Paradigms involve recognized procedures for
determining how to resolve legal conflicts. Finally, legal theory itself involves
the morality of actual legal pronouncements, their implications and operations.
However, this "morality of the law" is not identical to a correct moral theory.
There is no doubt that a legal paradigm must be clarified in terms of its logical
implications. However, it is misleading to describe what we do when we look for
these logical implications as:
the imaginative extension of the significations of laws and of other rele-
vant social phenomena to situations and areas in which no plaintiff in a
given contemporary society has perhaps as yet brought suit, or about
which possibly no member of a past society that is being studied is ever
known to have complained.
McBride, Towards a Phenomenology of Internutional Justice, in LAW, REASON
AND JusTIcE 137, 149 (G. Hughes ed. 1969).
The process McBride describes is a pragmatic, interpretive process that gives
new meaning to old laws. This is one principal way the law changes and evolves
towards a nobler moral vision. What we can't say of such a process is that it tells
us what the law is; instead it tells us what the law should be and what it is becom-
ing.
The fundamental question here is whether this process is a change in the law
or whether "the life of the law is a permanent striving to fulfill the practical
moral imperatives implicit in legal institutions and legal rules." MacCormick,
Jurisprudence and the Constitution, in 36 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 13, 28
(1983). Ultimately, this question is trivial if we permit every plausible moral and
political theory to be considered implicit in the law.
382. Suppose the best justifying theory required the paradigm in the privacy cases to
include the right of homosexuals to marry. Would we say that they had that right
all along? Would we say that this right was originally included in the sexual
privacy paradigm? Would we instead say that the sexual privacy paradigm must
be perfected and refined according to the best justifying theory so that it could
include marriage rights for homosexuals?
One should not interpret this dispute as merely verbal. It matters greatly how
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ciple for the future.
Pragmatic constitutional theory looks to the actual paradigm in a
constitutional practice and then determines how closely it conforms to
the best moral paradigm. If these paradigms are sufficiently close,
pragmatic theory interprets the legal paradigm to be identical to the
moral paradigm, thereby implying a new constitutional right. If the
moral paradigm does not fit the constitutional paradigm in this man-
ner, the moral paradigm will be rejected unless its attractiveness, as a
justification, compensates for its poor fit.383 In such circumstances,
pragmatic theory contends that the constitutional paradigm should be
transformed into a morally acceptable model. Consequently, whatever
restrictions case law places on the paradigm, a pragmatic solution will
conclude that the paradigm should be transformed to protect
homosexuality.38 4
Tribe believes that a concept more generalS85 than marriage, pro-
we characterize the development of a constitutional paradigm. Indeed, how we
characterize this issue is one way of distinguishing between liberal and radical
constitutional theory.
383. Lipkin, supra note 14, at 748 n.350.
384. Of course, there is another constitutional route to protecting homosexuals. If one
can establish that homosexuality is a suspect classification, heightened judicial
scrutiny is appropriate. In fact, such scrutiny probably would overturn legislation
involving classifications pertaining to homosexuality. Note, The Constitutional
Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classication, 98
HARv. L. REv. 1285,1297-1305 (1985). See also Wilkinson & White, Constitutional
Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 563, 590-600 (1977)(exam-
ining the state's interest in prohibiting homosexuality); Note, Droneburg v. Zec¢k-
Judicial Restraint or Judicial Prejudice?, 3 YALE L. & POL. REv. 245, 253-56
(1984). Even if the state has the right to criminalize homosexual sodomy, there is
no reason to suppose the case cannot be brought under the equal protection
clause. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Rela-
tionship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1161,1163
(1988).
385. Tribe argues that the decision in Hardwick is unprincipled. Tribe insists that
"the principles of private liberty endorsed by the Court since the 1920s can be
limited to the three contexts of marriage, family and procreation only by the
most arbitrary judicial fiat." L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 1430. He then cites col-
umnist George Will as partial support for this contention. In the footnote, Tribe
writes that "[e]ven such conservative commentators as George Will deemed the
Court's distinction between the sexual privacy at issue in Hardwick and that in-
volved in prior privacy rulings unprincipled." L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 1430
n.66. This erroneously suggests that Will believes, as does Tribe, that there is a
principle of sexual privacy that cannot be limited to heterosexual contexts. Noth-
ing could be further from the truth. See Will, What 'Right' To Be Let Alone?,
Washington Post, July 3,1986, at A23, col. 1. The critical term "unprincipled" can
be used in at least two ways. One sense makes it inconsistent to endorse the prin-
ciple of privacy in the privacy cases and to not side with the dissent in Hardwick.
Tribe uses this sense of the term "unprincipled." Another sense of "unprinci-
pled" refers to a commitment to a slippery slope. This is the sense of "unprinci-
pled" Will uses. Will contends that both the majority and the dissenting opinions
in Hardwick are unprincipled because once starting down the slippery slope of
[Vol. 68:701
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS
creation and family is the appropriate principle in the privacy cases.3 8 6
His argument maintains that there exists a general principle or funda-
mental value, namely, the right of intimate associations. However,
this argument presupposes a viable methodology for determining a
constitutional principle's appropriate degree of generality. In order to
understand Tribe's argument, he must describe and defend this meth-
odology in greater detail.387
Coherence theorists contend that an appeal to coherence is suffi-
cient to explain normal adjudication. If my argument concerning gen-
erality is correct, this contention is wrong. Coherence theories do not
sufficiently explain the period in which constitutional revolutions are
perfected and refined. In such periods, coherence and pragmatic fac-
tors must be jointly appealed in order to determine the constitutional
paradigm's appropriate degree of geierality. Undoubtedly, coherence
plays a predominant role in routine adjudication. However, routine
adjudication is conceptually the least important form of judicial rea-
soning for understanding the nature of the evolution of constitutional
law. Routine adjudication, though practically important, adds little
structure to a constitutional paradigm.
C. Coherence and Integrity
Professor Ronald Dworkin has refined and perfected an ingenious
coherence theory of law: law as integrity.38 8 According to Dworkin's
theory, a judicial decision must be grounded in the best explanatory
and justificatory interpretation of law in that area.38 9 One interpreta-
tion is better than another if it better fits actual practice and provides
a morally and politically superior justification of that practice.3 90
Hence, if two interpretations fit the privacy cases equally, but one is a
better justification, then the better justification prevails. The princi-
ple in Hardwick and a principle of "moral independence" protecting
consensual homosexual sodomy both fit the privacy cases equally.
However, since the second principle is a superior justification, it
privacy, there is no way to stop without concluding that almost every legitimate
government interest (for example, taxation, police power, conscription and so
forth) burdens the fundamental right of privacy. Thus, a principle of sexual pri-
vacy stopping at marriage and a principle excluding that homosexual sodomy are,
according to Will, equally unprincipled. Consequently, Tribe should not look for
comfort or support from George Will.
386. Some argue that the "privacy" involved in the sexual privacy cases is not privacy
at all, but is more like autonomy or freedom. Posner, supra note 315, at 195.
387. Lipkin, supra note 14, at 723-27.
388. R. DWOREnM, supra note 3.
389. I am merely simplifying Dworkin's theory for the purpose of argument.
390. Dworkin appears to believe that shared coherent moral principles exist that have
evolved as part of American constitutional practice. But see A. MACINTYRE, AF-
TERa VmTUE 37 (1981) (arguing that our society as a whole has no such principles).
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should be chosen as the principle governing constitutional questions of
privacy. The second principle is a superior justification because,
among other things, it is more general than the first principle.
Dworkin's argument is impressive. Unfortunately, it is subject to
the following objection. A principle having a perfect fit will always be
a better explanation than a principle having an imperfect fit but
whose justification is superior. Consider the following argument. A
perfect interpretation is one that fits the relevant case decisions and
only those decisions. An interpretation can be a poor fit because its fit
is too tight or too loose. A fit is too tight when it fails to explain the
relevant cases, while it is too loose when it explains the relevant cases
but includes an additional judicial principle not yet encountered. This
situation presents Dworkin with the following problem. If a principle,
P1, explains decisions 1-5, and P2 explains decisions 1-5, but yields a
new decision that is either explicitly rejected by the decisions in 1-5, or
about which 1-5 are silent, then on the dimension of fit, P2 is a poorer
fit than P1. However, on Dworkin's view, P2 is more general than P1
and therefore may be a better justification of 1-5 than P1. Conse-
quently, anytime a principle is preferable to an alternative based on
moral or political grounds, the principle is a poorer fit than that alter-
native. This objection insists that the very feature of a principle that
Dworkin exalts on the justificatory dimension-its greater general-
ity-renders the principle a poorer fit.
Certainly, Dworkin could reply that this objection is too mechani-
cal, presupposing that we can never accept a principle representing a
better justification but a poorer fit. In fact, we weigh the virtues of a
principle's fit and its justification to determine whether it is the best
interpretation. A better justification can compensate for a poorer fit.
Indeed, when one has a justificatory principle that is normatively at-
tractive, it can compensate for a minimal or non-existent fit. This re-
ply is precisely the move Dworkin should make, but it is a move that
makes law as integrity indistinguishable from pragmatism.
Dworkin insists that law as integrity can explain the decision in
Brown v. Board of Education.391 Furthermore, he insists that the ex-
391. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). According to Dworkin, law as integrity can explain the result
in Brown by appealing to a fundamental justificatory principle presupposed by
the structure of constitutional practice. Dworkin's appeal to these justificatory
principles does not explain the result in Brown. To explain this result, we need
to know how to determine which principles are included in the justificatory
scheme. By failing to do this, Dworkin is able to overlook that the foundational
decision in Plessy and years of legal and social practice based on Plessy endorsed
segregation. In not taking Plessy seriously, Dworkin appears to be appealing to a
conception of equality that is explicated in terms of what abstract justice dictates
independently of how constitutional practice actually operates. Perhaps this
should not be surprising. Dworkin has argued that prior to the Civil War, slavery
could be held unconstitutional on the ground that it conflicted with the justifica-
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planation he offers enables us to say that the "new" principle is al-
ready contained in constitutional practice.3 92 On his view, each sound
legal decision explains and justifies past legal practice.3 93 Conse-
quently, the principle in Brown-denying segregation--explains past
decisions and provides the best justification of equal protection law.3 94
This, however, is a very misleading description of the process of revo-
lutionary constitutional change.3 95 It is important to point out that
the principle in Brown could not explain past legal practice because
Plessy, a denial of Brown, controls that practice.39 6 Consequently,
tory scheme embedded in the structure of constitutional law. Dworkin, The Law
of the Slave-catchers, Times Literary Supp., December 5,1975, at 1437. In enter-
taining this argument, it becomes clear that Dworkin takes neither foundational
nor positive law seriously. See generally Fallon, supra note 11. See also Eis-
gruber, Justice Story, Slavery, and the Natural Law Foundations of American
Constitutionalism, 55 U. CH. L.-REv. 273, 325 (1988)(arguing that Dworkin fails
to "distinguish philosophy grounded in experience from philosophy that is specu-
lative, theoretical and visionary").
392. Of course, this contention rests upon what is included in "constitutional practice."
If everything that is relevant to and influences constitutional decisions is in-
cluded in constitutional practice such as social traditions, social science, moral
and political philosophy and so forth, then Dworkin is right. A principle revers-
ing constitutional paradigms or foundational constitutional decisions is already
part of constitutional practice. But this is a completely trivial result. If, on the
other hand, we define constitutional practice as the actual process of making judi-
cial decisions and the principles required to explain these decisions, then Dwor-
kin's contention is false.
393. Sometimes a judicial decision ratifies, so to speak, an already existent constitu-
tional practice. For example, it could be argued that "Carolene Products trans-
lated two centuries of constitutional practice into constitutional doctrine."
Nelson, The Eighteenth Century Constitution as a Basis for Protecting Personal
Liberty, in LmERTY AND ComummrrY: CoNsTITUrION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY
AMERIcAN REPuBLIc 50 (1987). Despite having a basis in constitutional practice, a
decision such as Carolene Products represents, perfects and makes explicit dispa-
rate pieces of American constitutionalism. As such, it has revolutionary implica-
tions for the future.
394. Dworkin's argument is that there exists a coherent structure underlying actual
practice, and the principles required to justify this structure yield the decision in
Brown. Dworkin's argument presupposes that constitutional law--equal protec-
tion law-forms a system, but nowhere does he provide an argument for this
questionable contention. A cursory inspection of constitutional law will reveal its
unsystematic nature. Cf. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in
LEGAL THEORY AND THE COMMON LAw 8, 24 (W. Twining ed. 1986)(describing
"the common law [as] more like a muddle than a system"). The fact that Dwor-
kin can point to coherent ideals of equality and liberty is insufficient to establish
American constitutionalism as systematic and coherent.
395. Lipkin, supra note 14, at 743-51. See also Bodenheimer, Law as Bridge Between
Ought and Is, 1 RATIo Jums 137, 148 (1988).
396. Plessy was an authoritative statement of what equal protection meant under the
Constitution. Brown changed the meaning of this provision. Such "[a]uth-
oritative interpretations of the text often create a new meaning for it, and the
original meaning... ceases to be the current meaning." Munzer & Nickle, supra
note 102, at 1045. This is precisely what occurred in Brown.
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Dworkin's theory which attempts to show that the decision in
Brown 3 97 was part of the law prior to the actual decision must fail.398
Under what circumstances would we say that a desegregation deci-
397. Dworkin argues that a principle permitting racial segregation may have been "ad-
equate when Plessy was decided." R. DwoRKiN, supra note 3, at 387. However,
this principle "is not adequate now, nor was it in 1954.... It gains little support
from ideals of political fairness. The American people would almost unanimously
have rejected it, even in 1954, as not faithful to their convictions about racial jus-
tice." Id. But see C. BLACK, supra note 309, at 6 (stating that in 1950 Plessy ap-
peared to be "quite a serious piece of work"). Furthermore, the attitude toward
blacks expressed in Plessy "predated the founding of the Republic and may even
have preceded slavery in England's North American colonies." C. LOFGREN, THE
PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 7 (1987).
I do not know what evidence Dworkin has to support this sanguine view, be-
cause it seems clearly false. In fact, as late as 1956, more than half the population
disapproved of integration. J. CASPER, THE PoLrIIcs OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 169
(1972). By 1963, probably as a result of Brown, almost two-thirds of the popula-
tion approved of school integration. Id. at 16-70. See also Tushnet, Book Review,
57 TEx. L. REV. 1295, 1303 (1979)(arguing that the significant Warren Court deci-
sions were not endorsed by local and probably not endorsed by national majori-
ties).
Besides, subsequent history during the civil rights movement seems to suggest
many Americans have no great commitment to real integration. Cornell, supra
note 46, at 1169 n.109. Look what happened in Yonkers in 1988 and 1989 where a
federal judge found the city council guilty of contempt for failing over the course
of 40 years to provide low-income housing. Such recalcitrance can only be ex-
plained in terms of negative stereotypes concerning blacks and poor people. In-
deed, stereotypes about blacks "serve a hegemonic function by perpetuating a
mythology about both blacks and whites even today, reinforcing an illusion of a
white community that cuts across ethnic, gender and class lines." Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment Transformation and Legitimation in Antidis-
crimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1371 (1988).
In 1954, Chief Justice Vinson himself was not ready to overrule PMessy. SUPER
CHIEF, supra note 181, at 74-75. Similarly, Justices Clark and Jackson were origi-
nally disinclined to outlaw segregation. Id. at 88-89. Justice Black did not believe
the South would have accepted integration. Id. at 118. It is also arguable whether
President Eisenhower ever believed that Brown had been decided correctly. In-
deed, President Eisenhower, referring to the South, told Warren: "These are not
bad people. All they are concerned about is to see that their sweet little girls are
not required to sit in school alongside some big black bucks." Id. at 112-13. See A.
BICKEL, supra note 6, at 265-66 (describing Eisenhower's lack of commitment to
the principle in Brown). What further evidence could we adduce as evidence
against Dworkin's contention?
One possible reply here is unilluminating. Dworkin might respond that the
law is not determined by polls; deeper moral and political convictions are in-
volved, but how do we know these deeper convictions? How are they related to
the pollster's evidence?
398. Dworkin must, in order to distinguish his theory from positivism, avoid describ-
ing the judicial decision in Brown as law as it should be. This would mean that
the law changed and that there was a new rule. Such a belief cannot be admitted
by Dworkin. But see Finnis, On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire, 6 LAw &
PHIL. 357, 376 (1987)(arguing that "Hercules' claim obscures the reality that con-
scientious judges do acknowledge that they are making new law, breaking new
ground ... by choice, a new commitment, not mere discovery and application").
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sion followed from Pessy? Suppose the Court in Brown chose not to
deny that separate but equal facilities were constitutionally protected.
Instead, "[i]t might have put flesh on Plessy's bones and insisted that
racially separate schools be truly equal."3 99 Call this imaginary case
"Brown Hypothetical" or "Brown H" for short. Would Brown H be
revolutionary or would it follow from the paradigm in Plessy? One
thing we can say for sure, a Dworkinian argument that Brown H was
already the law would be very persuasive.4 00 However, one can still
question whether Plessy and Brown H contain the same principle.
The argument against this conclusion would suggest that since Plessy
did not have teeth, a Plessy-like case having teeth represented a differ-
ent judicial paradigm. Regarding the practical implications this is cer-
tainly true,401 but the paradigm in Plessy and Brown H are the same.
The revolution in Brown H, if there was one, would be in the practical
results and the remedy.402 Conceptually or theoretically there would
be no revolution at all.403 Consequently, a Dworkinian argument
showing that the principle in Brown H was the same principle or judi-
cial paradigm as in Plessy could be successful.
But how can the principle in Brown follow from actual constitu-
tional practice if Plessy is to govern the law in the area of equal protec-
tion?404 The answer to this question is that it cannot.405 How can we
399. J. WnxNsoN, Il, FROM BROWN TO BAiE 25 (1979).
400. There are at least two possible reasons for being dissatisfied with Brown. First,
we are justifiably skeptical over whether separate facilities can ever be equal.
However, if they are "the same," we still feel that segregation is wrong. Perhaps
that is because part of the evil in segregation is that it violates freedom of associa-
tion. See Wechsler, supra note 25. But see Pollak, Racial Discrimination and
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 27, 29-30
(1959).
401. The practical implications would be either desegregation due to unequal facilities,
or continued segregation with facilities that were equal in all important ways, if
such a thing is possible.
402. This is not to disparage revolutions in practical results orlyremedies. Changes in
what the law sanctions often save a person's life, or frees him from jail or enables
him to be treated as an equal citizen.
403. This does not mean that no social or political revolution would occur, or that
these revolutions would have no benefits for blacks.
404. Suppose, following Corwin, we distinguish between a formal and material consti-
tution. The formal sense of the term "constitution" is the document itself, includ-
ing its amendments. E. CORWIN, COURT OvER CONsTrruTiON 86 (1938). The
material sense of constitution refers to:
a body of rules in accordance with which a government is organized and
operates; and in this sense "the Constitution of the United States" com-
prises a vastly extended system of legislation, customs, adjudications, of
which the constitutional document is, as it were, the nucleus, and into
which it tends ever to be absorbed.
Id. at 87.
Dworkin may then argue that the principle in Brown is contained in the mate-
rial constitution, though not the formal constitution. However, this would imply
that there is a fundamental conflict between these two senses of "constitution."
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take foundational constitutional decisions like'Plessy seriously if the
decision in that case does not govern equal protection law? Moreover,
if foundational constitutional cases like Plessy help determine what
the law is, as well as the underlying justificatory principles, then a
principle denying Plessy cannot be encompassed by these principles. 406
Dworkin might reply that the principle in Brown need not explain
actual decisions since the decisions based on Plessy were wrong. In-
stead, the principle in Brown reflects fundamental justificatory princi-
ples underlying constitutional law. Such principles are required to
justify the entire scheme of constitutional law. Brown is merely an
elaboration of this scheme, taking a justificatory principle and declar-
ing it to represent positive law.40 7
Why, in such a conflict should the material sense of the term prevail? Further-
more, even if we conclude that it should prevail, it must be conceded that such a
move involves a radical change in the formal constitution. Such a change can
only be explained in pragmatic terms. Nothing in the formal constitution
prompts such a change; indeed, the formal constitution is the main opposition to a
change of this sort.
405. Here, Dworkin might invoke an unfortunate distinction between a legal rule and
a legal principle. A legal rule has an all-or-nothing characteristic, whereas legal
principles are prima facie reasons which might have a certain degree of weight,
but which must be balanced against other values. With this distinction, Dworkin
can argue that the "separate but equal doctrine" in Plessy is a rule which conflicts
with a more fundamental principle of equality that is embedded in our constitu-
tional scheme and which is the basis for the rule in Brown. There are two
problems with this reply. First, it is unclear that this distinction is viable. Rules
are just unopposed principles. Second, what is the justification for insisting that
there is a principle of equality embedded in our constitutional system that is op-
posed to the "rule" in Plessy? If this is a justificatory principle, what is its justifi-
cation? Dworkin cannot say that this principle is required to justify actual
practice without begging the question. In fact, what Dworkin really means is that
this principle is required to justify the constitutional practice we would like to
have, not the practice we actually have.
406. Cf. Lipkin, supra note 14, at 746. There are two issues here. First, what is the
role of foundational constitutional decisions in determining actual practice? Sec-
ond, how does actual practice constrain the choice of justificatory principles? If
foundational constitutional decisions determine constitutional practice, then
Plessy, during its reign, determined the meaning of the equal protection clause.
Also, if justificatory principles must be consistent with actual practice, no justifi-
catory principle can deny Pessy.
407. On this view, there are unstated principles in our system of law that may have
force in a given situation. Consider Dworkin's words:
A principle like "no man may profit from his own wrong"... states a
reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular
decision. If a man has or is about to receive something, as a direct result
of something illegal he did to get it, then that is a reason which the law
will take into account in deciding whether he should keep it. There may
be other principles or policies arguing in the other direction.... If so, our
principle may not prevail, but that does not mean that it is not a princi-
ple in our legal system, because in the next case, when these contraven-
ing considerations are absent or less weighty, the principle may be
decisive. All that is meant, when we say a particular principle is a princi-
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There are several problems with this reply. First, one must show
that explicit provisions in the Constitution as well as judicial decisions
require the conclusion in Brown despite a foundational decision deny-
ing Brown.40s This alternative implies that we need not worry
whether the principle has any significant fit with actual practice. Un-
fortunately for Dworkin, such a view embraces pragmatism. 409
Second, if a scheme of principles posited to justify explicit constitu-
tional conventions need not reflect key constitutional provisions as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court, then what constrains the choice of
such principles? 410 The answer is that extrinsic factors, such as basic
ple of our law, is that the principle is one which officials must take into
account, if it is relevant, as a consideration inclining in one direction or
another.
Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cmi. L. REv. 14, 26 (1967).
Hence, the rule that Jones not receive the bounty in a given case is justified by
the application of the above principle. But see Tur, Positivism, Principles and
Rules, in PERSPECTIVES IN JURISPRUDENCE 42 (E. Atwool ed. 1977)(arguing
against Dworkin's distinction between principles and rules). Based on the above
account of principles, they function something like prima facie duties that pre-
sume a result given no other considerations override them. See generally W.
Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930). Still, two fundamental problems plague
this approach. First, how do we identify unenacted legal principles? Second, how
do we calculate the comparative weight of principles, rules, statutes and judicial
decisions?
Similarly, the view that equality precludes segregation may be a principle that
constrains our law. If so, then the principle in Brown fits past practice because it
fits the principle of equality that constrains the law. But how do we know that
there is such a constraining principle? Even if such a principle exists, how do we
know its content? If we do not require a serious fit with actual practice, then the
principle of equality is whatever the best moral and political theory says it is.
Consequently, socialist or other radical egalitarian conceptions of equality may fit
the bill. If we require a serious fit with actual practice, then it is difficult to see
how we can avoid the principle in Plessy.
Dworkin, of course, may argue that the principle of non-segregation is a prin-
ciple of law, while the rule in Plessy is merely a rule. Principles are more impor-
tant than rules; hence, the principle of non-segregation easily overrules the rule
in Plessy. But how do we distinguish rules and principles in this way? Why isn't
the rule in Plessy a principle?
408. The argument here is that a foundational constitutional decision must govern all
explicit constitutional norms as well as implicit and extra-constitutional norms.
See Grey, supra note 203, at 206 (arguing "that an enacted constitutional norm
takes hierarchical precedence over an unenacted norm where the two conflict").
In using the term "govern," I do not mean "forclose." Instead, I mean that, in
determining what the law is, we must appeal to foundational constitutional deci-
sions. If on the other hand, we are concerned with what the law should be, due to
a constitutional crisis, we may appeal to extrinsic factors.
409. Lipkin, supra note 14, at 742-51.
410. Here, Dworkin appears to be committed to a natural law conception. At one
point, Dworkin doesn't appear to view this as an objection to this theory. Dwor-
kin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 165 (1982). In this article,
Dworkin embraces a weak conception of the term "fit." A strong justificatory
principle can compensate for a weak fit. Such a relaxation of the "fit" require-
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cultural ideals, or abstract moral and political theory, constrain such a
choice. The scheme of justificatory principles reflects the best norma-
tive ideals we can conceive. However, this is a pragmatic result.
I do not assert that any scheme of justificatory principles can be a
candidate for the justification of American constitutional and political
order. Our history will, of course, rule out such normative ideals as a
theocracy or monarchy. Consequently, there is a minimal threshold
that a justificatory scheme must meet. However, within the spectrum
of principles taken seriously in American political life-from a liberta-
rian perspective on one end to a socialist perspective on the other-
any normative ideal that can carry the day becomes the best justifica-
tion of our constitutional practice, and therefore, the ideal should be
the law of the land.411
The problem with Dworkin's theory is that it attempts to integrate
the virtues of conventionalism and pragmatism into one unitary the-
ory. This is impossible if he wishes to retain the virtues of each the-
ory. According to conventionalism, the law is what the explicit
constitutional conventions say it is. The virtue of conventionalism is
that it guarantees that the legal system will be predictable and stable.
Pragmatism's virtue is its flexibility and its ability to incorporate ethi-
cal truths into constitutional law. Dworkin seeks a theory that com-
bines these virtues. The integrity of law seeks to combine actual legal
practice and the virtue of conventionalism, but it also seeks to capture
pragmatism's virtue by determining the best rule for the future. Ac-
cording to Dworkin, the best rule for the future will be the one im-
plied by the best normative principle.
Here is Dworkin's dilemma. He uses the concept of "fit" equivo-
cally. Should the new rule fit actual explicit practice, or should it fit
the normatively correct rule? The problem here can be appreciated
by reconsidering the privacy cases. One account of the principle in
these cases is that constitutional protection exists for matters involv-
ing marriage, procreation and the family. Call this conventionalist
principle C1. According to Dworkin, C1 is not the best interpretation
because a principle of moral independence explains the actual cases
almost as well as C1 and represents a better justification of the cases.
Call this second principle C2. Must the new principle presented in
deciding Hardwick fit C1 or C2. If it must fit C1, it is difficult to see
how we can ever get to C2. If, on the other hand, the principle in
ment does not help Dworkin explain Brown. In that case, the "fit" requirement
has a value of zero, something Dworkin's theory does not allow.
411. Keep in mind, in my view, this newly declared principle is now law. It was not
law when we started our inquiry. Even if a new rule is in some sense implicit in
the constitutional practice, there has still been a change in the law. N. MAc-
CORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 188 (1978)(arguing that "the
law is changed the moment after a great 'leading case' is decided from what it was
the moment before.").
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Hardwick must fit C2, Dworkin is completely correct in his view of
how Hardwick should have been decided. However, in this case,
Dworkin has abandoned the fit dimension. If the fit dimension cannot
support C2, then C2 must come from some other source. Does it come
from other parts of the legal system? If C2 comes from another
source, where does it come from? Furthermore, if it comes from other
parts of the legal system, how can it have justificatory force in due
process cases? There is one last possibility. The justificatory principle
doesn't find its source within the legal system at all. Instead, it is a
normative principle the truth of which is determined by natural law.
If this is Dworkin's solution, his theory has embraced naturalism.412
Dworkin's insistence that this type of naturalism is perfectly proper is
not an adequate substitute for an argument.4' 3
Dworkin contends that new rights flow from a background consti-
tutional theory. However, he never identifies the background consti-
tutional theory giving rise to these rights. Is it a relativistic
constitutional theory,4 1 4 a critical cultural theory415 or an abstract
moral and political theory?4' 6 If it is a relativistic constitutional the-
ory, then it must reflect the conception of equal protection stated in
Plessy. In that case, the background theory fails as a justification for
412. I do not consider this to be an objection to Dworkin's conclusion, but it is an
objection to his theory. A natural law theory need not be concerned with ex-
plaining an actual legal system. Indeed; naturalism's goal is to criticize actual
legal practice, not to defend it.
413. Dworkin scoffs at the criticism that law as integrity is "really two conceptions:
law as integrity supplemented, when integrity gives out, by some version of natu-
ral law theory." Dworkin's response to this concept is bewildering. Consider:
"This is not a very important objection; it only suggests a different way of report-
ing the conclusion it no longer challenges." R. DwoRKIN, supra note 3, at 263.
There are two reasons why Dworkin should take this objection more seri-
ously. First, it does not respond to those who believe that once integrity runs out,
judicial responsibility ends. More importantly, it signals caution in evaluating
Dworkin's theory. Dworkin ignores the fit dimension in Brown, suggesting that
the natural law component of his theory is at work at the level of fit. Hence, the
normative dimension infiltrates the fit dimension, thus making the two indistin-
guishable. See P. STEIN & J. SHAND, LEGAL VALUEs IN WESTERN SocIETY 49
(1974)('"Dworkin's argument depends on the existence of rights having an abso-
lute quality, rights which are independent of the law in the sense of rules enacted
by a legislature or recognized by a court."). Natural rights, for Dworkin, exist
despite the existence of contrary statutes or judicial decisions. Furthermore,
such rights exist independently of the Constitution. Hence, according to Dwor-
kin's naturalism, a judge need not be concerned with the fit dimension at all. In
other words, Dworkin's theory is a form of pragmatic naturalism.
414. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. The relativistic constitutional the-
ory is a theory that is derivative from the explicit constitutional conventions. See
supra note 75. One avenue for future research is whether the relativistic consti-
tutional theory can have content not contained in the explicit constitutional
conventions.
415. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
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legal practice. If it is a critical cultural or abstract moral and political
theory, then it justifies the cases but cannot explain them.417 Dwor-
kin's theory founders on the Scylla of explanation and the Charybdis
of justification. Whenever a foundational constitutional decision is
overturned, the same principle cannot both explain and justify the
reversal.
D. Constructive Coherence
Professor Richard Fallon introduces a theory of "constructive co-
herence," requiring judicial decisions to be based on the following fac-
tors: constitutional text, original intent, theory, precedent and moral
and political values.418 In the standard case, judges should seek coher-
ence--the same answer-from each factor in this hierarchy.419
Should one factor generate a dissonant result, the final decision must
be based on the dissonant result's place in the hierarchy.420 Presuma-
bly, if the text clearly rules out an answer, the interpretive process
ends. On the other hand, if the text endorses a particular decision or
at least is not inconsistent with that decision, a judge should move on
to the next factor in an attempt to achieve the same result as before.
In Brown, for example, Fallon argues that moral and political val-
ues infuse the other factors,42 1 permitting Plessy to be overruled.42 2
Fallon never states explicitly what "infusing value into other factors"
means. Presumably, value considerations "infuse" other categories
when moral and political values are so great as to compensate for a
dissonant result in one or more of the other factors. Fallon states that
"[i]n Brown, the value arguments that infused the categories of argu-
ments from text and of constitutional theory very arguably would
417. The point here is that it is difficult to see how a principle can explain actual
constitutional practice which, after all, includes the foundational decision in
Plessy, and not preclude the decision in Brown. As a foundational decision, Plessy
represents a condition of adequacy which must be satisfied by any acceptable ex-
planation of actual constitutional practice.
418. Fallon, supra note 11, at 1189-90.
419. Id. at 1193.
420. Id. at 1193-94.
421. Id. at 1280.
422. Presumably, the reason for this is twofold. First, precedent "stands close to the
bottom." Id. at 1279. See also Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C.L. REV. 367
(1988) (describing some of the uses of precedent and the relationship between pre-
cedent and other values). Cf. Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning
Prajudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 201 (1933)(arguing that
stare decisis applies only when we follow precedent for no other reason than that
it is precedent). Second, the concept of value infuses the other categories. Fallon,
supra note 11, at 1280. Since Fallon never tells us what it means to say "value
infuses the other categories" it is difficult to know how to evaluate this argument.
Perhaps an obvious reading is that "value" infuses other categories when the im-
portance of the value involved decreases the significance of its lack of coherence
with the other categories.
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have justified an overruling." 42 3 Here Fallon appears to be arguing
that when value considerations are predominant, the value category
improves the chance of generating the same result in other
categories.424
Insofar as values are extrinsic features of constitutional practice,
the theory of constitutional revolutions is consistent with the theory
of constructive coherence. Moreover, even if values are intrinsic to
constitutional practice, an explication of the process of overruling a
foundational constitutional decision in terms of constructive coher-
ence will take a pragmatic turn. A foundational constitutional deci-
sion should be overturned when the moral and political value of doing
so overrides retaining the decision.425
Indeed, in order for Fallon's theory to work, it must be restruc-
tured. In the normal case, each of Fallon's categories must be satisfied
in terms of the hierarchical structure. However, in revolutionary situ-
ations the hierarchy is ignored and replaced by a pragmatic argument.
Interestingly, like Dworkin's theory, Fallon's argument must be re-
constructed along the lines of the theory of constitutional revolutions
for it to successfully explain Brown and other constitutional revolu-
tions. What first appeared to be a theory of constitutional adjudication
having a unitary though pluralistic model, must now be reformulated
as a dualistic theory in order to explain constitutional revolutions.
Consequently, a coherence theory, like any unitary theory of constitu-
tional adjudication, must be rejected as an inaccurate explanation of
actual constitutional practice.
Constitutional pragmatism explains constitutional revolutions.
Pragmatism also provides a partial explanation of the first stage of
normal adjudication, the period in which a revolution is perfected and
refined. Despite the inadequacy of coherence theories in explaining
constitutional revolutions, they have some role to play during this
stage of adjudication. Conventionalist theory explains routine adjudi-
cation.42 6 Consequently, any constitutional theory attempting a uni-
423. Fallon, supra note 11, at 1280.
424. Fallon needs to describe in much greater detail the process involved here.
425. Whether we describe the situation as "value" infusing other categories, or the
weight of one factor overriding the dissonant results in the other categories, the
result is the same. Pragmatic considerations permit us to emphasize the impor-
tance of one category to the exclusion of the others. Such a process is entirely
consistent with the theory of constitutional revolutions. Indeed, conceptually
there is no way to distinguish between one factor infusing other categories and a
pragmatic argument concluding that one category is weightier than the others.
426. There are two different forms of coherence that need to be spelled out. "Macro
coherence" refers to the type of coherence employed when perfecting and refin-
ing a revolution; this is an appeal to general principles capturing the essential
value embedded in the revolutionary paradigm. Pragmatic factors are still rele-
vant at this stage.
"Micro coherence" or strict consistency with the paradigm may slightly mod-
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tary model of constitutional adjudication is inadequate. An adequate
constitutional theory must integrate the roles played by pragmatism,
conventionalism and coherence theory in constitutional adjudication.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to show that contemporary
constitutional jurisprudence rests on the mistaken assumption that
constitutional adjudication is a unitary activity. Conventionalists,
pragmatists and coherence theorists all make this mistake. The Arti-
cle shows that there are two different stages of constitutional adjudi-
cation: revolutionary adjudication and normal adjudication. Revo-
lutionary adjudication occurs when a foundational constitutional pro-
vision is given a new constitutional paradigm. Normal adjudication oc-
curs under the authority of the new constitutional paradigm. The first
stage of normal adjudication involves first refining and perfecting the
paradigm and then stabilizing its meaning. The second stage of nor-
mal adjudication involves the routine application of a stabilized para-
digm to the appropriate fact situations. Revolutionary adjudication
has only pragmatic authority; that is, it is explained and justified in
terms of factors extrinsic to constitutional law. The first stage of nor-
mal adjudication is explained in terms of both pragmatic and coher-
ence theories. Routine adjudication is explained in terms of
conventionalism. The theory of constitutional revolutions locates the
appropriate place of these traditional jurisprudential theories in the
continuing process of constitutional change.
ify or extend the paradigm. "Micro coherence" occurs in routine adjudication and
essentially embodies a conventionalist strategy for adjudicating cases.
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